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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
In this thesis, I explore the topic of new ventures’ network development as well as its 
antecedents and outcomes. Specifically, I address the following questions: a) Can 
entrepreneurs pursue new ventures’ network development processes and, if so, how? 
b) Do network development processes impact new venture performance and, if so, 
how and why? Before addressing these questions, this Chapter aims to integrate the 
studies included in this dissertation into the wider picture of entrepreneurship 
research. The Chapter begins with an outline of entrepreneurship research and new 
venture development. The focus is subsequently narrowed until, finally, I introduce 
my research questions. I will then address the questions in the studies described in 
Chapters four through six, which I conducted together with three different co-
researchers: Thorsten Semrau, Mark Ebers and Douglas Wegner. Prior versions of my 
studies have been presented at leading international conferences, such as the Academy 
of Management Meeting and the European Academy of Management Conference.  
Table 1.1 provides an overview of authors, datasets in use, and the current status of 
the different studies.  
Table 1.1: Overview of Studies 
1 Networking Ability and the Financial Performance of New Ventures: A Mediation Analysis among Younger and More-
Mature Firms 
 Thorsten Semrau 
Stefan Sigmund 
Structural Equation Modeling 
146 new ventures from Germany 
Forthcoming in Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Journal (SEJ) 
2 Networking Ability and the Financial Performance of New Ventures: Moderating Effects of Venture Size, Institutional 
Environment, and their Interaction 
 Stefan Sigmund 
Thorsten Semrau 
Douglas Wegner 
Moderated Regression Analysis 
283 new ventures from Germany and Brazil 
Forthcoming in Journal of Small Business 
Management (JSBM) 
3 Identity-Based vs. Calculative Ties: A Comparative Analysis of Their Impact on New Venture Financial Performance 
 Stefan Sigmund Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
156 new ventures from Germany 
Working paper 
4 Exploration and Exploitation in Network Development: How Ambidexterity Affects New Venture Performance 
 Mark Ebers 
Thorsten Semrau 
Stefan Sigmund 
Logistic Random Effects Panel Regression 
PSED II dataset 
Revise and Resubmit in Journal of Business 
Venturing (JBV) 
5 Contextual vs. Temporal Ambidexterity in Network Development: Which Provides the Better Pathway to Enhancing 
New Ventures’ Financial Performance? 
 Thorsten Semrau 
Stefan Sigmund 
Mark Ebers 
Logistic Random Effects Panel Regression 
PSED II dataset 
Working Paper 
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1.1. Entrepreneurship and New Ventures 
Scholars have frequently questioned, either implicitly or explicitly, why anyone 
should study entrepreneurship. The underlying theory is underdeveloped, data is 
difficult to collect, and many findings are similar to those in other research areas. In 
response, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) offer three good reasons for studying 
entrepreneurship. First, entrepreneurship is a mechanism that helps society achieve 
technical progress, as entrepreneurs convert technical information into products and 
services. Second, entrepreneurship is a mechanism that discovers and mitigates spatial 
as well as temporal inefficiencies in an economy. Third, as Schumpeter (1934) argues, 
entrepreneurially driven innovation drives change processes. As a result, business 
research without the study of entrepreneurship would be incomplete.  
The demarcation between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs has been 
discussed extensively in entrepreneurship research (Carland, Hoy, Boulton, & 
Carland, 1984; Gartner, 1985; Shaver & Scott, 1991). It has been argued that it is 
necessary to theoretically and empirically separate small businesses from 
entrepreneurial ventures by relying on the criterion of growth-orientation and 
innovativeness (Carland, Hoy, & Carland, 1988). However, it has been pointed out 
that such a narrow definition of entrepreneurship is associated with difficulties, such 
as assessing the level of innovativeness of services and products, or methods (Gartner, 
1988). As a result, scholars widely agree on the use of the criterion of new venture 
creation to delineate entrepreneurship research from other research disciplines 
(Aldrich, 1999; Shane, 2003; Vanderwerf & Brush, 1989). Therefore, I based my 
thesis on this general description of entrepreneurship research.  
The process of new venture creation has been examined by addressing 
behaviors or tasks that are associated with founding a venture. As a major 
contribution, authors have developed stage and phase models that describe new 
venture formation and subsequent growth. The process is generally described as 
having two major transitions––namely conception and firm birth (Reynolds, 2007; 
Wilken, 1979). The former is triggered when the founding individuals proceed from 
thinking about starting a new venture to engaging in activities that are directed at 
reaching the objective of founding; the latter begins when the nascent entrepreneur 
succeeds in actually creating a new venture (Aldrich, 1999; Carter, Gartner, & 
Reynolds, 1996; Reynolds, Carter, Gartner, & Greene, 2004). Even though the process 
does not appear to emerge in the linear and predictable manner of sequential steps 
(Liao, Welsch, & Tan, 2005), researchers widely agree that a certain set of activities, 
such as organizing a founding team and preparing a business plan, are typical for 
engaging in the founding process (Reynolds & Miller, 1992). The same is true 
regarding the second transition—firm birth has been associated with activities such as 
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registration of a legal entity or generating first sales (Reynolds, 2011). As described in 
the method sections of the following studies, I relied on this widespread classification 
when selecting new ventures for the empirical analyses. 
In terms of new venture development, researchers have also developed models of new 
venture growth. Greiner (1972) established a five phase model in which each phase 
characterizes specific management problems with which a new venture must cope in 
order to achieve continuous growth. Similarly, Churchill and Lewis (1983) describe 
five stages through which small companies pass while growing. Each stage is 
characterized by certain levels of business size, organizational goals, and a specific 
management style (Churchill & Lewis, 1983). Finally, Ruhnka and Young (1987) 
developed a process model of new venture development by analyzing the interview 
data of 73 U.S. venture capital firms. They identified five distinct stages of new 
venture development, each associated with specific risks and developmental goals 
(Ruhnka & Young, 1987). 
A question that has attracted considerable attention in entrepreneurship 
research over the last years asks: “Why are some entrepreneurs [and their new 
ventures] more successful than others in exploiting opportunities they have 
discovered?” (Baron & Markman, 2003:42). However, one should bear in mind that 
success and performance for new ventures is not the same as for established firms. 
Specifically, the conception of new venture performance comprises constructs such as 
survival, initial profitability, (initial) revenue, revenue growth, and employment 
growth (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992). The rationale for this deviant perception of 
venture performance is that, for newly founded ventures, outcomes such as continuous 
survival, revenue growth, and periods of initial profitability reflect important aspects 
of development as well as the potential to continuously succeed (Reynolds, 2011).  
When attempting to generate answers to the above mentioned question, 
scholars focus their efforts primarily on four interrelated dimensions: a) characteristics 
of the founder(s); b) the organization created; c) the process by which a new venture is 
developed; and d) the new venture environment. 
Recent research revealed that none of these factors alone can account for new 
venture success (Brush, Manolova, & Edelman, 2008; Frank, Lueger, & Korunka, 
2007; Korunka, Frank, Lueger, & Mugler, 2003; Song, Podoynitsyna, van der Bij, & 
Halman, 2008). Nevertheless, other studies have found that some factors partially 
explain new venture performance. In the following, I will briefly summarize the major 
findings. 
In terms of the characteristics of the individual(s) starting the new venture, 
research has attempted to explain differences in entrepreneurial outcomes by 
examining founders’ personalities and personal histories. Even though its value has 
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been frequently questioned, several studies following this approach confirmed that 
some psychological variables, such as risk taking propensity, internal locus of control, 
and confidence in one’s skills, are significantly associated with new venture 
performance (Rauch & Frese, 2007; Shaver & Scott, 1991; Walter & Walter, 2009). 
Another popular approach is to examine the influence of founders’ human capital. For 
example, several studies indicate that years of education, work experience, industry 
experience, and entrepreneurial experience foster new venture survival and growth 
(Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Colombo & Grilli, 2005).  
With regard to the association between organizational variables and new 
venture performance, aspects such as the strategic orientation and organizational 
structure have been found to be relevant. Specifically, results indicate that the 
technological strategy (Newbert, Kirchhoff, & Walsh, 2007) as well as strategic 
differences such as differentiation on quality versus cost leadership (Chandler & 
Hanks, 1994b) significantly influence the performance of new ventures. Furthermore, 
Meijaard, Brand, and Mosselman (2005) conclude that the performance of new 
ventures might be related to their organizational structure.  
Finally, researchers have also examined how certain environmental 
characteristics affect new venture performance. Specifically, studies examined how an 
association with institutions such as business incubators, science parks, and 
universities affect new venture performance (Aernoudt, 2004; Mian, 1997; Phan, 
Siegel, & Wright, 2005). Results indicate that technology transfer between ventures 
and universities is positively associated with new venture performance (Markman, 
Phan, Balkin, & Gianiodis, 2005). In a similar vein, results also indicate that new 
venture performance is influenced by new ventures’ networks (for recent overviews, 
see, e.g., Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Street & Cameron, 2007). The relevance of this 
factor for new venture success is described in the next section. 
 
1.2. New Ventures and Networks 
Approximately 25 years ago, research on networks in entrepreneurship emerged 
prominently. In 1986, Aldrich and Zimmer argued that every entrepreneur is 
embedded in a network that plays an important role for the development of a new 
venture. A network is defined as a set of individuals and organizations as well as the 
linkages between these actors (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Lechner, Dowling, & 
Welpe, 2006). 
The rationale given for the critical role of networks with regard to new venture 
success is simple: networks are seen as an avenue to acquire resources. More 
specifically, they potentially provide resources to better conditions than market 
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exchange or vertical integration (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004). 
Thus, networks are especially important for new ventures, which typically suffer from 
severe resource constraints (Aldrich, 1999; Batjargal, 2005; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; 
Steier & Greenwood, 1995). 
When examining the association between exchange networks, defined as the set 
of a new venture’s exchange relationships that goes beyond simple market exchange 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001), and new venture performance, 
researchers focus mostly on exchange network characteristics, such as size and the 
position, intensity, and quality of relationships. For instance, in a study based on a 
sample of Chinese entrepreneurs, Zhao and Aram (1995) found that the extensive use 
of networks distinguished high-growth from low-growth ventures. Likewise, among 
firms in Singapore, researchers found that venture growth is associated with the 
number of partners a venture can rely on (Lee & Tsang, 2001). 
Drawing on Burt’s structural hole argument (1992)—which suggests an 
advantage to occupying a bridging position within the network due to the increased 
likelihood of receiving resources sooner than others—studies revealed, for instance, 
that lower-density-networks (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999) and exchange partner 
heterogeneity (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000) are positively associated with 
competitiveness and new venture performance (as measured by revenues).  
With regard to relationship intensity and quality, the dichotomy of strong and 
weak ties has attracted considerable attention. A lasting debate about the relative value 
of strong versus weak ties has emerged (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). While several 
studies have underscored the value of weak ties (Batjargal, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; 
Ruef, 2002), a study conducted by Brüderl and Preisendorfer (1998) found that strong 
ties (as measured by self-reports of support from family and friends) were more 
critical to venture survival than weak ties (proxied as support from acquaintances). It 
is noteworthy that effects of networks and ties appear to vary with the outcome of 
focus. The above mentioned study by Brüderl and Preisendorfer (1998) studied effects 
of strong ties on venture survival and financial outcomes. They found stronger effects 
on survival, indicating that the effects associated with exchange network ties may not 
be equal across measures of new venture performance. In light of these findings, 
Hoang and Antoncic (2003) conclude that if, as Uzzi’s (1996, 1997) research seems to 
propose, ventures benefit from a mixture of different types of ties, then one must 
further investigate their respective outcomes. 
However, in terms of a resolution of the debate regarding strong and weak ties, 
a contingency approach might be valuable. For example, the founding stage of a new 
venture may influence the relevance of strong or weak exchange ties—a focus on 
strong ties might be more valuable during an early growth stage when such ties are in 
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place as reliable, low-cost links to critical resources (Starr & Macmillan, 1990). 
Indeed recent studies point to the fact that, in the course of a new venture’s 
development, the founders might have to adapt the venture’s exchange network 
according to changing resource needs in order to reach performance and growth 
targets (Hite, 2005; Hite & Hesterly, 2001).  
I will address the relevance of exchange network development processes for 
new ventures as well as its antecedents in following section. Furthermore, I will 
elaborate on the network development-related research questions addressed in this 
thesis.  
 
1.3. Network Development and Its Antecedents and Outcomes 
Recently, researchers have been called to view networks as a dynamic phenomenon. 
Thus, researchers should focus on exchange network development processes rather 
than an alleged static set of ties (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, Dodd, & Anderson, 
2008; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). Again, the reasoning underlying this notion is 
straightforward. In the course of a new venture’s development, the venture must cope 
with change (Churchill & Lewis, 1983). The network that was present when the 
venture was founded often may not be able to provide all the resources necessary 
during the venture’s progress. Therefore, new ventures must adapt their network 
according to the changing requirements, in order to be able to achieve growth and 
performance goals (Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Witt, 2004). 
In this manner, Hite and Hesterly (2001) and Larson and Starr (Larson & Starr, 
1993) bring forward two eminent conceptual studies concerning the process of 
network development. Larson and Starr (1993) argue that the entrepreneurial network 
develops through different stages, in which each stage involves adding, developing, 
and dropping ties. The ties that prove valuable are developed from one-dimensional 
dyadic exchange ties to a dense set of multidimensional and multilayered ties, thus 
increasing complexity. The authors suggest that the venture usually relies on ties with 
family and friends in early phases. However, mutual business interests eventually gain 
relevance, causing social and business relationships to overlap. The authors further 
argue that this evolution is driven by the entrepreneurs and shaped by their social 
context.  
In their more recent conceptualization, Hite and Hesterly (2001) argue that 
initial networks will be composed primarily of identity based ties that were already 
apparent before the venture was founded. As the firm develops the network changes 
and contains a growing number of exchange ties that are intentionally managed. Thus, 
Hite and Hesterly (2001) argue that the venture’s exchange network shifts from being 
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dominated by intense socially embedded ties that stem from a period prior to 
founding, to containing a mixture of identity-based and arm-length ties that have been 
added after the venture was founded. In other words, the network changes form being 
path-dependent to being intentionally managed. In terms of the consequences of this 
shift, Hite and Hesterly argue that both subgroups of ties fulfill different duties. While 
identity-based ties are essential in the emergence stage of the venture, the calculative 
ties are essential for new venture development.  
Therefore, both conceptualizations argue that the exchange network will be based on 
strong embedded ties in the beginning and will evolve in time. Although they are not 
necessarily contradictory, both studies have important differences. While Hite and 
Hesterly (2001) propose that economically motivated arm-length ties will be more 
dominant in later stages of venture development, Larson and Starr (1993) suggest that 
one-dimensional ties (either affective or economic) become multiplex, meaning that 
the friend becomes an investor and the investor a friend. While Hite and Hesterly 
(2001) suggest that networks become less dense over time, Larson and Starr argue that 
the network increases in density. 
Even though the topic of network development is considered a fruitful avenue 
for empirical research, neither the implications nor antecedents of performance are 
currently well understood (Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). However, there 
is some empirical literature that addresses new ventures’ exchange network 
development. Most contributes to understanding the process of network development 
by focusing either on the antecedents or outcomes of network development (Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003). In the following, I will summarize the key-findings.  
 
1.3.1. Antecedents of Network Development 
This group of studies focuses mostly on certain aspects of exchange network change, 
such as an increase of structural holes or the intensity of network change and 
prevalently analyzes the impact of prior network characteristics, firm characteristics, 
environmental conditions, and characteristics of the founder(s). 
Batjargal (2006) found in a survey study of 75 Russian entrepreneurs that the 
extent to which network development processes emerge depends on a) initial 
exchange network size and b) financial performance of previous years. Specifically, 
he found that the size of a new venture’s initial network reduces the changes in 
network size, diversity, strong ties, weak ties, and resourcefulness over time. 
Likewise, but even more astonishing, he found evidence that the extent to which 
changes in the exchange network occur is negatively influenced by the revenue the 
new venture gained in previous years. He explained his results with the tendency of 
actors to prefer well-known ties that generated revenue in the past, because they are 
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less costly and less risky. He also observed a declining number of strong ties in the 
networks of Russian entrepreneurs. However, one should keep the unique institutional 
and cultural context of Russia in mind when considering these results.  
Analyzing a panel data set of 209 public and private new ventures in the 
biotechnology industry in the U.S., Milanov and Fernhaber (2009) focused on the 
imprinting effect of a new venture’s initial alliance partner on the subsequent 
development of the new venture’s exchange network. Their results provide support for 
the notion that the conditions at founding and, specifically, the exchange network at 
founding affect the subsequent development of the new venture’s exchange network. 
In particular, they found evidence for a positive effect of the size and centrality of the 
new venture’s initial network on the subsequent size of the network at a later time. 
Additionally, organization characteristics such as the diversity of the founding 
team (Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007) and the number of patents held by a new 
venture (Colombo, Grilli, & Piva, 2006; Herneric, Fragg, Hommel, & Witt, 2008) 
have been found to be associated with the extension of the exchange network.  
In terms of environmental characteristics, a longitudinal study examining the 
effects on the intensity of exchange network development was conducted by 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) among the population of newly founded 
semiconductor firms. They found that difficult market conditions, such as markets 
with many competitors, and risky firm strategies, such as an innovative strategy, 
increased the rate of alliance formation. 
Other studies with this focus observed that new ventures extend their exchange 
network when they must cope with an uncertain technological environment 
(Steensma, Marino, & Weaver, 2000) or are affected by network externalities or 
industry standards (Ahuja, 2000).  
In their qualitative study of 44 nascent, novice, and habitual entrepreneurs, 
Mosey and Wright found that human capital in the form of prior business ownership 
experience of technology-based entrepreneurs increased the likelihood of building 
new exchange ties outside scientific communities, which resulted in broader networks 
with more structural holes. In addition, they concluded that entrepreneurs in early 
stages of venture development who had been educated in more cooperative 
environments such as engineering schools were also more likely to build new ties 
outside of their technology community. 
Likewise, the development of a firm’s exchange network has been found to be 
affected by entrepreneurs’ family background (Anderson & Miller, 2003) and their 
attitude towards networking (Neergaard & Madsen, 2004; Sorenson, Folker, & 
Brigham, 2008). 
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Another study conducted by Batjargal (2010) on 94 Chinese Entrepreneurs found 
evidence for an increasing number of structural holes as well as an increasing number 
of ties to venture capitalists over time, which was positively influenced by the 
networking skills of the entrepreneur. These findings indicate that network 
development might also be a function of individual skills. However, institutional, 
regulatory, and market immaturity in China should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting these results. 
Despite these findings, research regarding the antecedents of new ventures’ 
exchange network development is still underdeveloped (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; 
Street & Cameron, 2007). First, there are virtually no studies that analyze how the 
antecedents of network development affect new venture performance via influencing 
network structure. Second, there is a lack of research on how entrepreneurs and new 
ventures as strategic actors may actually influence the development of their exchange 
network (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). Third, there is still little knowledge regarding 
the contingencies of the association between network development and its 
antecedents, such as environmental characteristics. Finally, there is a lack of studies 
addressing the interplay between the macro level of exchange network development 
and the micro level of dyadic interaction (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).  
Chapters two and three of this thesis address these issues. The study presented 
in Chapter two analyzes how entrepreneurs’ individual networking abilities affects 
new venture financial performance by influencing the size and tie strength of new 
ventures’ exchange networks. In addition, the moderating impact of venture age on the 
hypothesized relationships is examined to shed light on the boundary conditions of the 
influence of entrepreneurs’ personal attributes on the formation of new ventures’ 
networks and performance. Extending the findings of the study presented in Chapter 
one, Chapter three analyzes the complex interaction between individual, 
organizational, and environmental variables. Specifically, we develop and test 
hypotheses on how venture size and institutional environment as well as their 
interaction affect the impact of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on new ventures’ 
financial performance. 
 
1.3.2. Outcomes of Network Development  
This approach models network development as an independent variable that 
influences new venture development. However, research on this topic, in general, and 
on the association between exchange network development and new venture 
performance, in particular, is still very sparse (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). The 
few results contributing to understanding this phenomenon are described in the 
following.  
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One of the first studies that empirically addressed the performance implications of 
network development was conducted by Maurer and Ebers (2006). Based on a 
comparative case analysis, the researchers examined how the evolution, organization, 
and configuration of entrepreneurs’ networks affect firm performance. Inter alia they 
conclude that the more successful ventures were able to reconfigure their exchange 
network according to evolving resource needs by adding new ties.  
Eisenhardt and Ozcan (2009) examined the development of high-performance 
networks. In their study, they examined longitudinal interviews of six rivaling new 
ventures and additional archival data. As a result, they describe different approaches 
that entrepreneurs follow in order to develop their network. Specifically, they found 
evidence that new ventures that form exchange ties to disconnect others, rather then 
using others as stepping stones, achieve greater firm performance. 
Lechner and Dowling (2003) focused on different types of exchange network 
ties (social, marketing, reputational, co-operative, etc.) and developed propositions 
concerning the benefits that these ties offer in different stages of venture development. 
In a large scale follow-up study (Lechner et al., 2006), they could partly confirm their 
argumentation.  
A notably study that addresses performance as an outcome of network 
development processes is a notable survey study conducted by Batjargal (2010) on 
Chinese and Russian new ventures. The author found that network structural holes 
negatively impact profit growth in early stages of new venture development.  
Although there are some studies that link network development to performance, 
research about how network development must be understood and managed to provide 
benefits to new ventures is extremely rare (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Consequently, 
neither the variation in new ventures’ networks characteristics nor the consequences 
of this variation are currently well understood. As a result, researchers are encouraged 
to further study network development as an independent variable while integrating 
new venture performance as a dependent variable (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). 
Moreover, there is a need to further examine how different approaches in exchange 
network development influence entrepreneurial outcomes (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009). Finally, as most quantitative studies analyzing network development processes 
focus on network size as a proxy for network development, clear empirical insights 
are still laking regarding ‘real’ network development in terms of its “two evolutionary 
primitives––the creation and dissolution of ties” (Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006, 
p. 721). 
Chapters four, five and six address these issues. The study presented in Chapter 
four analyzes the comparative performance effects associated with two different types 
of new ventures’ exchange relationships: identity based ties, which are based on 
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relationships that already existed before the new venture was founded, and calculative 
ties, which were developed after the new venture was established. The study 
empirically addresses the conceptual framework of Hite and Hesterly (2001), thus 
contributing to our understanding of the relevance of network development processes 
to new venture performance. 
The studies presented in Chapters five and six address continuous network 
development processes based on a longitudinal dataset. The study presented in 
Chapter five focuses on the performance implications of different ways in which new 
ventures can develop their exchange network over time. The proposition is that both 
exploration in network development (conceived as the formation of new exchange 
relationships) as well as exploitation in network development (conceived as a reliance 
on existing exchange relationships) positively influence new ventures’ performance, 
yet for different reasons. In addition, the study examines performance effects of the 
ambidextrous engagement in both activities. Chapter six presents a study that extends 
the findings of those presented in Chapter five. Specifically, the study comparatively 
analyzes two different strategies of realizing ambidexterity in network development. 
In particular, the study examines how contextually or temporally balancing 
exploration and exploitation in exchange network development affects new venture 
performance. Moreover, the moderating effect of environmental and network 
conditions as well as characteristics of the new venture is hypothesized and tested.  
The findings of both studies thus extend the literature on the performance 
implications of new ventures’ continuous network development by studying the 
outcomes of different network development activities and strategies over time.  
 
It is important to note that the studies in this thesis rely on different measures for new 
venture performance. While the studies in Chapters two, three, and four define new 
venture performance in terms of revenue, revenue growth, and profit growth, the 
studies presented in Chapters five and six employ profitability as proxy for new 
venture performance. 
Revenue measures are widely considered to be powerful indicators for new 
venture performance.  
Form a theoretical point of view, there is considerable agreement about the 
appropriateness of revenue figures as performance measures. As already indicated 
above, different studies conclude that generating a certain level as well as a certain 
growth rate of revenue is a major issue in the process of new venture development 
(Baron & Markman, 2003; Baum et al., 2000; Lechner et al., 2006). Additionally, it 
has been argued that even in comparison to more sophisticated measures, revenue is 
appropriate to apply, because very successful ventures often incur losses in early 
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stages of their development while gaining high revenue. In this manner, Brüderl and 
Preisendorfer (1998) found in an impressive large-scale study that revenue figures 
discriminate between more successful and less successful ventures in terms of 
survival.  
Additionally, different studies have underscored the validity and reliability of 
revenue measures. Examining different options to measure new venture performance 
Chandler and Hanks (1993) found that even self-reported revenue as well as revenue 
growth figures are of high external reliability and validity. Additionally, Brush and 
Vanderwerf (1992) demonstrate that revenue figures obtained from archival data and 
direct questioning of founders are highly correlated. 
Likewise, yet far less criticized, profitability has been shown to be a legitimate 
measure for new venture performance (see e.g. Sandberg & Hofer, 1987). 
However, the diversity of measures in my studies is due to the fact that the publicly 
available dataset of the latter two studies (PSED II) does not contain additional 
financial data other than the profitability as such (Reynolds, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the following: all the samples in the 
following studies rely on new ventures from various industries. However, while the 
studies presented in chapter two through four exclusively contain new ventures that 
have been founded independently, the studies presented in Chapters five and six also 
contain new ventures that have been founded on behalf of an employer. Again, this 
divergence is due to the conception of the PSED II dataset, as it contains a high share 
of dependently founded ventures. As a result, excluding them would have caused a 
significant decrease in the number of observations and thus of statistical power. 
Therefore, we included them and addressed this issue by controlling for the 
dependence/independence of the ventures when analyzing the PSED II data. However, 
even though slightly inconsistent with regard to this thesis, both approaches have been 
shown to be legitimate when studying new ventures (Parker, 2011; Vanderwerf & 
Brush, 1989). 
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Chapter 2 
 
Networking Ability and the Financial Performance of New 
Ventures: A Mediation Analysis among Younger and More-
Mature Firms 
 
2.1. Introduction 
One of the important questions that entrepreneurship research tries to answer, is why 
some entrepreneurs are more successful than others in founding and developing their 
new ventures (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1993; Markman & Baron, 2003; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). Several of the factors identified as being relevant for answering 
that question, such as personality traits, skills, and prior experiences are directly 
linked to the entrepreneurs themselves (see, for example, Baum & Locke, 2004; Frank 
et al., 2007). In contrast to the considerable knowledge generated on the relevance of 
person-related factors, however, our understanding of the processes and mechanisms 
through which these micro-level characteristics influence relevant macro-level 
measures, such as new venture performance, is still limited (Baron, 2007; Rauch & 
Frese, 2007; Zhao, Seibert, & Lumpkin, 2010). 
Another factor increasingly perceived as a key element in the discussion on 
entrepreneurs’ success is the network in which the new venture is embedded. 
Specifically, prior research has provided considerable evidence for the notion that 
certain characteristics of the new ventures’ network, such as its size and the quality of 
network relationships, may impact the success of a new venture (Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003; Jack, 2010; Street & Cameron, 2007). In addressing the relevance of networks 
in different stages of the new venture creation and development process, however, 
research has so far almost exclusively treated their characteristics as exogenous 
variables (Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). As a consequence, neither the variation in new 
ventures’ networks characteristics nor the antecedents of this variation are well 
understood so far (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). 
In order to shed more light on the micro-macro link in the field of 
entrepreneurship and to contribute to closing the aforementioned gaps in the literature, 
the present study connects the person-related and the network-focused streams of 
research. Specifically, we develop and test the hypotheses that entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability––an individual’s skill to easily develop friendships and coalitions 
by means of understanding power structures and the force of one’s typically subtle 
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style (Blass, Brouer, Perrewé, & Ferris, 2007; Ferris et al., 2005)––plays a significant 
role for new ventures’ financial performance, because it enables the development of a 
new venture’s network with more and stronger exchange relationships. In addition, we 
develop and test hypotheses about a moderating effect of venture age on the 
relationships between entrepreneurs’ networking ability, new ventures’ network 
characteristics, and their financial performance. 
Based on structural equation modeling (SEM) and a sample of 146 
entrepreneurs and their new ventures in Germany, our results provide broad support 
for our hypotheses. In particular, we find a significant relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking abilities and new ventures’ financial performance that is 
mediated by the size of the new venture’s network and the strength of network 
relationships among younger ventures, but not among more mature ones. 
In view of these findings, we think that our study contributes to enhancing the 
breadth and accuracy of current models of entrepreneurs’ success. In providing 
evidence for how entrepreneurs’ networking ability may influence new ventures’ 
financial performance by enabling them to shape parts of their social environments 
according to their new venture’s needs, our study first of all contributes to answering 
the under-investigated key question of how individual-level skills may impact macro-
level variables in the field (Baron, 2007; Rauch & Frese, 2007; Zhao et al., 2010). At 
the same time, our study also contributes to network research in entrepreneurship by 
pointing to entrepreneurs’ networking skills as one of the cognitive and behavioral 
foundations of new ventures’ networks, which have so far been widely neglected by 
empirical research (Baron, 2007; O'Donnell, Gilmore, Cummins, & Carson, 2001). 
Finally, we think that our results on the moderating effect of venture age, which 
complement and extend previous findings, contribute to answering questions about (a) 
the conditions affecting the relevance of entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics 
(Rauch & Frese, 2007), as well as about (b) the potential contingencies influencing the 
relationship between network characteristics and new ventures’ performance (Hoang 
& Antoncic, 2003). 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we develop 
our hypotheses. We then describe our research method, present the results of our 
analysis, and then discuss them. 
 
2.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Numerous studies demonstrate that variables related to the entrepreneur as a person 
are relevant for predicting the performance of their new ventures. Among the 
variables identified are personality characteristics, such as extraversion and emotional 
   
 
 
15
stability (Zhao et al., 2010), locus of control (Hansemark, 2003), need for 
achievement (Rauch & Frese, 2007), optimism (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009), and 
entrepreneurial passion (Baum & Locke, 2004); variables related to entrepreneurs’ 
experiences, such as general human capital (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Diochon, 
Menzies, & Gasse, 2008), experience in the industry of the new firm (Colombo & 
Grilli, 2005), and prior entrepreneurial experience (Colombo & Grilli, 2005); as well 
as certain socio-demographic variables like age (Lévesque & Minniti, 2006), gender 
(Brush, 1992; Langowitz & Minniti, 2007; Minniti, 2010), and migrant background 
(Baycan-Levent & Kundak, 2009; 2007). Additionally, recent research provides 
confirming evidence for a link between the social skills of entrepreneurs and their 
success in running and developing a new venture. In particular, Baron and Markman 
(2003) and Baron and Tang (2009) have shown that entrepreneurs’ social skills are 
significantly related to the financial performance of their new ventures.  
Despite this compelling evidence for the relevance of person-related factors, 
the value of the person-related stream of research in entrepreneurship has frequently 
been questioned (Frank et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2002; Rauch & Frese, 2007 p. 
353). A major critique is that there are few studies to date that conceptualize and at the 
same time empirically address the processes and mechanisms explaining how person-
related factors may exert their influence on the performance of new ventures, and an 
even greater dearth of research addressing the complex interplay of entrepreneurs’ 
characteristics and organizational as well as environmental variables (Baron, 2007; 
Korunka, Frank, Lueger, & Mugler, 2003; Rauch & Frese, 2007). To help close this 
gap in research, we develop and later test hypotheses on how and under which 
conditions entrepreneurs’ networking ability––an individual skill––affects the 
financial performance of new ventures––a macro-level variable. 
 
2.2.1. Networking Ability and a New Venture’s Financial Performance  
As noted above, networking ability describes an individual’s skill to easily develop 
friendships and coalitions by means of understanding power structures and the force 
of one’s typically subtle style (Blass et al., 2007; Ferris et al., 2005). It is considered 
to be ‘the core’ (Blass et al., 2007: 93) or the ‘most important [dimension]’ (Todd, 
Harris, Harris, & Wheeler, 2009: 287) of the political skill concept. 
Similar to social skills, political skills have their roots in the concept of 
interpersonal intelligence (Hochwarter et al., 2007). According to theorists, however, 
there is also a significant difference between the two concepts. Whereas social skills 
are considered to be ‘general skills affecting social interactions in a broad array of 
everyday contexts’ (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, & Ammeter, 2004: 312) 
and defined as ‘skills useful to individuals in interacting with others’ (Baron & Tang, 
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2009: 282), political skills are conceptualized as being more strictly ‘work-related’ 
(Kolodinsky, Treadway, & Ferris, 2007: 1748) and more ‘instrumental’ (Hochwarter 
et al., 2007: 229) or ‘goal-oriented’ (Ferris et al., 2008: 750). Correspondingly, 
political skills are defined as the ability to ‘influence others to act in ways that 
enhance one’s personal or organizational objectives’ (Todd et al., 2009: 180), and 
people with distinct networking abilities are considered to be good at using the social 
influence strategies and tactics necessary to develop, maintain, and mobilize powerful 
alliances and coalitions in order to achieve their personal objectives (Ferris et al., 
2005; Hochwarter et al., 2007; Peled, 2000). As an important dimension of the 
political skills concept, networking ability has empirically not only been found to 
positively influence job performance (Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006) and income 
(Ferris et al., 2008; Wolff & Moser, 2009), but has also been observed to have 
significant incremental validity in predicting career outcomes over several other 
social-effectiveness constructs (Semadar et al., 2006; Todd et al., 2009).  
Based on these observations, we expect an individual’s networking ability to 
not only have a positive impact in the context of larger organizations but also in an 
entrepreneurial one. Specifically, we expect that the financial performance of new 
ventures will be positively influenced by entrepreneurs’ networking abilities. For the 
development of a newly established business, many different tasks have to be 
accomplished and diverse tangible and intangible assets such as financial capital, legal 
and market knowledge, and many others are needed (Ensley, Pearson, & Amason, 
2002; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). Since not all of the resources needed are 
typically available within a new venture in sufficient quality or quantity, it is widely 
recognized that external resource support is needed for successfully developing a new 
firm (Jarillo, 1989; Larson, 1992). Additionally, researchers have observed that, even 
when the venture grows, entrepreneurs are the ones primarily responsible for securing 
access to the external resources needed by means of dealing with external partners 
(Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Starr & Macmillan, 1990). 
In view of these findings and the fact that networking ability is considered to be 
a key skill in building and using relationships and coalitions to achieve one’s personal 
objectives (Blass et al., 2007; Ferris et al., 2008), we expect the networking ability of 
entrepreneurs to have a significant impact on the financial performance of their new 
ventures. Consequently, we propose: 
 
H1. Entrepreneurs’ networking ability has a positive impact on the financial 
performance of their new ventures. 
 
   
 
 
17
2.2.2. Characteristics of a New Ventures’ Network as a Mediator 
In general, there are several possibilities for how entrepreneurs’ ability to build and 
use stronger bonds and coalitions may positively impact the performance of a new 
venture. First, it could help entrepreneurs to form an effective founding team. Second, 
a high level of networking ability could enable entrepreneurs to acquire customers. 
Third, it could help entrepreneurs to establish an external, firm-level network of 
exchange relationships that may contribute to their new ventures’ success. 
In the present paper, we focus on the last of these potential explanations and 
analyze in more detail how entrepreneurs’ networking ability may impact the financial 
performance of their new ventures by potentially affecting the characteristics of their 
new ventures’ networks. We do so for two reasons: First, a still-growing body of 
research in the field of entrepreneurship suggests that a new venture’s network––
defined as the set of a new venture’s exchange relationships that goes beyond simple 
market exchange (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lee et al., 2001)––is crucial for success in 
founding and developing a new business (see, for example, Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; 
Street & Cameron, 2007). Second, Batjargal (2010b) has provided some initial 
evidence for a link between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ 
networks by showing that entrepreneurs skilled in networking are able to attract a 
greater number of institutional investors than their less-skilled counterparts.  
Based on these previous findings, we subsequently develop detailed hypotheses 
on how the potential influence of entrepreneurs’ networking abilities on a new 
venture’s financial performance may be mediated by (a) the size of the new venture’s 
network, and (b) the strength of the new venture’s network relationships. We focus on 
these two network variables for several reasons: First of all, network size and 
relationship intensity are two variables that prominently represent the relational and 
the structural camp into which network research in entrepreneurship may be broadly 
divided (see, for example, Granovetter, 1992; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; 
O'Donnell et al., 2001). Secondly, a growing number of studies indicate that these two 
particular variables contribute significantly to explaining new ventures’ performance 
when addressing active firm-level exchange relationships (see, for example, Baum et 
al., 2000; Raz & Gloor, 2007). Finally, addressing these two network variables seems 
to be especially fruitful in the study at hand, since Ferris et al. (2005: 129) claim that 
individuals with a distinct networking ability are especially good at building ‘strong, 
beneficial alliances and coalitions’. 
 
2.2.2.1. New Ventures’ Network Size as a Mediator 
As noted above, we focus on the new ventures’ network, defined as the set of 
exchange relationships of the firm that go beyond simple market exchange (Hite & 
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Hesterly, 2001; Lee et al., 2001; Oczan & Eisenhardt, 2009). As a still-growing body 
of research in the field of entrepreneurship suggests, such network relationships are 
important for developing a new business (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Street & Cameron, 
2007). Specifically, research indicates that such relationships are beneficial for 
entrepreneurs because they provide access to tangible and intangible resources, such 
as relevant information, expertise, complementary physical assets, and even financial 
capital at favorable terms (Batjargal, 2003; Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Baum et al., 2000; 
Liao & Welsch, 2005). In particular, network relationships are expected to provide 
these resources at much better exchange terms than traditional market exchanges on 
the one hand and enable entrepreneurs to avoid the capital investments and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies that come with vertical integration on the other (Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001; Larson, 1992).  
The size of a new venture’s network refers to a structural level of analysis and 
focuses on the extent of existing network relationships (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 
1992; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). In general, the expectation that exchange 
network size has a positive impact on new venture performance is based on the fact 
that larger networks are made up of more network partners who in sum may provide 
more resources at favorable terms (Lee & Tsang, 2001). Moreover, a larger network is 
also expected to increase the variety of resources available, making it more likely that 
new ventures will be provided with the resources needed (Batjargal, 2003). In line 
with this reasoning, we thus expect the size of a venture’s network to positively 
influence its financial performance (Hansen, Podolny, & Pfeffer, 2001; Liao & 
Welsch, 2003). 
Even though the new venture’s network refers to a different level of analysis 
than the entrepreneurs’ individual networking abilities, we suppose that a potential 
impact of entrepreneurs’ networking skills on new venture performance may––at least 
partially––be explained by the size of a new venture’s network. In general, new 
ventures typically lack a history of prior partnerships and might be unable to 
reciprocate directly due to resource constraints (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009). 
Consequently, we expect that entrepreneurs trying to establish exchange relationships 
for their new ventures will have to cope with potential exchange partners’ reservations 
to cooperate; and additionally believe that entrepreneurs with a distinct networking 
ability are better able to deal with potential exchange partners’ reluctance. 
As already indicated above, individuals with strong networking abilities are 
highly skilled negotiators and deal makers and are good at using social influence 
strategies and tactics (Ferris et al., 2008). Gifted with the power of a characteristically 
subtle style and the ability to transmit signals conducive to a favorable image, which 
results in higher assessments of reputation (Ferris et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2007), we 
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expect them to be better able to overcome potential partners’ reluctance and convince 
them to cooperate. Consequently, we expect entrepreneurs more highly skilled in 
networking to be able to establish more network exchange relationships for their new 
businesses than their less-skilled counterparts. In turn, these network relationships 
should widen the breadth of resources available to the new ventures, and as a result 
foster their firm’s financial performance. We therefore propose:  
 
H2a. The effect of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on the financial performance of 
their new ventures is partially mediated by the size of the new ventures’ exchange 
networks. 
 
2.2.2.2. The Strength of New Venture’s Network Relationships as a Mediator 
Besides the size of a new venture’s exchange network, we also expect the strength of 
network relationships to partially explain how entrepreneurs’ networking abilities 
influence their new venture’s financial performance. Stronger network relationships 
involve a higher frequency of interaction as well as an emotionally closer relationship 
between network partners (Granovetter, 1982). Because of these very characteristics, 
stronger ties are expected to be beneficial for getting access to needed resources. First, 
the feelings of affection that come with a stronger connection motivate exchange 
partners to be more helpful and support one another by granting access to their 
resources at more favorable terms (Krackhardt, 1992; McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004; 
Steier & Greenwood, 2000). Second, a stronger network relationship is expected to 
make resource exchange more efficient. Through repeated interactions, exchange 
partners develop similar knowledge stocks and cooperative routines that ameliorate 
resource exchange (McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004; Uzzi, 1997). As a result, 
obtaining resources that network partners may be able to provide should be 
significantly easier and less costly when new ventures’ network relationships are 
stronger.  
As we have described above, however, developing exchange relationships for a 
new venture is usually not easy, since young firms typically lack a history of 
cooperation and are often unable to reciprocate directly. Consequently, we expect 
developing exchange relationships that are characterized by an intense level of 
cooperation to be even more of a challenge. Based on this reasoning, and the fact that 
entrepreneurs with distinct networking abilities are considered to be especially good at 
building strong, beneficial, and contextually appropriate network relationships (Ferris 
et al., 2005; Todd et al., 2009), we believe that entrepreneurs’ networking abilities 
may be essential for developing stronger exchange relationships for their new 
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ventures, which in turn foster new ventures’ financial performance. Consequently, we 
propose: 
 
H2b. The effect of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on the financial performance of 
their new ventures is mediated by the strength of the new venture’s network exchange 
relationships. 
 
2.2.3. Moderating Effect(s) of Venture Age 
Above, we have argued that network exchange relationships are crucial for new 
ventures because they provide necessary resources at favorable terms. Additionally, 
we have suggested that entrepreneurs’ networking abilities may be a key to 
developing the new venture’s exchange network, since potential network partners may 
hesitate to cooperate because of a new venture’s resource constraints and a lack of 
history in prior partnerships. We now outline in detail why we expect these two 
effects to be moderated by venture age. 
It has been widely recognized that younger ventures in particular are exposed to 
a liability of newness, meaning that they have a higher failure rate than their older 
counterparts (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Wiklund, 
Baker, & Shepherd, 2010). Members of a recently founded venture have to learn and 
develop new roles, and establish a common normative basis and informal structures to 
develop effective and efficient modes of interaction (Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990). As 
long as such working routines are not fully established, day-to-day operations are not 
very effective, meaning that the resources available to young ventures are often not 
used efficiently (Wiklund et al., 2010). Resource availability, however, is especially 
critical for younger ventures that are typically more resource poor than more-mature 
ones (Jarillo, 1989; Larson, 1992). As delineated above, a widely recognized measure 
to counteract resource scarcity is establishing network exchange relationships that 
provide access to needed resources, such as financial capital or information and 
knowledge that help to build up the internal working routines needed for efficient 
operation (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Larson, 1992).  
Combining these arguments, we expect younger ventures, which have a greater 
need for external resources than more mature ones, to particularly profit from 
developing greater and more-intense network exchange relationships. Accordingly, we 
believe that the financial performance of younger ventures is to a much larger extent 
determined by the size of their exchange network and the strength of those exchange 
relationships. We thus hypothesize: 
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H3a. The positive effect of the size of a new venture’s network on its financial 
performance is stronger for younger than for more-mature businesses. 
 
H3b. The positive effect of the strength of a new venture’s network relationships on its 
financial performance is stronger for younger businesses than for more-mature ones. 
 
Analogously, we also expect younger ventures’ success in developing larger exchange 
networks with stronger network relationships to depend more extensively on their 
entrepreneurs’ networking skills. Whereas more mature ventures may rely on a track 
record of performance and cooperation that signals legitimacy when trying to develop 
network relationships, younger ventures lack these opportunities (Milanov & 
Fernhaber, 2009; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Additionally, younger ventures are 
more likely unable to directly reciprocate in resource exchanges, since they face more 
severe resource constraints than do more mature businesses (Milanov & Fernhaber, 
2009). 
In view of these arguments, we believe that younger ventures in particular will 
have to rely on other assets to when trying to establish and intensify cooperative 
exchange relationships and expect founders’ individual networking ability to be such 
an asset. Consequently, we expect that entrepreneurs’ networking skills are more 
relevant for recently founded new ventures than for their more-mature counterparts 
when it comes to establishing larger exchange networks with more intense 
relationships. We thus propose: 
 
H3c. The positive impact of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on the size of a new 
venture’s network is stronger for younger firms than for more-mature ones. 
 
H3d. The positive impact of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on the strength of 
network relationships is stronger for younger firms than for more-mature ones.  
 
2.3. Method 
To obtain a broad sample of newly founded ventures for our study, we asked 
institutions organizing business plan competitions and coordinating startup funds to 
grant us access to their alumni. Because of confidentiality issues, they refused to 
provide us with contact information but offered to invite their alumni to take part in 
our research. We developed an online questionnaire accessible with username and 
password that our partner institutions sent directly to their alumni. A total of 575 
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founders accessed and 221 finished our questionnaire, yielding a rate of completed 
responses of 38.4 percent. 
 We then selected our sample population according to criteria commonly used in 
entrepreneurship research (Vanderwerf & Brush, 1989). Specifically, we only 
included independent businesses—that is, no subsidiaries of parent corporations. 
Second, we restricted our sample with respect to company age. Consistent with other 
studies in the field (Covin, Slevin, & Covin, 1990; Hansen, 1995; Lechner et al., 2006; 
Sorenson et al., 2008), we excluded all firms less than one year old and companies 
established more than ten years ago. We then had to exclude additional data sets 
because of missing values, leaving 146 usable responses.  
 This data-collection approach admittedly has its disadvantages. First, response 
bias may have been an issue. Consequently, we conducted two checks: we grouped 
respondents by arrival date and compared early respondents to late ones with respect 
to several of our independent and dependent variables. Additionally, we checked for 
nonresponse bias to the extent that anonymous respondents more closely resemble 
nonrespondents (BarNir & Smith, 2002). In both comparisons, no significant 
differences were found. 
 Additionally, our data-collection approach definitely resulted in a convenience 
sample, which may raise issues of representativeness. To deal with this concern, we 
compared our sample to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The 
SOEP is a representative household panel survey conducted annually by the German 
Institute for Economic Research in Berlin and is often used for representative research 
on German entrepreneurs (Caliendo, Fossen, & Kritikos, 2009; Mueller, 2006; Schäfer 
& Talavera, 2009). We found a high degree of similarity between the entrepreneurs 
within our sample and the self-employed individuals within the SOEP. The small 
percentage of female founders (32 percent) within our sample, for example, matches 
well with the 31 percent of female entrepreneurs within the SOEP (Caliendo et al., 
2009). Moreover, the observation that self-employed Germans are well-educated is 
also reflected in our data. Also, considering that our data collection lead to a sample in 
which firms operating in many different industries, such as life sciences, information 
technology, chemical products, construction, food, and education are represented, we 
think that our sample might be fairly representative for German entrepreneurs and 
their new ventures. 
We also checked whether our sample is biased with respect to new-venture 
performance. To do so, we compared the average revenue growth rates reported by 
our respondents with the respective industry averages, which we obtained from the 
German Federal Statistical Office. The comparison revealed that across industries, 39 
percent of our respondents reported a growth rate at the same level or even below the 
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industry standard. Given that growth rates of younger ventures are expected to be 
higher than the industry standard on average (Chandler & Hanks, 1993), we believe 
that our sample is not seriously biased in terms of performance. 
 
2.3.1. Measures 
Since there were no objective data available to represent the main exploratory and 
dependent variables in our study, we relied on self-reported measures. We are 
confident that this approach led to results with reasonable validity. First, most of our 
variables are concrete and will therefore be perceived and reported more accurately 
than will psychometric properties (Fuchs & Diamantopoulus, 2009). Second, previous 
research in entrepreneurship gives broad support for the reliability and validity of self-
reported measures (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Lechner et al., 2006; Peng & Luo, 
2000). Recognizing that several authors advocate a different position (Boyd, Gove, & 
Hitt, 2005; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & 
Organ, 1986), however, we took several additional steps to ensure the validity of our 
data. We describe these steps in more detail after introducing our measures. 
 
2.3.1.1. New Venture’s Financial Performance 
To capture new-venture financial performance, we used three items that have been 
shown to be reliable and valid in prior research (Chandler & Hanks, 1993, 1998; 
Honig, Lerner, & Raban, 2006; Lee & Tsang, 2001). Specifically, we asked our 
respondents to indicate the current revenue, as well as the revenue growth rates and 
profit growth rates of their new ventures, in broad categories. We chose this scale 
format because it is considered helpful to overcome problems caused by unwillingness 
to disclose detailed financial information and also helps to address the problem that 
even when business owners are willing to share financial performance data, the 
accuracy of their figures cannot be taken for granted (Zahra, Neubaum, & El-
Hagrassey, 2002).  
For revenue, the response categories ranged from 1–‘up to €50,000’ to 9–‘more 
than €10,000,000’. Growth rates were grouped in seven brackets ranging from 1–‘less 
than 5 percent’ up to 7–‘more than 200 percent’, and had to be indicated for a three-
year period (or in comparison to their first 12 months of operation if the venture was 
younger than three years). We then divided these cumulative growth rates by three (or 
company age if the company was younger than three years) to obtain comparable 
average growth rates. Because revenue growth and profit growth turned out to be 
highly interrelated (r = 0.81, p < 0.001), but only modestly related to revenue (r = 
0.23, p < 0.01 and r = 0.26, p < 0.01 respectively), we decided to include revenue and 
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growth as two separate variables in our further analysis. To correct for skewness, we 
constructed the natural log of all three items. 
 
2.3.1.2. Network Variables 
As described in our theory section, we focused on the new venture’s exchange 
network and thus followed an ego-centered network approach (Knoke & Yang, 2008; 
Wassermann & Faust, 1994) at the firm-level. To capture new ventures’ network size, 
we asked our respondents for the number of active exchange relationships between 
their new venture and external individuals or organizations that go beyond a simple 
market exchange. To further refine this question, we asked for three different 
categories of relationships. Specifically, we asked for the number of network 
exchange relationships that provide access to (1) financial capital; (2) physical 
resources, such as facilities, equipment, or manpower; and (3) knowledge and 
information. We then added the three item scores to get a measure for the total 
network size. 
To capture the strength of exchange relationships, we adapted two items used 
in prior research (Hansen, Mors, & Lövas, 2005; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000) 
and asked our respondents to indicate on a seven-point scale (1) how frequently 
members of their new ventures interact with network partners, and (2) the extent to 
which there is a close, personal relationship between new ventures’ members and 
these network partners. As expected, both items turned out to be highly positively 
correlated (r = 0.73, p < 0.001) 
 
2.3.1.3. Networking Ability 
To capture entrepreneurs’ networking ability, we adapted three items from the 
networking ability scale that is included in the Political Skill Inventory (Ferris et al., 
2005; Ferris et al., 2007). Specifically, we asked our respondents to indicate on a 
seven-point scale to what extent the entrepreneurs who liaise with network partners 
(1) have always spent substantial time and effort networking with others, (2) have 
always been good at building relationships with influential people, and (3) have 
always been good at using their connections and network to make things happen, even 
before they founded their new venture. We chose to use these three items for 
parsimony reasons and because they cover all three different facets of the networking 
ability scale––spending time on networking, building useful relationships, and using 
connections to make things happen––which are usually captured with two items each. 
With a Cronbach’s alpha of .86, the resulting measure turned out to be as reliable as 
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the complete networking ability scale, for which a Cronbach’s alpha of .87 is 
commonly reported (Blass et al., 2007; Ferris et al., 2005). 
 
2.3.1.4. Venture Age 
To capture venture age, we asked our respondents to indicate for how many years the 
venture has been operating. Since company age typically corresponds to a firm’s 
resource base and influences its revenue potential (Stam & Elfring, 2008), we not only 
used this variable when testing our moderation hypotheses, but also included it as a 
control in our models. 
 
2.3.1.5. Controls 
We included several additional control variables. First, we controlled for the current 
number of employees and employment growth to address the fact that developing 
competencies within a new venture by means of hiring employees may, at least to 
some extent, substitute for relying on network exchange relationships (Colombo et al., 
2006; Larson, 1992; Oliver, 1990). For similar reasons, and because the number of 
founding team members may also influence the number of network exchange 
relationships that can be developed and managed (Batjargal, 2006), we also included 
this variable as a control. Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) as well as Schutjens and 
Stam (2003) demonstrate that network structures may vary substantially across 
industries that differ in terms of technological dynamism and uncertainty. 
Accordingly, we included a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm belongs to a 
high-tech industry. Additionally, we sequentially controlled for effects of the different 
industries such as life sciences, information technology, chemical products, 
construction, food, education, and clothing.  
 
2.3.2. Data and Construct Validity 
As mentioned above, we took several additional steps to ensure the validity of our 
data. Recognizing that our measures are self-reported, we first checked for common 
method bias. By Harman’s one-factor test, five distinct factors were extracted, 
accounting for 74 percent of the total variance. While the first factor explained 20 
percent of the variance, no one factor accounted for most of it. Because Harman’s 
single factor test provides only a coarse indication for common method bias, we also 
followed the recommendation of Podsakoff et al. (2003) and tested for a latent method 
factor by means of confirmatory factor analyses. Specifically, we constructed (a) a 
method model, in which all items load on a common method factor; (b) a theoretical 
model, in which the items were assigned to respective latent variables according to 
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theory; and (c) a full model, in which all items loaded on their latent variables as well 
as an additional method factor. Given that all three models are only defined for 
variables with more than one indicator, our analysis comprised the items capturing 
networking ability, tie strength, and growth in financial performance. Comparing the 
models by means of chi-square difference test (Bagozzi, Youjae, & Phillips, 1991), we 
found that neither the method model nor the full model provided a significantly better 
fit with our data than the theoretical model. Consequently, we are confident that 
common method bias is not an issue in our study. 
 We further tested the validity of our data by comparing self-reports with 
external sources of information for those companies that identified themselves in the 
data collection process. The correlations between the self-reported measures and data 
on firm age, the number of employees, and the number of founding team members 
available on the internet were all highly significant and ranged from 0.97 (p < 0.01, N 
= 41) for company age to 0.98 (p < 0.01, N = 49) for the number of founding team 
members.  
 Since prior research has shown a high correspondence of self-ratings and other-
ratings on networking ability in an intra-organizational context (Ferris et al., 2008), 
we are quite confident that the measure we used is valid. Considering that we are the 
first ones to use these items in an entrepreneurial context, however, we also tried to 
further ensure the validity of this measure. Specifically, we asked those entrepreneurs 
who contacted us after participating in our study to provide us with the contact details 
of a person outside their company who is acquainted with the founding team members 
that deal with external partners and whom we could interview. We then contacted the 
18 people whose contact details we received and asked them to rate the networking 
ability of those entrepreneurs dealing with the new venture’s network members. 
Ranging from 0.84 (p < 0.01) to 0.94 (p < 0.01), these other-ratings turned out to be 
highly correlated to the self-ratings provided by the entrepreneurs in our data set. 
 To ensure the validity of our financial performance measures, we tried to 
follow Batjargal’s (2010a) approach and validate our new ventures’ financial 
performance data with taxation department officials. Pointing to the legal requirement 
to keep tax information strictly confidential, however, the German officials refused 
our request. We thus tried a different approach. In Germany small firms have to be 
listed with the local chamber of commerce and in the commercial register when they 
meet certain criteria (Brüderl et al., 1992; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990). Service 
companies have to be listed if they realize revenues of at least €75,000, and producing 
companies if they realize revenues of at least €150,000. Making use of these criteria, 
we split our subsample of those ventures that we could identify into two subsets, and 
checked whether the ventures from both subgroups were listed or not. The result of 
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this search showed that every company that should be listed according to the self-
reported revenue data was indeed listed and vice versa. Additionally, we searched 
three different German firm databases––Hoppenstedt, Dafne and Creditreform––for 
more detailed financial performance data on the firms in our sample. As a result, we 
were able to compare the revenue data provided by 18 of our respondents with 
database entries and found the data to be highly correlated (r = 0.95; p < 0.01). In 
sum, we are thus confident that the financial performance data used in our study are of 
considerable validity. 
 
2.3.3. Analytical Approach 
We tested our hypotheses using structural equation modeling (SEM). We chose SEM 
because it offers two advantages: First, it allows for simultaneously testing interrelated 
hypotheses (Byrne, 2009; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), which seems crucial for our 
study since its aim is to test the interplay of relationships between one independent, 
two mediating, one moderating, and two outcome variables. Additionally, SEM 
provides the opportunity to include latent variables so that we could take the 
measurement error for our latent variables—networking ability, tie strength, and 
revenue growth—into account when statistically analyzing the data.  
To test our hypotheses, we developed four different models: (1) a direct model, 
which includes the direct paths of networking ability on revenue and financial 
performance growth; (2) a full model, in which the direct paths of networking ability 
on revenue and financial performance growth, as well as the proposed indirect paths 
mediated by network size and tie strength, are included; (3) a mediation model, which 
includes only the proposed indirect paths; and (4) a null model, in which no 
relationships are posited. After checking for the global fit of these models, we then 
applied the nested model test described by Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza (2001) to 
get a first impression of whether our mediation hypothesis might hold true. 
Afterwards, we tested for Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b step-by-step, by means of 
examining the constellation of path coefficients in and across our models.  
Finally, to test for our moderation hypotheses (Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d), 
we followed the recommendation of Wegener and Fabrigar (2000), Rigdon and 
Schuhmacker (1998), and the example provided by Simonin (1999) and used a 
multiple-group model. Even though we recognize that this approach comes with the 
disadvantage of lower statistical power, it seems appropriate for our study because it 
avoids multicollinearity and distributional problems that may occur when testing a 
complex model with multiple interaction effects by including interaction terms 
(Rigdon et al., 1998; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2000). 
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2.4. Results 
For consideration, means, standard deviations, and correlations for our variables are 
shown in Table 2.1.  
To assess the global fit of our SEM models, we relied on two global-fit criteria: 
the chi-square test, which is the only real statistical test of significance for structural 
equation models (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), which has recently been recognized as one of the most 
informative standards in covariance structure modeling (Byrne, 2009). According to 
these two global-fit measures––for which estimates are presented in Table 2.2––the 
direct as well as the full and the mediation model fit the empirical data well. The 
normed chi-square values of all three models are close to the recommended value of 
2.0 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). With values close to 0.08, the RMSEA 
estimates also suggest that the fit of all three models is at least reasonable (Byrne, 
2009). 
As also depicted in Table 2.2, we additionally checked for the comparative fit 
index (CFI) values of our models and found them to be close to the recommended 
value of 0.90 (Bentler, 1990; Bentler, 1992; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 
2006; Marsh, Balla, & Hau, 1996). 
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Table 2.1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
N = 146  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Networking ability 1          
2 Network size 0.22* 1         
3 Tie strength 0.35* 0.34* 1        
4 Revenue (in T€) 0.17* 0.21* 0.11 1       
5 Growth (in % per  year) 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.26* 1      
6 Venture age -0.14 0.01 0.04 0.37* -0.07 1     
7 Number of founders 0.27* 0.07 0.05 0.31* 0.08 -0.10 1    
8 High-tech industry (Dummy) 0.05 -0.16 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.08 1   
9 Number of employees 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.59* 0.10 0.16 0.44* 0.01 1  
10 Employment growth -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.47* 0.17 0.08 0.45* 0.05 0.88* 1 
 Means 3.71 4.50 3.55 424.74 42.20 4.08 1.84 0.58 4.85 2.94 
 S.D. 1.70 5.77 2.02 8.43 62.97 2.66 1.07 0.49 17.36 0.93 
* p < 0.05; two-tailed test; for latent variables correlations with factor scores are reported 
 
Table 2.2. Model Statistics––Full Sample Estimation 
Model Chi² d.f. p Normed chi² RMSEA CFI 
1. Direct effects model (1) 168.99 73 0.00 2.32 0.09 0.85 
2. Full model (2) 143.17 38 0.00 2.14 0.09 0.88 
3. Mediation model (3) 143.4 42 0.00 2.08 0.08 0.89 
4. Null model (4) 746.73 105 0.00 7.11 0.21 0.00 
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2.4.1. Nested-Model Test 
To test for differences in statistical significance between the direct, mediation, and full 
models, we first analyzed whether the chi-square values of the three models vary 
significantly (Steiger, Shapiro, & Brown, 1985). The results of the sequential chi-
square difference tests are shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Nested Model Tests––Full Sample Estimation 
Comparison  Chi² diff. d.f. diff. P Model Preference 
Model 2 vs. 4 Full vs. null 603.32 38 0.00 2 
Model 2 vs. 1 Full vs. direct 25.82 6 0.00 2 
Model 2 vs. 3 Full vs. mediation  0.23 2 0.89 3 
 
A significant difference in the chi-square value indicates that a more complex 
model—that is, a model with fewer degrees of freedom—yields a better fit with the 
data (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Accordingly, the chi-square 
difference comparison between the full and null models suggests that the first provides 
a far better fit. A comparison between the full and the direct model suggests that the 
full model has a significantly better fit with our data (p < 0.001). Finally, when 
comparing our full model with the mediation model, it becomes clear that the 
mediation model is superior, as the explanatory power of the two models does not 
differ significantly (p = 0.89) and the mediation model is the more parsimonious one. 
The nested-model test thus provides initial evidence for our proposition that the 
relationship between networking ability and a new venture’s financial performance 
may indeed be best described by a mediation model. In order to test our hypotheses, 
we then analyzed the path coefficients in and across our models. 
 
2.4.2. Path Coefficient Analysis 
As depicted in Table 2.4, the direct model shows a statistical significant relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and a new venture’s revenue, which 
provides support for Hypothesis 1. 
To test for Hypotheses 2a and 2b stating that the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ revenue is mediated by the size 
of new ventures’ exchange network and the intensity of exchange relationships, we 
analyzed the constellation of the relevant path coefficients across the direct, full, and 
mediation models. In doing so, we examined whether the three conditions necessary 
for full or partial mediation described by Baron and Kenny (1986) were met. These 
three conditions are: (1) the predictor must be related to the mediator, (2) the mediator 
must be related to the dependent variables, and (3) the previously significant 
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relationship between the predictor and the dependent variables should be eliminated 
(full mediation) or substantially reduced (partial mediation) when the mediator is 
accounted for.  
Table 2.4. Standardized Path Coefficients––Full Sample Estimation 
Description of Paths Direct Model Full Model Mediation Model 
Networking ability Æ Revenue 0.20** n.s.  
Networking ability Æ Growth n.s. n.s.  
Networking ability Æ Network size  0.20* 0.20* 
Networking ability Æ Tie strength  0.68** 0.68** 
Network size Æ Revenue  0.16* 0.16* 
Network size Æ Growth   0.93* 0.89* 
Tie strength Æ Revenue  n.s. 0.25* 
Tie strength Æ Growth  n.s. n.s. 
Resource needs Æ Network size 0.29*** 0.24** 0.24** 
Resource needs Æ Tie strength 0.96*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
Resource needs Æ Revenue n.s. n.s. -0.25+ 
Resource needs Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. 
High-tech industry Æ Network size n.s. -1.57* -1.57* 
High-tech industry Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. 
High-tech industry Æ Revenue n.s. n.s. n.s. 
High-tech industry Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Venture age Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Venture age Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Venture age Æ Revenue 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 
Venture age Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of founders Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of founders Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of founders Æ Revenue 0.20** 0.19* 0.19* 
No. of founders Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of employees Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of employees Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of employees Æ Revenue 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 
No. of employees Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Revenue n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p< 0.01; * p< 0.05; +  p < 0.10; n.s.: not significant 
 
As Table 2.4 indicates, the conditions for a full mediation are met when we include 
our two network variables in the model. 
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First of all, networking ability is positively related to network size (β = 0.20, p < 0.05) 
and to tie strength (β = 0.67, p < 0.01) in the mediation model. Secondly, network size 
and tie strength are both positively related to revenue (β = 0.16; p < 0.05 and β = 0.25, 
p < 0.05). Finally, the path from networking ability to revenue, which is significant in 
the direct model, loses its significance (from β = 0.20; p < 0.01 to β = -0.005; p = 
0.99) in the full model that also includes network size and tie strength. In sum, the 
path coefficient analysis for revenue as the dependent variable thus provides support 
for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
 
2.4.3. Moderation Analysis 
As already noted above, we made a subsample comparison to test for the proposed 
moderating effects of venture age. To do so, we split the sample into one subgroup 
comprising the firms up to three years of age and another one comprising all the 
companies that had already completed four or more years of operation. Using this cut-
off point seemed appropriate for several reasons: First of all, the median company age 
in our sample is three years, so applying this criterion results in two commensurate 
subsets. Additionally, theorists argue that three years is approximately the earliest 
point in time new ventures might have overcome the liability of newness (Chrisman, 
Bauerschmidt, & Hofer, 1998), and research results in the field support this notion by 
providing initial evidence that ventures in these two age categories may indeed profit 
differently from similar network constellations (Aldrich, Rosen, & Woodward, 1987). 
When assessing potential moderating effects, we first checked whether we 
could apply the same measurement models for our latent variables across our 
subgroups (Byrne, 2009; Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008). We then compared the 
path coefficient constellation across the two subgroups. As shown in Table 2.5, we 
find the constellation that we could already observe when analyzing the full sample to 
also be evident for the subgroup of younger ventures, whereas none of the paths 
corresponding with our theoretically proposed relationships reach a conventional level 
of significance in the subsample of more-mature ones. 
In line with this first observation, a comparison of the mediation models reveals 
clear confirming evidence for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d, since we find the size of 
a new ventures’ exchange network as well as the strength of network relationships to 
be positively related to revenue (β = 0.21; p < 0.05, and β = 0.44; p < 0.05), and 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability to be positively related to network size (β = 0.30; p 
< 0.05) and to tie strength (β = 0.81; p < 0.01) among younger ventures, but not 
among more mature ones.  
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Table 2.5. Standardized Path Coefficients––Split Sample Estimation 
Younger Companies Older Companies 
Description of Path Direct 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Mediation 
Model 
Direct 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Mediation 
Model 
Networking ability Æ Revenue 0.38** n.s.  n.s. n.s.  
Networking ability Æ Growth n.s. n.s.  n.s. n.s.  
Networking ability Æ Network size  0.30* 0.30**  n.s. n.s. 
Networking ability Æ Tie strength  0.83** 0.81**  0.55* 0.53+ 
Network size Æ Revenue  0.22* 0.21*  n.s. n.s. 
Network size Æ Growth   0.89+ 0.89+  n.s. n.s. 
Tie strength Æ Revenue  n.s. 0.44*  n.s. n.s. 
Tie strength Æ Growth  n.s. n.s.  n.s. n.s. 
Resource needs Æ Network size 0.25* n.s. n.s. 0.35** 0.34** 0.34** 
Resource needs Æ Tie strength 0.98** 0.55* 0.56* 0.93** 0.78** 0.79*** 
Resource needs Æ Revenue n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Resource needs Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
High-tech industry Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. -.19+ -.20+ -.20+ 
High-tech industry Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
High-tech industry Æ Revenue n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
High-tech industry Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Venture age Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Venture age Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Venture age Æ Revenue 0.35** 0.26* 0.28* 0.19+ 0.19+ 0.19+ 
Venture age Æ Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of founders Æ Network size n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of founders Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of founders Æ Revenue 0.19+ 0.20+ 0.20+ 0.23* 0.23* 0.23* 
No. of founders Æ Growth n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of employees Æ Network size n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of employees Æ Tie strength n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
No. of employees Æ Revenue 0.35** 0.29* 0.29* 0.56** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
No. of employees Æ Growth n.s. n.s n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Network 
size n.s n.s n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth ÆTie strength n.s n.s n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Revenue n.s n.s n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Employment growth Æ Growth n.s n.s n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10; n.s.: not significant 
 
Acknowledging that the size of our split samples lies below N = 100, which some 
authors consider a critical value (Hu & Benterl, 1998), we conducted additional tests 
to check for the stability of these results. In doing so, we made use of the fact that the 
power of a statistical test depends on the relationship between the number of 
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parameters estimated and sample size (Muthén & Muthén, 2002). Accordingly, we 
first constructed and ran a model based on indices instead of latent variables, which 
considerably reduced the number of estimated parameters. Additionally, we tested our 
moderation hypotheses by means of moderated regression analyses. Both additional 
analyses confirmed our findings. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
The present paper examines the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability and new ventures’ financial performance. Specifically, we address the 
questions of if, how, and under which conditions entrepreneurs’ networking ability 
might affect the financial performance of their new ventures. 
 
2.5.1. Entrepreneurs’ Networking Ability and New Ventures’ Financial 
Performance 
In line with our first hypothesis, our results indicate a significant relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new venture’s financial performance. In 
general, this result is consistent with previous research in the field showing that the 
personal characteristics of entrepreneurs, such as their personality, skills, and 
experiences may play a significant role in explaining their new ventures’ performance 
(Baum & Locke, 2004; Rauch & Frese, 2007). More specifically, our finding 
underscores existing research results on the relevance of entrepreneurs’ interpersonal 
skills. As already described above, there are some common roots between political 
skills and other social-skill and social-competence concepts, meaning that one has to 
empirically expect them to be interrelated (Ferris, Perrewé, & Douglas, 2002; 
Hochwarter et al., 2007). As to the extent of this interrelation, our results complement 
previous findings on a positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ social skills and 
their new ventures’ performance (Baron & Markman, 2003; Baron & Tang, 2009), by 
showing that this link not only holds true in the national contexts of the US and China, 
but also in Germany.  
However, we have to acknowledge that the relevance of entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability was only clearly observable for revenue, which is only one of the 
two financial performance variables that we used in our study. Considering that the 
other reflected the percentagewise increase in revenue and profit, this observation is 
not necessarily very surprising. As prior research has shown, these two variables 
represent different dimensions of new venture performance that have been frequently 
found not to be highly correlated (see, for example, Chandler & Hanks, 1993; Combs, 
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Crook, & Shook, 2005; Murphy, Trailer, & Hill, 1996; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000).  
Additionally, we think that there might be a theoretical explanation for these 
differences that may become clearer when considering the following illustrative 
example: In line with our results regarding the relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability and new ventures’ financial performance, Venture A, founded by 
an entrepreneur with superior networking ability yields a revenue of TEUR 90 in its 
second year of operation. At the same time, venture B, which is run by an 
entrepreneur less-skilled in networking, but otherwise similar to Venture A, would 
realize TEUR 75 in revenue. Consistent with our results on the link between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ growth, both of these two 
ventures would have grown at the same rate in the second year of their operation, for 
example, by 50 percent. This implies that venture A would have had TEUR 60 in 
revenues in its first year of operation, whereas venture B would have had only TEUR 
50. This example implies that our results of a significant connection between 
entrepreneurs’ networking abilities and revenue, but not with growth rates, might be 
explained by the fact that new ventures run by an entrepreneur with more-distinct 
networking skills realize superior revenues in their first year of operation and 
subsequently realize superior growth in absolute, but not in relative terms. In turn, this 
explanation would point to the fact that new ventures’ financial performance 
particularly profits from entrepreneurs more highly skilled in networking, since, 
because of their more valuable pre-existing network relationships, they are especially 
good at developing favorable exchange relationships for their new ventures when the 
venture is founded.  
Even though this explanation fits with previous research showing that new 
ventures’ networks in early start-up development are largely dominated by the pre-
existing social ties of their entrepreneurs (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lechner et al., 
2006), we clearly have to admit that this reasoning is speculative. Consequently, we 
want to encourage further research to address this question in more detail. In this 
context, we think it might also be interesting to shed some additional light on the 
networking behavior and strategies typical for entrepreneurs highly skilled in 
networking and, for example, specifically address whether entrepreneurs more highly 
skilled in networking also more heavily rely on symbolic management practices (Zott 
& Quy Nguyen, 2007). 
Even in view of the described need for further research, we think that the 
observed relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ 
financial performance offers some practical implications for entrepreneurs. In view of 
the fact that networking ability is a quite stable but trainable skill (Treadway, Ferris, 
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Duke, Adams, & Thatcher, 2007), our results specifically imply that entrepreneurs 
should consider either including people with significant networking abilities into their 
founding team and/or seeking assistance and training opportunities to enhance their 
networking abilities in order to be more successful in starting and developing a new 
venture. 
 
2.5.2. The Mediating Role of New Ventures’ Network Characteristics 
In line with our mediation hypotheses, the results of our study indicate that the 
relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and the financial performance 
of new ventures is mediated by the size of the new ventures’ exchange network and 
the strength of exchange network relationships. In particular, these results underline 
our reasoning that new ventures’ financial performance benefits from entrepreneurs 
that are, due to their characteristically subtle and engaging style and their expertise in 
networking strategies, able to develop more and stronger network ties for their new 
ventures.  
In general, this finding contributes to answering the question of how 
individual-level skills may impact macro-level variables in the field of 
entrepreneurship (Baron, 2007; Rauch & Frese, 2007; Zhao et al., 2010) by pointing 
to the fact that some of the mechanisms explaining the relevance of personal 
characteristics may be related to differences in individuals’ capacity to shape parts of 
their social environments according to their new venture’s needs. Additionally, these 
findings also contribute to network theory in the field of entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, they complement previous results pointing to how environmental 
characteristics, such as environmental uncertainty or industry-specific conditions, 
influence new ventures’ networks (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007; Schutjens & Stam, 
2003) and emphasize entrepreneurs’ networking skills as one of the person-related 
foundations of new ventures’ networks, which have so far been widely neglected by 
empirical research (Baron, 2007; O'Donnell et al., 2001).  
On a more concrete level of analysis, the results of our mediation analysis may 
also round out previous findings on why entrepreneurs’ interpersonal skills affect new 
ventures’ performance. Specifically, Baron and Tang (2009) provided confirming 
evidence for the notion that entrepreneurs with distinct social skills may be better able 
to acquire external resources for their new ventures. When now taking into account 
the common roots of political and social skills, as well as the fact that new ventures 
are expected to profit from larger exchange networks and stronger exchange 
relationships because such networks provide access to needed resources at attractive 
terms, one could argue that a partial cause for Baron and Tang’s finding on the 
relationship between social skills and resource access may be entrepreneurs’ 
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capability to develop more beneficial exchange networks comprising more network 
partners and stronger exchange ties. Even though this line of reasoning seems 
compelling, we clearly have to admit that we are not able to provide empirical 
evidence supporting it. Because we expect that continuing to address the relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ social and political skills and new venture performance may 
further enhance our understanding of the mechanisms and processes linking person-
related micro-level to firm-related macro-level variables in the field, we consequently 
want to encourage additional research to address the interrelation of social and 
political skills, resource access, and new ventures’ network characteristics and 
financial performance in more detail. 
 
2.5.3. The Moderating Influence of Venture Age 
Our moderation analysis reveals that the relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability and new ventures’ network characteristics, as well as the links 
between these network characteristics and new ventures’ financial performance, are 
moderated by venture age, in terms of being stronger for younger businesses.  
Regarding the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and the 
firm-level network, our results thus complement previous findings on the decreasing 
significance of entrepreneurs’ personality traits for relevant outcomes in the field 
(Frank et al., 2007). Specifically, they point to the fact that a similar effect may also 
hold true for other individual-level characteristics, such as entrepreneurs’ skills and 
thus underline the notion that ‘new businesses tend to emancipate themselves from 
their initiators’ (Frank et al., 2007: 248).  
Supporting our proposition that younger ventures in particular profit from 
establishing large networks with strong exchange relationships, the results of our 
moderation analysis also add to the literature on entrepreneurs’ networks. Specifically, 
they contribute to the ongoing debate on the benefits that come with stronger and 
weaker network relationships (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010), as they support 
the classical, but empirically only once-confirmed notion that younger firms may 
especially benefit from more-intense network relationships (Aldrich et al., 1987). In 
pointing to the fact that establishing larger exchange networks may also be primarily 
relevant for younger businesses––which has, to the best of our knowledge, so far not 
been discussed in prior research––our study sheds even more light on how 
organizational variables may conditionally limit the relevance of new ventures’ 
network characteristics. 
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2.5.4. Additional Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
Besides the limitations associated with the use of self-reported data, which we have 
already discussed in the method section, we clearly have to acknowledge some 
additional ones. The first is a result of our cross-sectional research design, which 
implies that a clear causal interpretation of our results is not possible. One could thus 
reverse the interpretation of the pertinent results and say that better financial 
performance or the existence of more and stronger relationships in the new venture’s 
network could lead entrepreneurs to a self-perception of having a distinct networking 
ability. However, there are a couple of arguments against this interpretation. First, 
previous studies in the field of career research that collected networking ability data at 
one point in time and afterwards data on various dependent measures found that 
networking ability clearly predicts positive work outcomes (Ferris et al., 2005; 
Hochwarter et al., 2007). Second, and as already noted above, research also indicates 
that even though networking abilities may be improved through training interventions, 
they tend to be quite stable over time (Treadway et al., 2007). Together, these 
arguments offer some support for interpreting our empirical results in a manner as 
proposed by our hypotheses. 
As an additional limitation of our study, we have to acknowledge that it is 
solely based on data from entrepreneurs and their new ventures in Germany. Our 
results may thus not be representative for entrepreneurs in other national contexts. 
Considering that prior research points to a potential moderating effect of national 
contexts on the relationship between network variables and performance (Batjargal, 
2010a), we consequently think that studying the impact of entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability in other countries and addressing a potential moderating influence of national 
context differences is a fruitful direction for further research. 
.
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Chapter 3 
 
Networking Ability and the Financial Performance of New 
Ventures: Moderating Effects of Venture Size, Institutional 
Environment and their Interaction 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Networking ability is an individual-level skill, defined as the ability to develop 
friendships and build strong, beneficial alliances and coalitions (Ferris et al., 2005). In 
an intra-organizational context, it has been found to positively influence managerial 
job performance (Semadar et al., 2006), income (Ferris et al., 2008; Wolff & Moser, 
2009), promotions and career, as well as life satisfaction (Todd et al., 2009). Most 
recently, however, it has also been shown that networking ability is relevant in an 
entrepreneurial context. Specifically, Batjargal (2010b) found that entrepreneurs’ 
networking skills enable them to attract a greater number of institutional investors. 
Additionally, Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) have shown that entrepreneurs with 
high networking ability realize a higher financial performance, as they are able to 
build larger exchange networks with stronger exchange relationships. However, the 
authors also provided initial evidence for the notion that the impact of entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability on new venture performance may be influenced by organizational 
variables. Specifically, they have shown that the positive relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new venture performance is moderated by 
venture age. 
This study is designed to extend this prior research. Specifically, it addresses 
the effect of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on a new venture’s financial 
performance in different institutional environments. Additionally, our study sheds 
light on the potential moderating role of venture size on the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ financial performance, and how 
this moderating role differs across institutional environments.  
Addressing the effects of venture size and institutional context on the 
relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new venture performance 
seems fruitful for several reasons. First of all, previous research has pointed to the fact 
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that venture age has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and the performance of their new ventures (Semrau 
& Sigmund, forthcoming). Theoretically, this effect is grounded in the fact that 
younger ventures suffer from the liability of newness, such as a lack of organizational 
legitimacy (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965) and as a consequence may 
have to rely on entrepreneurs’ networking ability to be successful. Other than 
suffering from the liability of newness, however, new ventures are also widely 
recognized to suffer from a liability of smallness, meaning that they lack necessary 
resources and thus need external support while at the same time are rather unattractive 
as exchange partners (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). In view of these observations, and the 
fact that the liabilities of newness and smallness have been shown to be conceptually 
and empirically distinct concepts (Brüderl et al., 1992; Freeman et al., 1983), 
contributing to research on the potential moderating role of venture size, when 
controlling for venture age, extends our knowledge of how organizational-level 
concepts and variables affect the relevance of entrepreneurs’ characteristics on new 
venture performance.  
Second, researching how differences in the institutional environment affect the 
relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new venture performance, 
as well as the interaction between venture size and this relationship, seems fruitful 
because it answers the calls a) for better contextualizing entrepreneurship research 
(Welter, 2011), and b) for shedding light on how a potential interplay of 
organizational-level and environmental variables influence the relevance of 
entrepreneurs’ individual characteristics for their new ventures’ performance (Baron, 
2007; Korunka et al., 2003; Rauch & Frese, 2007). 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present our 
theoretical reasoning and develop our hypotheses. We then describe our research 
method and the results of our empirical analysis based on a sample comprising the 
data of new ventures from Germany, which have previously also been used by Semrau 
and Sigmund (forthcoming), and additional data from new ventures in Brazil. We then 
discuss the results of our analysis, which significantly support our hypotheses by 
providing evidence for a) a positive effect of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on new 
venture performance in both institutional contexts; b) a moderating effect of venture 
size; and c) a significant three-way interaction between networking ability, venture 
size, and institutional context. We then conclude with some remarks on the limitations 
and the contribution of our study. 
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3.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
A large body of research indicates that person-related variables may exert a significant 
influence on entrepreneurial activity and success (Frank et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 
2002; Rauch & Frese, 2007; Shaver & Scott, 1991). Among those variables identified 
are cognitive factors, such as risk-taking propensity and internal locus of control 
(Arenius & Minniti, 2005; Caliendo et al., 2009; Hansemark, 2003; Walter & Walter, 
2009); variables describing entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and experiences, such as 
previous work and founding experience as well as general human capital (Brüderl et 
al., 1992; Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Diochon et al., 2008); 
and sociodemographic variables like age and gender (Brush, 1992; Langowitz & 
Minniti, 2007; Minniti, 2010). Additionally, recent research provides empirical 
evidence for a link between entrepreneurs’ skills and the success of their ventures. In 
particular, Baron and Markman (2003) and Baron and Tang (2009) have shown that 
entrepreneurs’ social skills are associated with the financial performance of new 
ventures, and Batjargal (2010b) as well as Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) 
provide initial evidence for the notion that entrepreneurs may profit from a distinct 
networking ability. 
However, prior research also indicates that the relevance of individual-level 
factors on the performance of new ventures may be limited to certain conditions. 
Frank, Lueger and Korunka (2007), for example, have shown that the relevance of 
personality traits for the success of entrepreneurs is much stronger in pre- than in post-
founding stages of the entrepreneurial process. Similarly, Baron and Tang (2009) 
provide evidence for the notion that the industry in which new ventures operate may 
have an effect on the performance relevance of entrepreneurs’ individual skills. 
Furthermore, Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) have shown that the effect of 
entrepreneurs’ networking abilities on the performance of new ventures is moderated 
by a new ventures’ age.  
In addition to this evidence, prior research has also shown that differences in 
the institutional context in which individuals are embedded may impact the relevance 
and use of network ties (Batjargal, 2010a; Peng & Luo, 2000). For instance, Xin and 
Pearce (1996) found that network relations may serve as substitutes for formal 
institutional support in a less-developed institutional framework.  
Based on these prior insights, we develop a theoretical rationale for how new 
ventures’ size and their institutional context may affect the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ financial performance. Before 
doing so, however, we will briefly describe why we expect entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability to have a positive effect on the financial performance of their new ventures. 
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3.2.1. Networking Ability and the Financial Performance of New Ventures 
Networking ability is the “core dimension” of the political skills concept (Blass et al., 
2007 p. 93; Todd et al., 2009 p. 187). It describes one’s ability to develop friendships; 
build strong, beneficial alliances and coalitions; and understand power structures and 
establish social relations according to one’s personal objectives (Blass et al., 2007; 
Ferris et al., 2005; Hochwarter et al., 2007; Peled, 2000; Semadar et al., 2006). As an 
important dimension of the political-skills concept, networking ability has been 
empirically found to positively influence managerial job performance (Semadar et al., 
2006), income (Ferris et al., 2008; Wolff & Moser, 2009), promotions and career, as 
well as life satisfaction (Todd et al., 2009).  
More recently, research has also shown that networking ability is relevant in an 
entrepreneurial context. In particular, Batjargal (2010b) observed that entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability helps them to attract a greater number of institutional investors. 
Complementing this result, Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) found that 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability impacts the financial performance of their new 
ventures, because it enables them to establish favorable exchange relationships which 
in turn facilitate the new venture’s financial performance. Specifically, their study 
revealed that the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and the 
financial performance of their new ventures is mediated by two characteristics of the 
new ventures network––network size and the strength of exchange ties.  
Theoretically, this result may be explained by the fact that both network 
characteristics have a positive impact on the resources available through a new 
venture’s network. In fact, larger networks are likely to provide more, and a greater 
variety, of resources since they consist of more network partners able to grant resource 
access (Batjargal, 2003). Analogously, stronger network-exchange relationships are 
also expected to be beneficial for new ventures because closer relationships and more-
frequent interactions motivate exchange partners to grant access to their resources at 
more favorable terms (Krackhardt, 1992; McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004; Steier & 
Greenwood, 2000), and make resource exchanges more efficient (McFadyen & 
Cannella Jr, 2004; Uzzi, 1997). 
In view of these arguments and the fact that prior research has shown that 
entrepreneurs in very different institutional contexts profit from resource exchanges 
via network relationships (Batjargal, 2010a; Lechner et al., 2006; Xin & Pearce, 
1996), we expect that the positive impact of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on the 
financial performance of their new ventures is not limited to a specific national 
context. Consequently, we propose: 
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H1. Entrepreneurs’ networking ability is positively related to the financial 
performance of their new venture, irrespective of the institutional context examined. 
 
3.2.2. The Moderating Impact of New Venture Size 
As already indicated by prior research, the impact of networking ability on new 
venture performance seems to be influenced by certain firm-level conditions. 
Specifically, Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) have shown that the relationship 
between both variables is moderated by company age, i.e., is stronger for younger 
than for more-mature ventures. The reasoning given for this effect is that more-
recently founded ventures lack a track record of prior performance and exchange 
relationships and thus have greater difficulties motivating potential network partners 
to cooperate, so that distinct networking abilities are especially useful for them when 
trying to establish needed support networks.  
However, we do not expect new venture age to be the only firm-level 
moderator of this relationship. Specifically, we expect the size of a new venture to 
also have a moderating effect on the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability and new venture performance, even when venture age is kept constant. As 
proposed by many theorists in the field, new ventures suffer not only from a liability 
of newness but also from a liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Kale & 
Arditi, 1998; Strotmann, 2007). Empirically, the size of a new venture is often 
coupled with its age, but not all organizations are born small or grow at the same rate 
in the course of their development (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). In fact, Freeman et al. 
(1983) as well as Brüderl et al. (1992), have shown that firm size is a factor that turns 
out to influence venture survival, even when controlling for venture age. The 
theoretical reasoning behind this result is that not only younger but also smaller firms 
face severe problems when trying to master the challenges involved in organizational 
development. First, small firms often have very limited financial and physical 
resources, a fact that makes them vulnerable to market contractions (Aldrich & 
Auster, 1986; Carayannopoulos, 2009). Even if they are able to raise capital via 
traditional market exchange, they usually have to pay higher interest rates and face 
more demands for changes that compromise the founders’ concept of the organization 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Strotmann, 2007). Second, smaller organizations not only 
suffer from scarcity of financial and physical resources; they usually also lack the 
managerial knowledge that larger companies possess, as they less likely to attract 
competent personnel (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Kale & Arditi, 1998). As a result, we 
expect that smaller ventures are more dependent on external support than are their 
larger counterparts when it comes to getting access to financial capital, other physical 
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assets, and relevant knowledge and information (Carayannopoulos, 2009; Strotmann, 
2007).  
In addition, a small firm will most likely have problems motivating potential 
network partners to cooperate. Again, our reasoning here is twofold: first, small 
ventures suffer from restricted visibility and organizational reputation, which limits 
their initial pool of potential partners (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009). Second, due to 
their lack of resources, they are unable to directly reciprocate within a network-based 
exchange. Consequently, potential network partners will usually hesitate to invest in 
an exchange relationship even when they become aware of a new venture.  
Based on these facts, we expect smaller ventures’ financial performance to be 
more-strongly related to their founders’ networking ability than the financial 
performance of their bigger counterparts for two reasons: a) smaller ventures will have 
to rely on greater external support to compensate for larger resource constraints; and 
b) because of limited organizational visibility and legitimacy, smaller ventures will 
have to rely more extensively on entrepreneurs’ subtle and convincing style that 
comes with distinct networking abilities in order to develop network exchange 
relationships. Expecting that entrepreneurs’ networking ability will be more important 
for smaller than for larger ventures, we suggest that the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new ventures’ financial performance will 
be negatively moderated by venture size. We thus propose: 
 
H2. There will be a negative moderating effect of venture size on the relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new ventures’ financial 
performance 
 
3.2.3. The Moderating Impact of the Institutional Environment 
Besides the size of a new venture, we propose that the institutional environment in 
which a new venture operates also moderates the impact of entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability on its performance.  
Institutions are defined as multifaceted, durable social structures composed of 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements (Scott, 2001). Social actors are 
embedded in environments that vary extensively among these three dimensions 
(Baumol, 1993, 1996, 2005; North, 1990, 1994, 2005) that are widely recognized as 
exerting a strong influence on economic behavior in general (Ralston, Holt, Terpstra, 
& Yu, 2008), and entrepreneurial activity in particular (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 
2008; Batjargal, 2007; Ralston et al., 2008). Acs, Desai, and Klapper (2008), for 
example, found significant differences in entrepreneurial activity when analyzing data 
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from different institutional environments. Similarly, Tominc and Rebernik (2007) 
conclude that different intensities of institutional support for entrepreneurial behavior 
in post-socialist countries have significant effects on the rate of new venture formation 
and subsequent firm development. 
Additionally, there is some empirical evidence indicating that institutional 
differences may also have a significant moderating impact on the relationship between 
the characteristics of a new venture’s network and its performance. Batjargal (2010a), 
for instance, provides confirming evidence for the notion that the effect of certain 
network structures on performance is contingent on institutional context-differences, 
and Sheng, Zhou, and Li (2011) found that network ties are more important for firm 
performance in less-developed institutional environments than in more-developed 
ones. Based on these observations, we argue that entrepreneurs’ individual networking 
ability, as an important antecedent of new ventures’ network characteristics, will have 
a much stronger impact on the performance of a new venture in environments with a 
less-developed institutional framework than it will in those environments with more 
fully developed regulative frameworks.  
Highly developed institutional environments are characterized by a stable rule 
of law, the existence and enforcement of a commercial code, and a functioning court 
system (Djankov, Miguel, Qian, Roland, & Zhuravskaya, 2005; McMillan & 
Woodruff, 1999). In such an environment, entrepreneurs may rely on contractually 
safeguarded exchange relationships as a way to easily enforce their rights. In contrast, 
entrepreneurs operating in less-developed institutional environments cannot rely on 
enforcing contractual rights to a similar extent, and may thus be faced with severe 
risks and opportunistic behavior when engaging in such exchange arrangements (Aidis 
& Adachi, 2007; Aidis et al., 2008; Batjargal, 2003; Radaev, 2002; Sedaitis, 1998). As 
a result, they have to substitute formal institutional support by relying on informal 
institutions such as trusted exchange partners and mutual safeguarding (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Peng & Luo, 2000). Consequently, we expect that being able to rely on 
trust and reciprocity-based network exchange relationships is much more relevant for 
entrepreneurs in less-developed institutional environments (Sheng et al., 2011; Zhou 
& Peng, 2010) and consequently also expect entrepreneurs’ networking ability to be 
more valuable in these contexts.  
Additionally, we expect entrepreneurs from less-developed institutional 
contexts to particularly profit from distinct networking skills, as these skills should 
help them to develop political ties that are particularly needed in less-developed 
institutional environments. Political ties are informal social connections with 
government officials in various levels of administration (Sheng et al., 2011). 
Especially in weaker institutional environments, such relationships are valuable 
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because governments officials and politicians control access to major business 
opportunities and may provide crucial support in terms of subsidies, favorable 
regulations, protection against competitors, tax benefits, and so on (Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Schuler, Rehbein, & 
Cramer, 2002). Supporting this line of reasoning, several previous studies point out 
that political ties are imperative for survival and growth in environments with less-
developed institutional settings (Baron, 1995; Sheng et al., 2011), and we expect 
entrepreneurs with more-distinct networking abilities to be better able to develop such 
ties. 
Summing up, we expect entrepreneurs in less-developed institutional 
environments to particularly profit from distinct networking abilities, because they 
should enable them to establish the exchange relationships and political ties that are 
especially crucial in these contexts. Conversely, we expect the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new ventures’ financial performance to be 
weaker in a more-developed institutional context. We thus propose: 
 
H3. The relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new 
ventures’ financial performance will be weaker in a more-developed institutional 
environment. 
 
3.2.4. The Combined Impact of Venture Size and the Institutional Environment 
In addition to the moderating effects described above, we expect that differences in 
institutional environments will also affect the moderating influence of venture size on 
the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and the financial 
performance of their new ventures. Specifically, we suggest the negative moderating 
effect of venture size on the relationship between networking ability and new 
ventures’ financial performance to be stronger in more-developed institutional 
environments. 
As described above, the rationale for the negative moderating effect of venture 
size on the relationship between networking ability and new venture performance is 
that larger ventures a) do not have to rely as heavily on external-resource providers as 
do their smaller counterparts, and b) are able to rely on their visibility and greater 
organizational legitimacy when trying to attract potential network partners. As a 
result, we propose that the relevance of entrepreneurs’ networking ability declines as 
new ventures grow.  
As also described above, however, we expect entrepreneurs in less-developed 
institutional contexts to particularly profit from distinct networking abilities, since 
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they not only have to establish the resource-exchange relationships needed by new 
ventures in general, but also have to develop political ties to government officials and 
bureaucrats. Assuming that these political ties remain crucial for new ventures in less-
developed institutional contexts, even when they grow, and also assuming that 
political ties have to be managed by the entrepreneur him- or herself no matter how 
large his or her company is, we expect that entrepreneurs’ networking ability remains 
significantly more crucial for their ventures’ financial success as it grows. 
Confirming the notion that political ties remain important even when a new 
venture grows, previous research has found that a large percentage of the value of top-
performing firms in Indonesia––which can be considered a less-developed 
institutional environment––is derived from political connections (Fisman, 2001). 
Similarly, based on her case-based research, Dieleman (2012) explains that even 
Indonesian firms of considerable size are likely to fail if ties to officials, such as 
politicians and bureaucrats, are severed. 
Additionally, there exists considerable evidence for the notion that, even as 
their ventures grow, entrepreneurs in less-developed institutional contexts 
continuously have to manage their political ties, whereas the management of non-
political ties may often be delegated. De Vries and Florent-Treacy (2003), for 
instance, vividly describe that the politicians and bureaucrats to whom entrepreneurs 
developed viable network relationships in Russia did not accept another contact 
person within the company, even as the firm grew and became a major player in the 
industry. Quite similarly, Dieleman (2012) observed that deals between companies 
and governmental officials in Indonesia are always based on personal relationships 
and personal interaction, even when companies have already grown and obtained a 
high level of organizational legitimacy. 
Summing up, we thus expect that a) the relevance of political ties for ventures’ 
financial performance is sustained in less-developed institutional contexts even when 
a new venture grows, and b) that political ties continuously have to be managed by the 
entrepreneur him- or herself. Consequently, we expect that entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability, which enables him or her to effectively develop and manage political ties, will 
remain significantly more important in less-developed institutional contexts, even 
when a venture grows in size. Conversely, we expect the negative moderating effect 
of venture size on the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their 
new ventures’ financial performance to be stronger in more-developed institutional 
contexts. We thus posit: 
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H4. The negative moderating effect of venture size on the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new ventures’ financial performance will 
be stronger in more-developed institutional contexts. 
 
3.3. Method 
Because our aim was to address the impact of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on the 
performance of new ventures in significantly different institutional environments, we 
decided to rely on the data of German entrepreneurs previously used by Semrau and 
Sigmund (forthcoming), and to collect additional data from new ventures in Brazil.  
Whereas the institutional context in Germany has to be considered fully 
developed and reliable, entrepreneurs in the emerging economy of Brazil have to cope 
with a significantly less-developed institutional setting. This perspective is supported 
by the results of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006). In this project, the quality of the institutional frameworks 
of 212 countries was characterized by several indicators, such as the perceived quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the likelihood of crime and violence, and the 
extent to which public power is seen as being exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2006). On all these indicators, 
Brazil scores significantly lower (ranked between 25th and 50th in terms of percentile 
ranking) than Germany (above 90th) (Kaufmann et al., 2006).  
 To obtain a parallel sample for the German data set, we followed the strategy 
described by Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) and contacted institutions that 
support entrepreneurial activities and asked them to promote the research project. Due 
to privacy concerns, most of the people contacted refused to provide the contact 
information on newly founded ventures, but instead offered to invite the founders 
associated with their institutions to take part in our online survey. As a result, we were 
able to collect data on 201 entrepreneurs and their new ventures in Brazil. We then 
combined this data with the data from German entrepreneurs, excluded companies that 
were not independent and further restricting the sample with respect to company age. 
Consistent with other studies in the field, we excluded all firms less than one year old 
(Hansen, 1995; Sorenson et al., 2008) and companies established more than ten years 
ago (Covin et al., 1990; Lechner et al., 2006). We then had to exclude more data sets 
because of missing values, leaving 283 usable responses in total––158 from German 
and 125 from Brazilian entrepreneurs.  
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3.3.1. Measures 
Because there were no objective data available to represent the main explanatory and 
dependent variables in our study, we had to rely on self-reported measures. We are 
confident that this approach led to results with reasonable validity. First, most of our 
variables are concrete attributes, which are typically reported more accurately than 
psychological constructs (Fuchs & Diamantopoulus, 2009). Second, previous research 
in entrepreneurship gives broad support for the reliability and validity of self-reported 
measures (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Lechner et al., 2006; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
Third, we took several additional steps (described later) to ensure the quality of our 
measures. 
 
3.3.1.2. New Ventures’ Financial Performance 
Firm performance is a multidimensional construct, and specifically measuring new 
venture performance presents a significant challenge for scholars (Carton & Hofer, 
2006; Chandler & Hanks, 1993). Following Chandler and Hanks’ (1993) 
recommendations for developing reliable and valid measures to capture new venture 
performance, two distinct variables—actual revenue and revenue growth—were used 
in this study. Both of these variables measure values in broad categories to overcome 
problems that may potentially be caused by respondents’ unwillingness to disclose 
precise financial-performance information. To operationalize the two variables, we 
relied on items that have shown their validity in prior research (see, Chandler & 
Hanks, 1998; Honig et al., 2006; Lee & Tsang, 2001).  
To get comparable results on revenue in both countries, we used the same 
categories in Brazil that were used in Germany but converted the answer categories 
from EURO to Brazilian Real according to exchange rates in December 2008. 
Specifically, the entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their revenue in 2008 in nine 
categories. The nine categories ranged from one (up to €50 thousand) to nine (more 
than €10 billion) for the German entrepreneurs and from one (up to R$150 thousand) 
to nine (more than R$30 billion) for the Brazilian entrepreneurs.  
Second, we asked our respondents to indicate their cumulative revenue growth 
rate since 2005 or since the business had been established. Growth rates were grouped 
in seven brackets ranging from one (less than five-percent growth) to seven (more 
than 200-percent growth) and had to be indicated for a three-year period (or compared 
to their first full year of operation if the new venture was younger than three years). 
We then divided the cumulative revenue growth rates by three (or company age if the 
company was younger than three years) to obtain a comparable average annual growth 
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rate. To compensate for skewness, we used the natural log of the category means of 
both variables in our regression analysis.  
 
3.3.1.3. Networking Ability 
To capture networking ability, three items from the networking-ability scale of the 
Political Skill Inventory (Ferris et al., 2005; Ferris et al., 2007) were adapted to an 
entrepreneurial context and used. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate on a 
seven-point scale to what extent the people in their founding team who liaise with 
external partners a) had already spent substantial time and effort networking with 
others, b) had been good at building relationships with influential people, and c) had 
been good at using their connections and network to make things happen even before 
the new venture was founded. The Cronbach’s alpha for the three items in our study 
was .87 and thus equal to the value reported for the networking-ability scale in 
previous studies (Blass et al., 2007; Ferris et al., 2005). 
 
3.3.1.4. Developmental Status of the Institutional Environment  
To account for the differences in the institutional environments, we followed the 
method used by Batjargal (2008; 2010a) and constructed a dummy variable. This 
dummy variable took the value of one for the German and zero for the Brazilian 
context because, as already described above in detail, Brazil scores consistently lower 
than Germany on all relevant indicators for the quality of institutional environment 
such as contract enforceability, property rights, the likelihood of crime and violence, 
and the extent to which public power is seen as being exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2006). 
 
3.3.1.5. New Venture Size  
We assessed new venture size by asking respondents to indicate the number of 
founders and current employees, in their organization. We then aggregated the two 
measures. In addition to employing new venture size as a moderator when testing 
hypothesis 2, we included it as a control in all other analyses. In doing so, we 
accounted for the fact that new venture size and financial performance are expected to 
be closely related (Birley, 1987; Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005). Thus, we were able to 
specifically address the potential effect of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on new 
venture financial performance, which may––as theorized above, and also addressed by 
Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming)––be explained by the impact of entrepreneurs’ 
networking abilities on the network characteristics of their new ventures. 
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3.3.1.6. Controls 
As Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) demonstrate, network structures may vary 
substantially across industries that differ in terms of technological dynamism and 
uncertainty and we expect entrepreneurs in Germany and Brazil to potentially differ 
regarding the propensity to found a high-tech venture. Therefore we included a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a firm belongs to a high-tech industry. Taking 
into account that entrepreneurs in Brazil and Germany have been found to differ with 
respect to industry sector participation (Kelley, Singer, & Herrington, 2012), and that 
industry sector may potentially influence the relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
individual skills and new venture performance, we also included a dummy variable 
indicating whether the new venture is operating in services or not. Furthermore, we 
included company age as a control variable for two reasons: First, we wanted to 
empirically eliminate effects that are grounded in the liability of newness (Freeman et 
al., 1983). Second, venture age typically corresponds to a firm’s resource base and 
legitimacy, and thus may influence its revenue potential (Stam & Elfring, 2008). To 
capture company age, we asked our respondents to indicate how many (complete) 
years the new venture had been operating.  
 
3.3.2. Data and Construct Validity 
Based on the data-validation efforts made by Semrau and Sigmund (forthcoming) for 
the German data, we took considerable efforts to also ensure the validity of the data 
from Brazil. To test for response bias, we grouped responses by arrival date and 
compared early to late respondents with respect to several of our independent and 
dependent variables using one-way analyses of variance. Additionally, we checked for 
nonresponse bias to the extent that anonymous respondents more closely resembled 
nonrespondents (BarNir & Smith, 2002), by comparing the answers of anonymous 
respondents in our sample with those who provided us with company names and e-
mail addresses. 
To check for common-method bias, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test 
(Harman, 1967). The basic idea of Harman’s one-factor test is that if a substantial 
quantity of common-method variance exists, either one dominant factor will account 
for most of the covariance amongst the variables or only one single factor will 
emerge. To check for this potential threat to the validity of our results, we entered all 
our variables in the study into a factor analysis and found that five factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one were extracted. With the first factor explaining just 20 
percent of the variance, we concluded that common-method variance is not a severe 
problem in our study. 
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Additionally, we compared our data with external sources of information to ensure its 
validity. For the new ventures in both countries, research assistants searched the 
internet for information on those companies that provided their company names and 
collected all the data relevant to our study, such as firm age and the number of 
founding team members. The correlations between the self-reported measures and 
internet data were all highly significant and ranged from r = .96 (p < .00, N = 67) for 
company age to r = .98 (p < .00, N = 60) for the number of founding team members. 
 Furthermore, all founders who contacted the researchers after participating in 
the survey were asked to provide the contact details of a person outside their company 
who is acquainted with the founding team members and whom we could interview to 
validate some of the answers given. As a result of this strategy, 53 people (33 
Brazilians and 20 Germans) were contacted and asked to rate the founding team 
members’ networking ability. The correlations between founders’ perceptions about 
founding team members’ networking ability and how founders’ network ability was 
perceived by others ranged from r = .78 (p < .00, N = 53) to r = .84 (p < .00, N = 53) 
for the items used. 
Whereas the answers provided on new ventures’ financial performance in 
Germany were validated by making use of listings in the commercial register and the 
information available via databases (Semrau & Sigmund, forthcoming), we followed 
Batjargal’s (2010a) approach and validated the financial-performance information 
provided by entrepreneurs in Brazil with taxation-department officials. To do so, we 
submitted the revenue information of 20 randomly chosen companies to the taxation 
department. From these 20 companies, the taxation officials were able to identify 17 
and reported that 82 percent of our revenue information fit perfectly with their data. 
As a result, we are confident that the financial-performance data used in our study are 
of sufficient validity.  
 
3.4. Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables in our sample are shown 
in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
N= 283 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Revenue 407491.13 1395429.30 1 .087 .078 .432* -.012 .153* -.026 -.071 
2. Revenue growth 39.89 59.76  1 .077 .001 .108 -.158* .022 .066 
3. Networking ability 3.88 1.61   1 .093 -.106 -.060 .023 .065 
4. Venture size 7.61 15.68    1 -,100 ,253* ,070 -,083 
5. Inst. env. (Germany) .56 .50     1 -.047 -.061 .256* 
6. Company age 4.09 2.68      1 .061 -.013 
7. High-tech industry .59 .49       1 .161* 
8. Service provider .74 .44        1 
* p < .05, two-tailed test 
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We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical-moderated regression analyses, which 
allow us to compare alternative regression models with and without interaction terms. 
As recommended by Aiken and West (1991) and Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004), we 
mean-centered and standardized all our non-binary independent variables and 
moderator variables. We then formed the interaction term by multiplying the 
respective measures.  
 Computing our regression, we first entered the control variables before testing 
the isolated effect of networking ability in the second step. In the third and fourth step 
we included the two interaction terms to test our moderation hypotheses. For all of the 
models, we computed several regression diagnostics and checked the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) to exclude multicollinearity. The VIFs for all our variables, 
including the interaction terms, were significantly below 10, the most-commonly used 
threshold for collinearity (see, e.g. Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 2005; Hair et al., 2006; 
Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). Variance inflation should thus not 
be an issue in our study. 
With respect to our control variables, the regression results depicted in Table 
3.2 underscore the correlation results depicted in Table 3.1. Specifically, Table 3.2 
reveals a significant, positive relationship between company age and revenue but not 
between company age and revenue growth. Additionally, a positive relationship 
between new venture size and our dependent variables becomes obvious. Finally, our 
results suggest that service providers realize lower levels of revenue than other new 
ventures. 
With respect to our hypotheses, our regression results provide confirming 
evidence for Hypothesis 1, stating that networking ability has a significant positive 
impact on new venture performance irrespective of the institutional context. First, 
Table 3.2 reveals a positive effect of networking ability on revenue in Models 2 to 5 
as well as on revenue growth in Models 7 to 10. An additional split-sample analysis 
confirmed that this result is not predominantly driven by the German entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, the analysis of the Brazilian subsample revealed a significant, positive 
relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ revenue (β 
= .207, p < .05), as well as new ventures’ revenue growth (β = .411, p < .05).  
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Table 3.2. Results of ierarchical Regression Analyses 
Revenue  Revenue Growth 
N = 283 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Constant 11.578** 11.60** 11.592** 11.593** 11.613**  2.144** 2.162** 2.164** 2.164** 2.147** 
Service provider -.371* -.427* -.473** -.485** -.482**  .307 .256 .237 .189 .211 
High-tech industry -.116 -.118 -.057 -.052 -.069  .038 .040 .065 .084 .078 
Company age .515** .537** .474** .468** .481**  -.025 -.005 -.033 -.060 -.070 
Inst. env. (Germany) .476** .540** .642** .644** .658**  .217 .270 .314 .325 .330 
Venture size .509** .482** .953** .962** .618**  .180+ .156 .357* .402* .417 
            
Networking ability  .251** .243** .296* .252*   .217* .212* .447* .424* 
            
Networking ability × Venture size   -.566** -,578** -.239    -.241 -.294+ -.207 
Networking ability × Inst. env.    -.085 -.045     -.377+ .355 
Venture size × Inst. env.     .568*      -.001 
            
Networking ability × Venture size × Inst. env.     -.559**      -.147 
R² .321 .347 .413 .414 .431  .021 .035 .044 .054 .056 
ΔR²  .026 .066 .001 .017   .014 .009 .010 .002 
adjusted R² .309 .333 .398 .397 .410  .003 .014 .020 .026 .021 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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When entering the two-way interaction term to test for the negative moderating effect 
of new venture size, we also find confirming evidence for Hypothesis 2. In particular, 
Table 3.2 reveals a significant negative moderating impact of venture size on the 
relationship between networking ability and revenue (Model 3, β = -.566, p < .01), 
which is also depicted in the interaction diagram in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Moderating Impact of Venture Size 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new ventures’ 
revenue are clearly positively related for smaller ventures but not for larger ones. 
Underlining this result, Model 4 shows that the negative moderating effect of venture 
size persists (β = -.578, p < .01), even when we include the additional interaction term 
necessary for testing our subsequent hypothesis. Providing further support for our 
second hypothesis, a marginally significant negative moderating effect of venture size 
on the relationship between networking ability and revenue growth––which is 
narrowly missed in Model 8 (β = -.241, p = .11)––becomes evident when we control 
for the interaction between networking ability and institutional environment (Model 9, 
β = -.294, p < .10). To test for the stability of this result, we additionally re-estimated 
our models, employing the number of employees instead of the aggregated number of 
employees and founders as a measure for new venture size. The results of these 
additional analyses clearly support our findings. 
In contrast, our data do not provide clear support for Hypothesis 3. Even though 
the interaction term between institutional environment and networking ability meets 
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the threshold for marginal significance in Model 9 (β = -.377, p < .10), we find no 
convincing evidence for the notion that the relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability and a new venture’s financial performance of is weaker in more-
developed institutional contexts in general. 
In contrast, our three-way interaction analysis provides significant support for 
Hypothesis 4, which proposed that the negative moderating effect of venture size on 
the relationship between entrepreneurs’ networking ability and their new ventures’ 
financial performance is significantly stronger in more-developed institutional 
contexts. Technically speaking, Hypothesis 4 thus implies a negative three-way-
interaction among venture size, institutional environment, and entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability, which we find clear evidence for in our data (Model 5, β = -.559, p 
< .01). 
 
3.5. Discussion 
This study aimed at extending previous research on the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and a new venture’s financial performance. Our 
results first of all provide evidence for the notion that entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability is an individual-level skill relevant for the performance of new ventures in 
different institutional environments. This evidence confirms and extends earlier 
research showing that certain individual-level characteristics of entrepreneurs, such as 
self-commitment, self-efficacy, or dynamism are of relevance for entrepreneurial 
activity and success in various and diverse settings (Kiss, Danis, & Cavusgil, 2012). 
From a practical point of view, this result implies that irrespective of the quality of the 
institutional environment surrounding them, entrepreneurs should consider either 
including people with significant networking abilities into their founding team, and/or 
seeking assistance and training to improve their own networking abilities when trying 
to found and successfully operate a newly founded venture.  
This insight, however, also offers some avenues for further research. In 
particular, we have to acknowledge that our data do not reflect whether the networking 
behavior and strategies that make some entrepreneurs better networkers than others are 
similar in different institutional contexts. In view of the fact that recent research 
presented by Batjargal (2010a), point out that some networking strategies, such as 
brokering between disconnected actors, might be accepted and successful in one 
context but even punished and unsuccessful in a different institutional environment, 
we explicitly want to encourage further research to help explain the kind of behavior 
and strategies that entrepreneurs who are highly skilled and successful in networking 
use in different national or institutional contexts. 
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Confirming our second hypothesis, our results show that the positive impact of 
networking ability on the financial performance of a new venture is moderated by its 
size. More specifically, our results suggest that the financial performance of smaller 
ventures tend to profit significantly more from the distinct networking ability of their 
entrepreneurs than does the financial performance of larger ventures. Providing 
evidence for our theoretical reasoning that ventures suffering from a liability of 
smallness benefit from entrepreneurs’ networking ability, this result complements 
previous findings on the decreasing performance relevance of entrepreneurs’ 
individual-level characteristics in the course of a new venture’s development (Frank et 
al., 2007; Semrau & Sigmund, forthcoming). Considering that we control for venture 
age when testing for the moderating impact of venture size, our results additionally 
underscore previous research results showing that the effects of the liability of 
newness and smallness are conceptually and empirically distinct (Brüderl et al., 1992; 
Freeman et al., 1983). 
With regard to our third hypothesis, which posits a general moderating effect of 
the institutional environment, we find no confirming evidence. As such, this finding 
clearly contradicts existing evidence for the notion that the ability to establish network 
ties may be more important for new ventures in less-developed institutional contexts 
than in fully developed ones (Danis, De Clercq, & Petricevic, 2011; Lee et al., 2001). 
At least partially, however, this contradiction may be resolved when also considering 
the results related to our fourth hypothesis, as well as the differences in the theoretical 
reasoning underlying both propositions. Specifically, when testing our fourth 
hypothesis, we found that whereas the impact of entrepreneurs’ networking ability on 
the financial performance of new ventures largely decreases with venture size in a 
more-developed institutional environment, such an effect is not observable in the less-
developed institutional context. Put differently, this finding suggests that whereas 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability seems to be equally relevant across contexts that 
differ with respect to the developmental status of their institutions as long as a venture 
is small, this individual skill is relatively more important in less-developed 
institutional contexts for larger ventures.  
From a theoretical point of view, this result may also be explained by the fact 
that irrespective of the institutional context, small ventures’ resource exchange is 
predominantly based on network-relationships, whereas when the ventures grow 
market- and contract-based exchanges become more important (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; 
Schutjens & Stam, 2003). As a consequence, differences in institutional environments, 
which have an impact on contract enforceability and reliability, do not play a 
significant role for the relevance of entrepreneurs’ networking ability as long as the 
venture is small, because entrepreneurs in less- as well as in more-developed 
institutional settings have to compensate for a lack of organizational legitimacy by 
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making use of their individual networking skills to develop the exchange relationships 
needed. Conversely, the question of whether a contract is more or less enforceable in a 
specific institutional environment seems to become much more relevant as a venture 
grows. Additionally, and in-line with empirical evidence showing that entrepreneurs in 
Germany should delegate network management responsibilities in the course of their 
new ventures’ development to be more successful (Maurer & Ebers, 2006), a more-
developed institutional environment seems to enable new ventures that have grown in 
size to become more and more independent from network relationships that are 
socially embedded and involve the entrepreneurs themselves. In contrast, our results 
indicate that even when already grown to a considerable size, new ventures in a 
context with a less-stable rule of law are much more dependent on entrepreneurs’ 
engagement in developing and managing network relationships and connections to 
political actors. 
From a practical point of view, this finding is particularly relevant for 
entrepreneurs who are thinking about internationalizing businesses that have reached a 
significant size. For them, our results imply that they have to carefully evaluate 
whether their personal networking abilities are needed in the international context they 
want to enter, and whether they want to personally engage more intensely in the 
process of developing contacts to exchange partners and political actors in the new 
environment when the institutional context is less developed. 
Connected to this point, however, we clearly have to admit that our study is 
based on the data from just two different institutional contexts, which does not allow 
us to more specifically attribute the observed effects to particular differences in the 
institutional environment (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Consequently, we want to encourage 
further research to build on and extend our results by analyzing the question of how 
differences in institutional environments might explain the effects of entrepreneurs’ 
networking ability––or other individual-level skills and attributes––in other 
institutional contexts and in more detail.  
Before concluding, we have to note two other limitations of our study. 
Specifically, we have to acknowledge that our cross-sectional research design may 
raise the issue of causality. Even though the networking ability items we used have a 
timeline that supports the direction of influence proposed in our hypotheses, a clear 
causal interpretation of our results may remain problematic. In general, one could 
reverse the interpretation of the pertinent results to some extent and say that the 
existence of positive financial performance could lead to a self-perception of strong 
networking ability. However, there are several arguments against this interpretation. 
First, there are a number of studies with longitudinal designs showing that networking 
ability clearly predicts work outcomes (Ferris et al., 2005; Hochwarter et al., 2007). 
Additionally, previous research indicates that networking abilities are quite stable over 
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time (Treadway et al., 2007). Moreover, we also have to acknowledge as a limitation 
of our study that the data collections in Germany and Brazil were not conducted 
simultaneously, which may potentially have had an impact on our results. However, 
there only was a very small time lag between the two periods of data collection, which 
were both conducted in 2009. Additionally, all the items used to capture variables that 
are not time-invariant had a clear timeline referring to the end of 2008. Even though 
we are not able to completely rule out that the not-perfectly synchronized periods of 
data collection might have had an effect, we are confident that our results are not 
seriously biased. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to extend previous research on the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and a new venture’s financial performance. In doing 
so, we shed more light on how venture size, differences in institutional environments, 
as well as the interplay of both variables affects the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ networking ability and new ventures’ financial performance. The 
results of our analyses not only show a significant moderating effect of venture size 
but additionally emphasize that whereas the impact of entrepreneurs’ networking 
ability on the financial performance of new ventures diminishes with venture size in a 
developed institutional environment, its relevance persists when the venture grows in a 
less-developed institutional context. Revealing this complex interaction between the 
individual, organizational, and environmental variables, our study makes a significant 
contribution to the literature, as it answers the calls for better contextualizing 
entrepreneurship research (Welter, 2011), and for shedding more light on how a 
combination of individual-level, organizational-level, and environmental variables 
may help to explain new venture performance (Korunka et al., 2003; Rauch & Frese, 
2007). 
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Chapter 4  
 
Identity-Based vs. Calculative Ties: A Comparative Analysis of 
Their Impact on New Venture Financial Performance 
 
4.1. Introduction 
New ventures’ performance is at the core of entrepreneurship research (Gartner, 1985; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997). Over the past decade, 
entrepreneurship research has made considerable progress in understanding the factors 
influencing this variable. One factor that figures prominently in this research area is 
new ventures’ exchange networks (Street & Cameron, 2007). From an egocentric 
perspective, a venture’s exchange network can be defined as the set of its exchange 
relationships that go beyond simple market exchange (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lee et 
al., 2001; Oczan & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
A widespread approach in assessing the link between a new venture’s exchange 
network and its performance is to examine the effects associated with network size. 
Indeed, many studies have found that, in general, the more extensive new ventures’ 
exchange networks are, the more successful the ventures are in terms of financial 
performance (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Lavie, 2007; Singh, 2000; Slotte-Kock & 
Coviello, 2010). The rationale behind this effect is that founders are typically unable to 
succeed by relying solely on internal resources. Instead, they must also utilize the 
external support provided by network relationships to cope with their resource needs 
and achieve economic success (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Jarillo, 1993; Stuart, 
Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). 
Researchers have also argued, however, that the overall size of a new ventures’ 
exchange network may hide other, more differentiated network characteristics that 
play an important role. In fact, Hite and Hesterly (2001) propose that different ties may 
fulfill different duties. Specifically, they argue that a new venture’s identity-based 
exchange relationships, i.e. those based on entrepreneurs’ social connections with 
family and friends, may be a valuable asset in early stages of a new ventures 
development; however, calculative exchange relationships, i.e. ties added to the new 
venture’s exchange network after founding, must be established in the course of the 
new venture’s development to ensure persistent growth.  
Clear empirical evidence for this notion is, however, currently lacking. The only 
two studies to date that explicitly address the post-founding performance implications 
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of identity-based ties generate ambiguous results. Hansen (1995) concludes in his 
qualitative study that the number of identity-based ties is positively associated with 
new venture performance after founding. Lechner Dowling and Welpe (2006), on the 
other hand, found no effect of identity-based ties on new venture performance directly 
after founding and even a negative effect in subsequent years. Conversely, the authors 
show that ties with competitors, reputational ties, and marketing ties established after 
founding are positively related to new venture performance. 
 This study aims to resolve this ambiguity and to contribute to our understanding 
of the performance implications of different types of exchange ties by comparatively 
assessing the role of identity-based and calculative ties in different facets of new 
venture financial performance. To do so, I first develop detailed hypotheses regarding 
the performance implications of identity-based and calculative ties. Specifically, I 
argue that the different types of ties influence two distinct facets of new venture 
financial performance––initial financial performance and subsequent growth, 
respectively––which have been found to be only modestly correlated (see, for 
example, Chandler & Hanks, 1993; Combs et al., 2005; Murphy et al., 1996; Tosi et 
al., 2000).  
The present study complements and extends previous findings on the 
relationship between exchange network characteristics and new venture financial 
performance. First, it offers empirical evidence supporting Hite and Hesterly’s (2001) 
suggestion that identity-based ties and calculative ties fulfill different duties and 
clearly highlights the notion that entrepreneurs must change the composition of their 
exchange networks for their new ventures to grow. Second, it complements the 
findings of Hansen (1995) and Lechner et al. (2006) regarding the association between 
identity-based exchange relationships and new venture financial performance and 
sheds further light on how these effects may be explained. Finally, it bears clear 
practical implications for entrepreneurs. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present my theoretical 
reasoning and develop the hypotheses. I then describe the research method, present the 
results of the analysis, and discuss their implications. The paper closes with some 
remarks on the contribution and limitations of this study. 
 
4.2. Theory 
As expressed in the theoretical constructs of the liability of newness and the liability of 
smallness, new ventures are characterized by a lack of internal resources 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Acquiring external resources by developing network exchange 
relationships is thus considered a crucial asset for new venture development and 
performance (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Maurer & Ebers, 2006).  
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Addressing how exchange network characteristics affect new venture performance, a 
number of studies conclude that the number of network ties is positively associated 
with new venture financial performance. For instance, Lee and Tsang (2001) found 
that network size is positively related to new venture growth in sales and profit. 
Similarly, Zhao and Aram (1995) found that high-growth new ventures have 
significantly larger exchange networks than low-growth new ventures. The underlying 
argument of these studies is that larger networks hold a greater quantity and a greater 
variety of resources, which makes it more probable that the founder receives the 
resources needed. 
However, others have argued that addressing the mere size of the exchange 
network may not sufficient and that a more fine-grained examination of the 
composition of the new ventures’ exchange networks may provide further insights. 
Specifically, Hite and Hesterly (2001) argue that identity-based ties fulfill other duties 
than calculative ties.  
To date, however, empirical research on network development is still 
underdeveloped (Lechner et al., 2006). Virtually no studies comparatively address the 
impact of these two types of ties. Thus, to address this gap, I will subsequently develop 
detailed hypotheses on how identity-based and calculative ties differ in terms of their 
influence on new venture financial performance. Specifically, I will derive why I 
expect identity-based ties to be related to the initial financial performance of a new 
venture, whereas adding calculative ties in the course of a new venture’s development 
should have a stronger positive effect on subsequent growth in financial performance.  
 
4.2.1. The Impact of Identity-Based Ties on Initial Financial Performance 
As indicated above, it is widely recognized that entrepreneurs must rely on external 
support to obtain necessary resources when founding and developing a new venture 
(Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Jarillo, 1993; Stuart et al., 1999). Several studies provide 
evidence for the notion that identity-based ties may provide resources and, thus, have a 
positive effect on entrepreneurial success. Davidsson and Honig (2003), for example, 
provide empirical evidence for the notion that nascent entrepreneurs who are 
supported by more network ties based on personal relationships, such as relatives and 
friends, are more successful in advancing through the start-up process. Additionally, 
Hansen (1995) demonstrated in a qualitative study that the size of the identity-based 
exchange network has a positive effect on organizational performance. Based on these 
observations, I expect identity-based ties to impact new venture financial performance. 
However, I expect that such ties are primarily associated with new ventures’ initial 
financial performance and are much less relevant for the ventures’ subsequent 
financial performance growth. 
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When attempting to found a new venture, entrepreneurs are expected to rely on 
identity-based ties such as family members, friends, and existing business contacts to 
obtain access to critical resources such as financial capital, knowledge, and advice 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Starr & Macmillan, 1990). This is based on the fact that 
these ties are heavily socially embedded, meaning that interactions are not primarily 
economically motivated but rather based on personal relationships (Hite & Hesterly, 
2001). Consequently, identity-based ties are likely to agree on being involved in an 
exchange relationship with a new venture and provide resources such as information, 
and knowledge, and financial capital on attractive terms (Coleman, 1990; Krackhardt, 
1992), even when more distant exchange partners may refuse to do so. For example, 
an entrepreneur might gain access to financial capital from close friends or family 
even when acquaintances or potential business partners are unwilling to invest because 
the survival and success of the newly founded business is highly uncertain.  
Moreover, relying on socially embedded exchange relationships may even be 
associated with a high level of exchange efficiency. Because exchange partners know 
each other well from the start of their collaboration, misunderstandings and conflicts 
are unlikely. This enables entrepreneurs to achieve superior initial performance (Uzzi, 
1997; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
In summary, I expect that new ventures with a greater number of identity-based 
exchange relationships are able to draw on a more extensive pool of external resources 
at attractive terms and, thus, should be able to achieve superior initial financial 
performance. Accordingly, I propose: 
 
H1. The number of identity-based ties brought into a new venture’s network will 
positively influence the venture’s initial financial performance. 
 
4.2.2. The Impact of Calculative Ties on Growth in Financial Performance 
As indicated above, researchers have also shown that greater numbers of calculative 
exchange network ties also foster new venture performance (Lechner et al., 2006). 
However, as I argue below, I expect these calculative exchange ties to be primarily 
associated with new ventures’ financial performance growth. 
As described above, entrepreneurs in the early stages of the new venture 
development process may rely on external support from ties previously known. 
However, once a venture is fully operating, it evolves through different stages of 
development (Bhide, 1999; Churchill & Lewis, 1983) that are associated with different 
strategic contexts and varying resource needs (Aldrich & Reese, 1993; Quinn & 
Cameron, 1983). To meet these needs, it is not sufficient to simply rely on identity-
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based exchange relationships (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lechner & Dowling, 2003; 
Maurer & Ebers, 2006), as identity-based exchange networks are typically densely 
constructed—thus, ties tend to control similar resources (Lechner et al., 2006). This 
subsequently restricts the diversity of resources available through these ties (Burt, 
1992). As a result, entrepreneurs must adapt their exchange networks by establishing 
exchange relationships with new partners in order to successfully develop their 
business (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Hite, 2005; Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Witt, 
2004). These newly established and purposefully functional calculative ties will more 
likely be able to provide access to the resources needed to face the challenges that 
evolve in the course of a new venture’s development (Hite & Hesterly, 2001).  
 In line with this reasoning, I expect that, whereas identity-based ties are 
important for the initial financial performance of a new venture, calculative exchange 
ties established after the venture’s founding will affect subsequent financial 
performance growth. I thus hypothesize: 
 
H2. The number of calculative ties established in the course of a new ventures 
development will have a positive impact on new ventures’ financial performance 
growth. 
 
4.3. Method 
To test the hypotheses on the comparative impact of identity-based and calculative ties 
on new ventures’ initial performance and subsequent growth, I examined data on new 
ventures between one and three years of age. First, Semrau and Sigmund 
(forthcoming) have shown that the relevance of exchange network ties for new venture 
performance is particularly high up to a venture age of three years. Second, due to a 
lack of archival data on some variables necessary for the analyses, I had to rely on 
retrospective information provided by respondents. However, restricting the sample to 
new ventures between one and three years of age limited the length of the recall period 
to a maximum of three years, thus minimizing a possible recall bias (Gibson & 
Bonggeun, 2007). 
 To obtain a sufficiently large sample, I combined data on new ventures from 
two different data sets. The first data set was collected in 2009 via an online 
questionnaire. Institutions organizing business plan competitions and coordinating 
startup funds sent their alumni an electronic link to an online questionnaire. Of the 
completed responses, which have been used previously by Semrau and Sigmund 
(forthcoming) and Sigmund, Semrau, and Wegner (forthcoming), 71 new ventures met 
the age criterion and were thus appropriate for use in this study. 
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The second set of data was collected in 2010 also via an online questionnaire. 
Entrepreneurs currently participating in business incubators in Germany were invited 
to participate. To ensure a high response rate, entrepreneurs’ contact information was 
obtained from the homepages of incubator organizations. Founders were then 
contacted by phone and, if willing to participate, sent an e-mail containing the link to 
the online questionnaire. A total of 408 founders accessed the questionnaire and 137 
(33.6 %) completed it. Of these 137 respondents, 85 were involved in a new venture 
between one and three years of age. 
 Because response bias may be an issue in this study, I compared early 
respondents to late respondents in both data sets on several independent and dependent 
variables. Additionally, I tested for nonresponse bias by comparing the respondents 
who revealed their identity to respondents who did not. The presumption is that 
anonymous respondents more closely resemble nonrespondents (BarNir & Smith, 
2002). In all comparisons, no significant differences were found. 
 I also examined whether the data was biased with respect to new-venture 
performance. To do so, I compared the average financial performance growth rates 
reported by respondents with the respective industry averages, which I obtained from 
the German Federal Statistical Office. The comparison revealed that, across industries, 
42 percent of respondents reported a growth rate at or even below the industry 
standard. Given that growth rates of younger ventures are expected to be higher, on 
average, than the industry standard (Chandler & Hanks, 1993), I believe that my 
sample is not seriously biased in terms of performance. 
 To ensure that the sample was representative, I compared the sample to data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is often used for research 
on German entrepreneurs, as it is a representative household panel survey conducted 
annually by the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin (Caliendo et al., 
2009; Mueller, 2006; Schäfer & Talavera, 2009). The comparison revealed a high 
degree of similarity between the entrepreneurs within the SOEP and the entrepreneurs 
in the joint sample. For instance, a relatively high percentage of male founders is 
reflected in the data from both the SOEP (69 percent) (Caliendo et al., 2009) and the 
current sample (66 percent). Likewise, the average level of entrepreneurs’ education in 
the sample and the SOEP is quite high. Finally, the sample contains firms operating in 
many different industries, such as life sciences, information technology, chemical 
products, construction, food, and education, thus enhancing the representativeness of 
the current sample. 
Because the data analyzed in this study is self-reported, I also tested for 
common method bias by employing Harman’s one-factor test. The test revealed four 
distinct factors with an eigenvalue greater than one. The four factors accounted for 65 
percent of the total variance, with the first factor explaining 21 percent of the variance 
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and no one factor accounting for most of it. Thus, I am confident that the data is not 
seriously biased. I further tested the validity of the data by comparing self-reports with 
available external sources of information. Information was available on the Internet for 
74 companies that identified themselves during data collection. The correlations 
between the self-reported data and the information from the Internet regarding firm 
age, number of employees, and number of founding team members were all highly 
significant and ranged from r = .97 (p < .01, N = 74) for company age to r = 1 (p < .01, 
N = 74) for the number of founding team members. To ensure the validity of the 
financial performance measure used in this study, I followed Semrau and Sigmund 
(forthcoming). In Germany, small firms must be listed with the local chamber of 
commerce and in the commercial register when they meet certain criteria (Brüderl et 
al., 1992; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990). Service companies must be listed if they 
achieve revenues of at least €75,000; and production companies if they realize 
revenues of at least €150,000. Making use of these criteria, I examined whether the 
ventures included in the dataset were listed. The result of this search showed that every 
company that should be listed according to the self-reported data was indeed listed and 
vice versa. Additionally, I searched three German firm databases––Hoppenstedt, 
Dafne and Creditreform––for revenue data on the firms included in the sample. As a 
result, I was able to compare the revenue data provided by 17 respondents with 
database entries and found the data to be highly correlated (r = .96; p < .01). In 
summary, I am confident that the financial performance data used in this study is of 
considerable validity. 
  
4.3.1. Measures 
4.3.1.1. Initial Financial Performance and Growth in Financial Performance  
To capture new ventures’ financial performance, I used three items that have been 
shown to be reliable and valid in prior research (Chandler & Hanks, 1993, 1998; 
Honig et al., 2006; Lee & Tsang, 2001). Specifically, I asked respondents to indicate 
in broad categories their current financial performance in terms of revenue, as well as 
accumulated revenue and profit growth for the last three years (or in comparison to the 
first 12 months of operation if the venture was younger than three years). I chose this 
scale format because it is considered helpful to overcome problems caused by 
unwillingness to disclose detailed financial information and also helps to address the 
problem that, even when business owners are willing to share financial performance 
data, the accuracy of their figures cannot be taken for granted (Zahra et al., 2002). 
To assess revenue in the 2009 data set, 9 categories ranging from 1 (revenue up 
to 50 TEUR) to 9 (revenue of more than 10 MEUR) were used. To assess revenue and 
profit growth, respondents were asked to indicate their accumulated growth in seven 
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categories ranging from 1 (less than 5% growth) to 7 (more than 200% growth). In the 
2010 data collection, similar but more differentiated items were used. The lowest 
answer categories of the three items were divided in three (revenue) and two (revenue 
and profit growth) additional categories, respectively. Consequently, 11 categories 
were used to capture revenue and 8 to measure revenue and profit growth. Before 
combining the two data sets, I thus merged the lowest categories for the financial 
performance items in the 2010 data set. I then divided the category means of the 
indicated growth rates by three (or company age if the company was younger than 
three years) to obtain comparable average growth rates. Because revenue growth and 
profit growth were highly correlated (r = .85, p < .001), I aggregated both items to a 
single measure reflecting growth in financial performance. I then constructed an 
indicator for new ventures’ initial financial performance by reducing the category 
means of the current revenue by the cumulated revenue growth since the venture was 
founded. To correct for skewness, I conducted all analyses using the natural log of the 
performance measures (Yli-Renko et al., 2001). 
 
4.3.1.2. Network Variables  
The network data was collected according to an ego-centered perspective (Knoke & 
Yang, 2008; Wassermann & Faust, 1994). In line with Lechner et al. (2006), network 
exchange partners were defined as individuals outside the young enterprise who 
provide resources within an exchange relationship that goes beyond a simple market 
exchange.  
To capture the number of identity-based and calculative ties within the new 
ventures’ exchange networks, respondents in both data sets were asked to indicate the 
current number of exchange ties as well as the number of exchange partners with 
whom none of the founding team members was connected before the new venture was 
founded. The latter measure was used as an indicator for the number of calculative 
exchange ties. To capture the number of identity-based ties, i.e. ties based on social 
relationships, I computed the difference between the number of current ties and the 
number of calculative ties.  
Because the number of identity-based ties reported for a new venture two or 
three years of age may not exactly represent the number of identity-based ties that the 
venture had in its first year of operation, I constructed a variety of measures to test for 
the stability of my results. Specifically, I made use of the fact that respondents in both 
data sets were also asked to indicate the number of the new ventures’ exchange 
relationships that had been terminated since the new venture was founded. Because 
this measure does not differentiate between identity-based and calculative ties, I 
calculated three alternative sets of measures for identity-based and calculative ties by: 
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a) adding the number of terminated ties to the reported number of identity-based ties; 
b) adding the number of terminated ties to the reported number of calculative ties, and 
c) adding half of the terminated ties to the reported number of identity-based ties and 
half to the reported number of calculative ties. I then used all three measures to test the 
stability of the results. 
 
4.3.1.3. Controls 
I included several control variables in the analyses. The financial performance 
potential as well as the number of partners that can be managed by a new company 
may be influenced by the number of individuals involved in the new venture 
(Batjargal, 2006). Consequently, I controlled for the number of founding team 
members as well as the number of employees (at founding) and employment growth. 
 Since younger ventures typically have a smaller resource base (Stam & Elfring, 
2008), which may influence their financial performance potential, I also controlled for 
firm age. Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) demonstrate that exchange network 
structures may vary substantially across industries that differ in terms of technological 
dynamism and uncertainty. Accordingly, I included a dummy variable to indicate 
whether a firm belongs to a high-tech industry.  
 As research suggests that founders’ intentions and attitudes are considered 
stable over time and might influence a new venture’s performance, I also controlled 
for founders’ growth aspiration (Delmar & Wiklund, 2008). Additionally, researchers 
have shown that the resource base that entrepreneurs can draw on is associated with 
new venture success (Baron & Tang, 2009). Accordingly, I also controlled for the 
ventures’ resource scarcity.  
 Moreover, I controlled for the year in which data collection took place, as the 
two approaches differed considerably. Finally, I sequentially controlled for effects of 
the year in which the venture was founded and industry, such as life sciences, 
information technology, chemical products, construction, food, education, and 
clothing. 
 
4.3.2. Analysis  
I tested the hypotheses using hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Stam & Elfring, 
2008). Computing the regression, I first entered the control variables before testing the 
competing effect of the identity-based and calculative ties. For all models, I computed 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) to exclude multicollinearity. The VIFs for all 
variables across all models were less than two. Even according to the strict threshold 
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of five favored by some authors (see, e.g. Menard, 2002), variance inflation was likely 
not an issue in this study. 
 
4.4. Results 
Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables analyzed 
in this study. The correlations between the main independent variables and the 
dependent variables were significant, which is in line with the hypotheses.  Table 4.1 
also shows that the extent to which entrepreneurs are involved in adding exchange 
relationships to their new ventures’ networks in the course of its development is 
significantly, positively related to the size of the identity-based exchange network. 
This pattern is in line with Milanov and Fernhaber’s (2009) finding that the size of the 
initial exchange network of a new venture is positively related to its size in subsequent 
periods. Furthermore, it seems noteworthy that a number of the controls included in 
the analysis positively relate to the dependent variables. First, there is a positive 
correlation between founders’ growth aspiration and employment growth, thus 
supporting earlier results on the influence of founders’ intentions (Delmar & Wiklund, 
2008). Second, company age and firm size measures show the expected significant 
correlations with the dependent variables.  
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Table 4.1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 N = 156 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  
1 Financial performance (in T€) 1             
2 
Initial financial performance (in 
T€) 
.782* 1            
3 
Financial performance growth 
(in %) 
.432* .192* 1           
4 No. of identity-based ties .319* .250* .181 1          
5 No. of calculative ties .317* .188 .282* .385* 1         
6 No. of employees .484* .395* .286 .061 .154 1        
7 No. of employees at founding .245* .264* .063 .088 -.075 .420* 1       
8 Employment growth .348* .302* .205* .003 .234* .693* -.037 1      
9 No. of founders .268* .159* .113 .194* .011 .346* .255* .244* 1     
10 Company age .322* .209 .264* -.013 .036 .136 .038 .095 .036 1    
11 High-Tech-Industry (Dummy) .111 .078 .068 .165* .201* .066 .069 .116 .127 .100 1   
12 Resource scarcity .181 .131 -.008 .285* .270* .051 -.050 .088 .054 -.098 .030 1  
13 Growth aspiration .162* .082 .103 -.013 .096 .132 .205* .168* .132 -.032 -.013 .199 1 
 Means 88.967 56.114 57.694 .078 2.310 2.970 .7273 2.47 1.980 1.880 .621 3.880 5.41 
 S.D. 175.67 125.96 79.253 1.775 4.765 5.008 2.121 5.099 1.242 .819 .486 2.260 1.900 
* p < .05; two-tailed test 
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As depicted in Table 4.2, most of the effects of the control variables are also apparent 
in the regression analysis. 
Table 4.2. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
Initial financial 
performance 
 Financial performance 
growth N = 156 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Constant .960** .956**  .151 .158 
Year of survey -.342** -.303**  -.001 -.143 
      
High-tech industry .011 .015  .030 .060 
Growth aspiration .060 .068  .038 .044 
No. of founders  .074+ .048  .021 .014 
Resource scarcity  .137 .068  -.061 .061 
No. of employees (at founding for model 1 + 2) .244** .241**  .200+ .187+ 
Company age     .254** .243** 
Employment growth     .030 .001 
      
      
Identity-based ties   .189**   .124 
Calculative ties   .054   .219** 
      
∆ R² .106 .051  .137 .072 
adjusted R² .103 .151  .096 .160 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
With regard to the hypotheses, Model 2 in Table 4.2 shows considerable support for 
Hypothesis 1, which predicted a positive effect of identity-based ties on new ventures’ 
initial financial performance. Specifically, the observed effect of identity-based ties on 
initial performance is positive and significant (β = .189, p < .01, Model 2). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive effect of calculative ties on subsequent 
venture growth, which was also confirmed. Specifically, Model 4 in Table 4.2 shows 
that the number of calculative ties is positively and significantly associated with 
growth in new venture financial performance (β = .219, p < .01). However, as implied 
by my argumentation, there is no significant association between the number of 
identity-based ties and new venture financial growth (β = .124, p = .46).  
 To test the stability of the results, I re-estimated all models using the alternative 
measures for identity-based and calculative ties described above. The results of these 
analyses confirmed the results reported in Table 4.2. I also re-estimated the models 
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using split-samples comprising the data gathered in either 2009 or 2010 and again 
found the results confirmed. 
To further assess the overall consistency of my argumentation, I estimated a 
mediated regression with new venture current financial performance as the dependent 
variable, identity-based and calculative ties as independent variables, and new venture 
initial financial performance and growth as mediators. As depicted in Figure 4.1, I 
tested: a) whether the direct effects of identity-based ties on new venture financial 
performance is mediated by their initial financial performance; and b) whether the 
direct effect of calculative ties on new venture financial performance is mediated by 
their growth in financial performance.  
 
Figure 4.1. Tested Mediation Model  
Financial Performance
Financial Performance 
Growth
Identity-Based Ties
Initial Financial 
Performance
Calculative Ties
 
To test for these effects, I adopted the widely used procedure developed by Baron and 
Kenny (1986). According to their approach, a mediation effect is present if the 
following conditions are met: a) The independent variable is significantly related to the 
dependent variable and the mediator; b) the mediator significantly predicts the 
dependent variable; and c) the direct effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable is reduced when the mediating variable is added to the regression. 
A full mediation is indicated when the effect of the independent variable disappears 
when the mediator is added in the last step, whereas a reduction of the direct effect that 
leaves the effect significant would indicate a partial mediation. 
Overall, the results of the mediation analysis, as depicted in Table 4.3, indicate 
that the effect of identity-based and calculative ties on new venture financial 
performance is indeed mediated by their initial financial performance and financial 
performance growth, respectively. First, as described above and shown in Model 2 in 
Table 4.1, the number of identity-based ties is positively associated with new venture 
initial financial performance (β = .189, p < .01) and the number of calculative ties is 
positively related to financial performance growth (β = .219, p < .01, Model 4).
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Table 4.3. Results of Mediated Regression Analyses 
Financial Performance  
N = 156 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant .070 .070 .152* .163* .151* .152* 
Year of survey -.341** -.308** -.149** -.123** .-345** -.166** 
       
High-tech industry .026 .057 .007 .036 .047 .019 
Growth aspiration .110 .127* .099* .114* .121* .103* 
No. of founders  .098 .067 .090 .081 .055 .086 
Resource scarcity  .180 .080 .074 .033 .086 .039 
No. of employees .371** .350** .172+ .151+ .328* .191+ 
Company age  .304** .297** .103** .180** .243** .109* 
Employment growth  .002 .002 -.051 -.020 -.017 -.053 
       
Identity-based ties  .223**  .094 .195** .062 
Calculative ties  .138**  .126** .087 .078 
       
Initial financial performance   .629** .609**  .614** 
Growth in financial performance   .265**  .231** .232** 
       
∆ R² .369 .079 .385 .251 .121 .389 
adjusted R² .344 .418 .745 .716 .461 .752 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p <.01 
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Furthermore, as shown in Model 2 in Table 4.3, the number of identity-based (β = .223, p 
< .01) and calculative ties (β = .138, p < .01) is positively related to new venture current 
financial performance. In sum, as required by the first step of the Baron and Kenny (1986) 
procedure, the independent variables are significantly related to both the proposed 
mediator and the dependent variable. 
The second step requires that the proposed mediators are significantly related to the 
dependent variables. As shown in Model 3 in Table 4.3, this requirement is also met. 
Initial financial performance (β = .629, p < .01) and financial performance growth (β = 
.265, p < .01) are significantly related to a new venture current financial performance. 
Finally, when the independent variables and the proposed mediators are simultaneously 
included in the regression, results indicate a full mediation. As shown in Model 4 in Table 
4.3, entering initial financial performance into the regression eliminates the formerly 
significant effect of the number of identity-based ties on new venture financial 
performance (β is reduced from .223, p < .01, to .094, p = .65). As depicted in Model 5 in 
Table 4.3, the effect of calculative ties on new venture financial performance also 
disappears when financial performance growth is included in the regression (β is reduced 
from .138, p < .01, to .087, p = .43). As shown in Model 6 in Table 4.3, both results are 
also supported when tested simultaneously.  
Summing up the mediation analyses reveals that identity-based and calculative ties 
do indeed influence different aspects of new venture financial performance, namely initial 
financial performance and financial performance growth, which constitute new ventures’ 
current financial performance. Additionally, the mediation analysis reveals evidence for a 
sustaining effect of the number of identity-based ties on new venture financial 
performance. Specifically, the association between the number of identity-based ties and 
new venture financial performance remains significant even when controlling for financial 
performance growth, whereas the effect of calculative ties on financial performance 
disappears. This indicates that the effect of the identity-based ties on a new venture’s 
initial financial performance persists even after the first year of operation. 
 
4.5. Discussion  
The current study aimed to extend previous findings regarding the relevance of new 
ventures’ exchange network characteristics on performance. Specifically, it shed light on 
how two different types of network exchange relationships—identity-based ties, which 
stem from entrepreneurs’ social relationships that existed before the new venture was 
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founded, and calculative ties, which involve new network contacts—affect new venture 
performance. To address this question, I formulated and tested hypotheses on how the two 
types of ties foster different aspects of a new venture financial performance––initial 
financial performance and subsequent financial performance growth. 
Confirming the hypotheses, the results of this study provide empirical evidence for 
Hite and Hesterly’s (2001) claim that: 1) identity-based relationships are a valuable asset 
in the state of organizational emergence, as they provide necessary resources when other 
potential network partners may hesitate to cooperate with the new venture; and 2) the 
development of more calculative ties, which are not embedded in social relationships, is 
necessary to provide a greater breadth of resources and foster a new venture’s subsequent 
performance growth.  
Additionally, the current study complements and extends previous qualitative 
research conducted by Hansen (1995), which showed that identity-based ties are 
positively associated with new venture financial performance in the first year of 
operation.  
By shedding light on the specific advantages of identity-based and calculative ties, the 
current study also underscores the results of Lechner et al. (2006), who found that 
different types of ties, such as social ties, marketing ties, reputational ties, and ties with 
competitors exert their influence at different points in a new venture’s development. 
However, the authors also report a negative effect of identity-based ties on new venture 
performance after the first two years of operation. In contrast to this result, the current 
findings suggest a positive effect of identity-based ties on new venture financial 
performance even through the third year of operation, which is due to its positive effect on 
new venture initial financial performance. To some extent, this difference may potentially 
be explained by sample differences. Whereas Lechner et al.’s (2006) results are based on 
a sample of venture-capital-backed ventures, the data examined in this study comprises 
ventures that are not venture-capital-backed. Given that recent research found that venture 
capitalists are not only providing financial resources but also often act as coaches and 
consultants, thus substituting for other sources of information and knowledge (Colombo 
& Grilli, 2010), the presence of venture capital support may have an impact on the 
relevance of identity-based ties. Specifically, it is possible that the benefits of maintaining 
identity-based ties, which in the course of a new venture’s development may primarily 
provide information and knowledge as well as emotional support, are less relevant when a 
venture capitalist is providing guidance. Consequently, maintaining these ties may even 
have a negative effect, as it may lead to network overload without providing additional 
benefits. However, considering that this reasoning is largely speculative, I would like to 
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encourage future research to examine in more detail the longer-term performance 
relevance of identity-based ties. 
In light of the current findings, the current study makes a significant contribution to 
the literature: To the best of my knowledge, it is one of the first studies to simultaneously 
assess the implications of identity-based and calculative ties on different aspects of new 
venture financial performance. It thus contributes to the literature on network 
development, which is still underdeveloped (Lechner et al., 2006), by clearly highlighting 
the notion that entrepreneurs must change the composition of their networks for their 
venture to grow. By demonstrating that different types of ties may have quite different 
implications for a new venture’s financial performance, this study also contributes to the 
field of applied network research. Particularly, it clearly shows that more fine-grained 
analyses are needed to enhance our understanding of the relationship between network 
characteristics and success.  
These findings also offer some practical implications for entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, they imply that, whereas founders may rely on social connections such as 
friends and family in order to successfully establish a new venture, they might have to 
focus on developing new and more strategically selected relationships in order to succeed 
in subsequent venture development.  
 
4.6. Limitations 
In addition to the limitations associated with the use of self-reported data, which I 
addressed in the method section, I would like to acknowledge the limitation of the cross-
sectional research design, which implies that a clear causal interpretation of my results is 
not possible. One could thus potentially reverse the interpretation of the findings and 
conclude that a high level of initial financial performance may increase the number of 
identity-based partners that enter a network resource exchange with the new ventures, and 
that a high growth rate allows entrepreneurs to develop more new and strategically 
oriented network relationships. Assuming that this reversed-causality holds true, however, 
one must also expect new ventures with a superior initial financial performance to be 
better able to establish strategically motivated calculated network ties, which is not 
reflected in the data.  
Another limitation of the study at hand that should be addressed by further research 
is related to the distinction between identity-based and calculative ties. Even though the 
distinction is more fine-grained than the widely used network size variable, research that 
is even more detailed may be necessary to further disentangle the performance effects of 
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different network constellations. For example, it may be fruitful to combine the approach 
of distinguishing between identity-based and calculative ties with an explicit 
consideration of how the strength of these relationships varies over time as well as 
whether there may be a complementary relationship of both network variables with regard 
to success. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Exploration and Exploitation in Network Development: How 
Ambidexterity affects New Ventures’ Financial Performance 
 
5.1. Introduction 
A still growing body of research suggests that network relationships are important for 
founding and developing new ventures, as they provide access to needed resources (Greve 
& Salaff, 2003; Street & Cameron, 2007). Building on this fundamental premise, the 
majority of studies in the field has so far focussed on how structural and relational 
features of entrepreneurs’ networks impact new venture survival, growth, and 
performance (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Street & Cameron, 2007). There has been 
comparatively less research, however, on how the dynamics of new ventures’ exchange 
networks affect their performance (Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).  
This is particularly surprising for two reasons: First, entrepreneurship research has 
noted that new ventures’ resource requirements change across their development stages 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Kazanjian, 1988) and a few qualitative case-based studies have 
highlighted how new ventures develop their networks over time in order to adapt to 
changing resource needs (e.g. Larson & Starr, 1993; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Second, 
alliance research among established ventures indicates that the ratio of being engaged in 
developing new network relationships to relying on existing ones impacts firm 
performance.  
In order to contribute to extending knowledge on the dynamics of new ventures’ 
networks and pertinent performance implications, the study at hand builds on these two 
aforementioned streams of research. First, we develop theoretical arguments outlining 
why new ventures can profit from exploration in network development (denoting the 
utilization of new network exchange relationships), on the one hand, and exploitation in 
network development (denoting the utilization of existing network ties), on the other. 
Second, we hypothesize that new ventures achieve superior financial performance when 
they realize ambidexterity in network development, i.e. when they engage in both 
explorative and exploitative activities. When testing our hypotheses with longitudinal data 
from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (PSED II), we find broad 
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confirming evidence for our propositions. Specifically, we find that new ventures profit 
from concurrently engaging in exploration and exploitation in their network development 
and achieve superior financial performance when balancing both activities evenly.  
These findings contribute to the extant literature by providing initial empirical 
evidence based on a large-scale longitudinal data set for how different ways of developing 
new ventures’ exchange relationships (exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity) over 
time affect firm performance. The study contributes to network theory in entrepreneurship 
by introducing the logic of ambidexterity to the domain of new ventures’ networks. These 
insights, which also have clear practical implications for entrepreneurs, contribute to 
answering a key question concerning the relationship between network dynamics and new 
venture performance (Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) and highlight how new 
ventures network have to be developed to suit the evolving needs and conditions of new 
venture evolvement over time. Additionally, our results also enrich the literature on 
ambidexterity in the domain of inter-organizational relationships, which so far lacks 
research on the early stages of firm development. 
 
5.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
An important stream in entrepreneurship research emphasizes the significance of a new 
venture’s exchange network for successful firm development (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; 
Street & Cameron, 2007). In particular, it highlights that new ventures’ networks––
defined as the set of active exchange relationships that go beyond simple market exchange 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lee et al., 2001)––provide access to necessary resources on 
attractive terms and thus enable entrepreneurs to compensate for existing resource 
deficits. So far, however, research following the network perspective in entrepreneurship 
has mainly taken a comparative static view on the implications of networks characteristics 
for new venture performance. For example, a considerable number of studies have shown 
that structural network characteristics, such as the number of new ventures’ network 
relationships, have a positive impact on the financial performance of new ventures 
(Hansen, 1995; Lee & Tsang, 2001; Raz & Gloor, 2007). 
Complementing this comparative static view on different structural and relational 
features of entrepreneurial networks and their performance implications, scholars have 
also pointed out the importance of network development for new ventures. Hite and 
Hesterly (2001) submit that entrepreneurs have to develop new network relationships in 
the course of their venture’s further development to adapt to changing resource needs. 
Relatedly, Elfring and Hulsink (2007) emphasize that changing the composition of a new 
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venture’s network is key to increasing performance over time. So far, however, only a few 
case studies have empirically investigated these claims. Based on a case study analysis of 
ten firms in different stages of firm development, Lechner and Dowling (2003), for 
example, present some confirming evidence for the notion that the composition of a new 
venture’s network needs to change over time, as the importance of different resources and 
corresponding network ties varies across different stages of firm development. Similarly, 
a comparative case-study of biotechnology firms conducted by Maurer and Ebers (2006) 
shows that firms realize performance benefits when they repeatedly adapt the composition 
of their network according to changing resource demands resulting from an evolving 
internal and external task environment. 
Analyzing a large-scale longitudinal data set, the present study extends this prior 
research by shedding more light on how different network development activities of new 
ventures impact financial performance. Specifically, we theorize and test empirically how 
exploration and exploitation in developing new ventures’ networks as well as the 
ambidextrous engagement in both activities affect the financial performance of new 
ventures. 
 
5.2.1. Exploration and Exploitation in New Ventures’ Network Development 
In general, the notion of exploration refers to activities involving “search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71), 
while exploitative activities are defined as including “refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution” (March, 1991, p. 71). Originating in 
March’s (1991) seminal article on organizational learning, the duality of exploration and 
exploitation has received considerable attention in various contexts of management 
research, such as knowledge and innovation management, organization design, and inter-
organizational relations (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010).  
In the context of research on firms’ inter-organizational relations, it has been 
regarded as a form of exploration when firms form new relationships with new partners, 
while utilizing relationships with existing partners has been considered a form of 
exploitation (Lin, Haibin, & Demirkan, 2007). When firms form new relationships with 
new partners they engage in a form of exploration, because in this way they expand their 
knowledge and access to resources through new network partners. Moreover, in line with 
March’s (1991) notion of exploration, firms thus not only enhance their opportunities but 
also increase risk and uncertainty because they cannot rely on prior experience with their 
new partners. Forming relationships with existing partners is a form of exploitation, as 
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firms extend their existing knowledge base with a select group of partners with whom 
they have established ties for accessing resources. In line with March’s (1991) notion of 
exploitation, retained relations not only foster mutual learning but also advance execution 
and efficiency of the exchange relation, as the partnering firms over time develop trust 
and engage in joint problem-solving (McEvily & Marcus, 2005).  
A fundamental question raised by theorists in the field of inter-organizational 
research is how exploration and exploitation as well as their interplay affect firm 
performance (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). Perhaps surprisingly, however, 
there has been little research that empirically examined these questions (Lavie et al., 
2010). While a few studies focused on exploration and exploitation in alliance networks 
of established firms (Lavie, Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011; Lin et al., 2007), there still is a 
dearth of knowledge about how exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity play out in 
early stages of firm development. By addressing the financial performance implications of 
exploration and exploitation in new venture’s network development as well as the effects 
of balancing these activities, the present study thus not only contributes to enhancing our 
knowledge in the field of entrepreneurial networks but also closes a gap in the wider 
literature on exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity in inter-organizational 
relationships. 
 
5.2.2. Exploration and Exploitation in Network Development and New Ventures’ 
Financial Performance 
When starting a new venture, entrepreneurs are usually able to rely on a network of social 
relationships, such as family members, friends and existing business relations, that is 
widely recognized as “their most valuable asset” (Hite & Hesterly, 2001, p. 278, p. 11) or 
“the entrance ticket for a start-up” (Lechner & Dowling, 2003), as it provides resources 
critical for founding a new business (Starr & Macmillan, 1990).  
As described by many process theories in the field, new ventures however face 
different challenges at different stages of their development (Churchill & Lewis, 1983; 
Greiner, 1972; Kazanjian, 1988). Correspondingly, their resource needs change over time 
(Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Even though the network relationships 
existing at new venture formation is extremely valuable for the emergence of a new 
venture, it is usually not able to provide over time all the resources necessary for 
successfully further developing the new business venture, such as industry and marketing 
knowledge or additional financial capital (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lechner & Dowling, 
2003; Lechner et al., 2006; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). As new ventures continuously face 
new challenges and opportunities in the course of their development, they thus need to 
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continuously engage in exploration activities in terms of developing new exchange 
relationships in order to be able to access the resources required for meeting novel 
challenges and opportunities.  
In line with this reasoning, we expect new ventures to profit when they adapt the 
composition of their networks by developing new network relationships. Accordingly, we 
propose: 
 
H1. New ventures that engage in network exploration, i.e. change the composition of their 
networks by establishing new exchange relationships, are more successful than new 
ventures that refrain from network exploration. 
 
Notwithstanding the benefits of network exploration, we also expect new ventures to 
profit from network exploitation, i.e. from continuing existing exchange relationships. 
Reliance on existing network ties provides several advantages over the establishment of 
new ones. First, existing exchange ties do not incur the cost of searching for new and 
appropriate partners (Goerzen, 2007). By foregoing the development of new exchange 
relations with new partners, new ventures save effort and resources that they can 
profitably invest in their core business instead. Second, longer-term exchange partners 
often grant access to their resources at much more attractive terms, as the exchange 
parties develop expectations of continuity and a level of mutual trust (Poppo, Zhou, & 
Ryu, 2008). Finally, interactions and resource exchanges with existing partners are more 
efficient than with new partners. This is because existing relationships have already 
moved through an initial period of trial-and-error learning (Bouty, 2000; Krackhardt, 
1992; Larson, 1992) and through repeated interaction the exchange partners have already 
developed similar stocks of knowledge, shared modes of understanding, and heuristics 
(McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004; Uzzi, 1997). These features ease joint problem-solving 
(McEvily & Marcus, 2005) and enhance the efficiency of collaboration and resource 
exchange (Podolny, 1994).  
Considering these arguments, we submit that––irrespective of the benefits 
associated with developing new exchange relationships––new ventures should also 
benefit from continuously relying on existing exchange relationships. We thus propose: 
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H2. New ventures that engage in network exploitation, i.e. continue to rely on existing 
exchange relationships, are more successful in terms of their financial performance than 
new ventures that refrain from network exploitation. 
 
5.2.3. Ambidexterity in Network Exploration and Exploitation 
Even though the above two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, because a new venture 
can both maintain some of its established exchange relationships and complement these 
with new network ties, one has to take into account that both activities are competing for 
scarce resources so that more exploration usually implies less exploitation, and vice versa.  
The time and energy entrepreneurs can spend on managing their network is limited 
(Batjargal, 2006; Elfring & Hulsink, 2007), as it takes significant time and energy to 
develop new network relationships as well as to engage in network exploitation in terms 
of maintaining existing ties (Ebers & Grandori, 1997; Witt, 2004). Entrepreneurs are thus 
faced with a trade-off. When they invest their time and energy in network exploration this 
will come at the expense of network exploitation, as existing relationships have to be 
severed. Conversely, entrepreneurs engaging in more network exploitation by nurturing 
their existing ties will have to cut back on their exploration activities, i.e. their search for 
and establishment of new relationships. This consequently raises the question whether 
new ventures that solely engage in either exploration or exploitation are more successful 
or, rather, ventures that realize ambitexterity in network development, i.e. engage in both 
these ways of developing their exchange relationships. 
In pondering this question, one has to take two particularities of new ventures into 
account. First, and as has been outlined above, new ventures in the course of their 
development, from firm emergence through early growth and beyond, face changing 
resource needs (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). Second, new ventures 
commonly suffer from the liabilities of newness and smallness, and are usually resource 
poor (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Jarillo, 1989). It follows that they are often unable directly 
to reciprocate in network exchanges and have to get access to needed resources on the 
most favorable terms possible. In view of these circumstances, we expect that new 
ventures fare comparatively better in terms of their financial performance when they 
realize ambidexterity in network development for the following reasons: 
First, reliance on network exploitation without some degree of network exploration 
over time will often starve a new venture of access to resources needed to master the new 
challenges emerging in the process of a new venture’s development, as the existing 
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network will not be able to fulfill changing resource needs either qualitatively or 
quantitatively (Lechner & Dowling, 2003).  
Second, reliance on network exploration without some degree of network 
exploitation over time will also produce inferior returns. Even though the resource needs 
of a new venture evolve over time and existing network ties may decrease in importance, 
not all of them become irrelevant. As noted by Schutjens and Stam (2003), even the social 
ties that existed before a new venture was founded can still be of considerable value in 
later stages of a new venture’s development, as they may provide important information 
about business opportunities and are a relevant source for sales relationships. Similarly, 
Lechner and Dowling (2003) outline that some network relationships that are usually 
established after a new venture is founded, such as ties with competitors that improve a 
new venture’s virtual resource base while at the same time retaining its flexibility, are 
important at all stages of a venture’s development. Moreover, longer-term relationships 
grant access to resources on more favourable terms, due to their higher relationship 
quality and mutual trust in the partners’ goodwill. New ventures throughout their 
development can thus profit from continuing to rely on existing exchange relationships, 
because these relationships provide new ventures with cost efficient access to resources 
that are needed continually. 
Third, network exploitation may also constitute an important precondition for 
network exploration. The continuous access to resources provided by existing partners 
and the efficiency of exchanges with these existing partners enhances the appeal of a new 
venture for new partners, as it signals continuity, reliability, trustful relations, and 
efficiency (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). The existing partner 
network thus constitutes an important symbol of legitimacy that affects whether or not 
new partners will invest in a relationship (Higgins & Gulati, 2003). Therefore, without 
some degree of continuity in existing partners, new ventures will face difficulties in 
attracting new partners who can provide needed resources.  
In view of these arguments, we conclude that ventures will suffer in their 
performance when they only focus on exploitation to the exclusion of exploration or on 
exploration to the exclusion of exploitation. Rather, we submit that realizing 
ambidexterity in network development, i.e. engaging in network exploration and 
exploitation, will yield superior economic performance due to the complementarity of 
these strategies (Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991) in generating value for new ventures. 
We accordingly propose: 
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H3. New ventures that engage in ambidextrous network development, i.e. realize a 
mixture between developing new and relying on existing network exchange relationships, 
are comparatively more successful in terms of their financial performance than new 
ventures that either engage only in exploration or exploitation. 
 
5.3. Method 
We tested our hypotheses on the basis of the PSED II data set. As the PSED II research 
design, data collection, and sample statistics are described in great detail in Reynolds 
(2011), we only provide a brief overview. The PSED II data set is publicly available and 
comprises longitudinal data on a representative sample of US entrepreneurs and their 
young ventures in different stages of the entrepreneurial process. To collect the data, a 
total of 1214 adults who engaged in starting up a new venture were identified in a 
screener telephone survey conducted between October 2005 and January 2006. After the 
screener, the individuals classified as (nascent) entrepreneurs were interviewed for the 
first time. Subsequently, four annual follow-up telephone interviews were conducted. By 
2011, the data set thus contains 5 waves (Wave A to Wave E).  
To analyze how network exploration and exploitation affect the financial 
performance of new ventures, we restricted the PSED II sample to the data of individuals 
who established a new venture. As our study focuses on how exploration and exploitation 
as well as their mix affect the performance of new ventures, we additionally excluded all 
those entrepreneurs from our analysis who reported to not relying on network 
relationships at all, i.e. in all five waves of our sample. As a result, we based our analyses 
on a sub-sample of the PSED II data set comprising 1269 observations. 
About 37% of the entrepreneurs in our sample are female, their age ranged from 18 
to 75 and up, with a mean of 44.7 years. 78% of respondents have at least some college 
education. The average prior industry experience of the entrepreneurs in our sample is 
9.33 years and ranges from 0 to 48 years. The new ventures are operating in a wide range 
of different industries. The most often reported are: the construction industry, the 
manufacturing of signs and musical instruments, clothing, cosmetics, food services, real 
estate, computer systems, consulting, and educational services.  
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5.3.1 Measures 
5.3.1.1. New Venture Financial Performance 
To capture a new ventures’ financial performance, we relied on respondents’ information 
on whether their monthly revenue exceeded monthly expenses for more than six of the 
past twelve months (Reynolds, 2011). The measure takes the value of one for profitable 
periods and zero otherwise. 
 
5.3.1.2. Exploration and Exploitation in Network Development 
To capture the variables related to new ventures’ networks, we followed previous studies 
using PSED data (Aldrich & Carter, 2004; Newbert & Tornikoski, 2010) and relied on 
measures indicating the number of “helpers” reported by entrepreneurs for each wave of 
panel data. A “helper” is defined as a person who does not have an ownership share but 
makes a distinctive contribution to the new venture, such as providing financial resources, 
materials, training, or business services. To capture exploration in network development 
independently of network size, we constructed a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
when an entrepreneur reported having a new helper, i.e. a helper who had not been 
reported in the preceding wave, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we constructed a dummy 
for exploitation in network development that takes the value of 1 for each period in which 
the entrepreneur relied on at least one exchange relationship with a helper that had already 
existed in the preceding wave, and zero otherwise. 
 
5.3.1.3. Ambidexterity in Network Development 
To test for our third hypotheses, we constructed two different measures reflecting the 
relative extent to which a new venture is engaged in exploration and exploitation in 
network development. When operationalizing ambidexterity as a continuum between 
solely being engaged in network exploration on the one hand and network exploitation on 
the other, we took into account that both activities compete for scarce network 
management resources (Lavie et al., 2010; Perretti & Negro, 2006). Following earlier 
studies in the field of established ventures (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009; He & Wong, 
2004), our first measure for ambidexterity is based on the difference between network 
exploration and network exploitation. Specifically, we subtracted the number of 
maintained network relationships from the number of new network ties for every venture 
in each wave. This measure takes a value of 0 when the numbers of new and maintained 
helpers are equal. It is positive, when exploration exceeds exploitation and negative when 
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the new venture engages more in network exploitation than in exploration. To test for the 
proposed positive effect of ambidexterity in network development we included the 
measure and its squared term in the equation. 
As an alternative measure reflecting ambidexterity in network development that 
allowed us to test the robustness of our findings, we weighted the absolute value of the 
above described difference between the number of new network ties and the number of 
maintained network ties for every venture in each wave with the total network size in the 
given period. Thus, the measure takes any value between 0 and 1. Specifically, it takes the 
value of 0 for every period in which the entrepreneur equally balances exploration and 
exploitation in network development and the value of 1 in every period she or he 
exlusively focuses on network exploration or exploitation. In order to further assess the 
robustness of our results, we constructed a third measure for ambidexterity in network 
development by employing a Herfindahl-Index (Hirschman, 1964; Jacquemin & Berry, 
1979). Specifically, we constructed an index (x1/x)² + (x2/x)², with x1 representing 
entrepreneurs’ engagement in explorative and x2 in exploitative network development in 
any given period. The index takes the value of 1 for every period in which an 
entrepreneurs is completely engaged in exploration or exploitation, and .5 if the two 
activities are equally balanced. 
However, for periods in which the entrepreneurs reported to not having a network 
tie, we assigend a missing value to all of our ambidexterity measures, which resulted in a 
drop of observations when testing our hypothesis 3. 
As there is consistent criticism against the reliability of difference measures, which 
is based on the fact that positively correlated component variables significantly decrease 
the reliability of difference measures (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Linn & Slinde, 1977), we 
checked for the correlation between the number of new network ties and the number of 
maintained network relationships. As they turned out to be only weakly correlated (r = 
.153, p < .01), the reliability our difference measure for ambidexterity in network 
development seems to be quite accetable (Bergh & Fairbank, 2002; Tisak & Smith, 1994).  
 
5.3.1.6. Controls 
We included several control variables in our analysis. On an individual level, we first 
included gender for two reasons: First, men and women tend to differ with respect to their 
network and networking behavior (Moore, 1990; Renzulli, Aldrich, & Moody, 2000). 
Second, research has shown some evidence for gender-specific barriers to entrepreneurial 
success (Murphy, Kickul, Barbosa, & Titus, 2007). We also added the age of the 
   
 89
entrepreneur as a control to our analysis, because younger and older entrepreneurs likely 
differ in terms of the resource base they have available, which may influence the 
performance of their ventures (Parker, 2004). We decided also to include the level of 
education, as general human capital has been shown to influence the success of new 
ventures (Samuelsson & Davidsson, 2009). As Delmar and Shane (2006) demonstrate that 
the industry experience of an entrepreneur may influence the performance of his or her 
new venture, we furthermore controlled for the number of years the founder worked in the 
industry in which his or her new venture operates.  
We additionally controlled for several firm-level variables. Recognizing that the 
PSED II data set comprises independent and dependent new ventures, a characteristic that 
might influence ventures’ financial performance (Matthews, Schenkel, Ford, & Human, 
2009) and their need for (additional) external support (Matthews et al., 2009), we 
controlled for the independence of the venture. Additionally, we controlled for the number 
of employees of the new venture for two reasons. First, a new venture’s performance is 
likely influenced by the number of employees (and vice versa). Second, a new venture 
may develop competencies by means of hiring employees, which may, at least to some 
extent, be a substitute for relying on network exchange relationships (Colombo et al., 
2006; Larson, 1992; Oliver, 1990). Furthermore, we included the number of founders as a 
control, because the size of the founding team may influence the capacity to develop and 
manage network exchange relationships (Batjargal, 2006). We incorporated a dummy 
variable to indicate whether a firm belongs to a high-tech industry for two reasons: First, 
Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) as well as Schutjens and Stam (2003) demonstrate that 
new venture’s networks may vary substantially across industries that differ in terms of 
technological dynamism and uncertainty. Second, Swaminathan (1996) found that these 
environmental factors might influence the success of a new venture.  
Given that our study focuses on how the relative magnitude of network exploration 
and exploitation affect new ventures’ financial performance, we isolated this effect from 
the widely recognized effect of the size of new ventures’ networks (Hansen, 1995; Lee & 
Tsang, 2001; Raz & Gloor, 2007), by controlling for the number of helpers in any given 
period.  
 
5.3.2. Analytical Approach 
To test our hypotheses, we employed logistic random-effects estimation. We chose this 
approach for several reasons. First, it is appropriate for estimating binary response 
models, which is relevant for our analysis as our dependent variable is binary in nature. 
Second, in contrast to classic logistic regression analysis, logistic random-effects 
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regression not only accounts for between-group variance, i.e. the systematic differences 
between our new ventures at the same point in time, but also for within-group variance, 
e.g. the variation of a new venture’s network development over time (Tabanick & Fidell, 
2007; Wooldridge, 2002). As PSED II contains both types of variance with regard to the 
study variables, the use of logistic random-effects regression seems appropriate in the 
context of our study. We further established that logistic random-effects is the most 
efficient estimation technique for our analysis by comparing its results to the results 
generated by logistic fixed-effects models by means of a Hausman test for significant 
differences (Hausman, 1978; Stuart & Sorensen, 2007). 
As the PSED II data are based on self-reports, they may potentially be biased. Even 
though a large number of earlier publications rely on the PSED data set (see Reynolds, 
2007) and there is broad evidence that gives support for the reliability and validity of self-
reported measures, not only in entrepreneurship research (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; 
Lechner et al., 2006; Peng & Luo, 2000), we thus conducted Harman’s one-factor test for 
the presence of common method bias. Our analyses extracted six distinct factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1, which together accounted for 62 percent of the total variance. 
With the first factor accounting for only 15 percent of the variance, we are confident that 
common method bias is not a serious issue in our study. 
To control for survivorship bias in terms of the unobserved heterogeneity that may 
affect firms’ probability of being in our sample and their performance, we adapted a 
typical Heckman two-step procedure commonly used in empirical studies based on 
longtitudinal data (Delmar & Shane, 2006). Specifically, we first estimated a probit model 
on firm exit during the 5 waves of observation. The independent variables of this sample 
selection model include variables that measure founders' characteristics (age, gender, 
marital status, education, prior industry experience), firm-specific characteristics (firm 
size and age, dependence on a parental organization, number of founders), and other 
independent variables (network size, network exploration and exploitaion, network 
ambidexterity, evironmental dynamism, obtained government loan, purchased venture). 
Based on these estimates, we then computed the inverse Mill's ratio for all firms included 
in our sample and inserted it as a control in our equations. 
 
5.4. Results 
Means, standard deviations and correlations for our variables are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
   
 91
Table 5.1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. New ventures’ financial 
performance 
.25 .43 1     
 
         
2. Network exploration .11 .30 .02 1              
3. Network exploitation .51 .49 -.02 .16* 1             
4. Network ambidexterity -1.12 2.23 .03 .17* -.94* 1            
5. Herfindahl ambidexterity .94 .14 -.008 -.56* -.08* -.12* 1           
6. Weighted ambidexterity .91 .24 -.012 -.52* -.04 -.15* .98* 1          
7. Network size 1.50 2.47 -.01 .45* .95* -.79* -.28* -.22* 1         
8. Prior industry experience 9.33 10.6 .02 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 -.01 .01 1        
9. Gender .37 .48 .01 .02 .01 -.01 -.01 .01 .02 -.10* 1       
10. Age of founder 44.70 2.59 -.01 .02 .04+ -.03 .01 .02 .04+ .37* .07* 1      
11 Level of education 4.84 1.53 .08* .04* -.00 .01 .01 .01 .01 .14* .10* .21* 1     
12. Independent venture .69 .46 .02 -.04+ .00 -.02 .02 .02 -.00 -.07* .06* .05* .01 1    
13. No. of employees 1.07 5.68 .07* -.01 .01 -.01 .02 .01 .00 -.01 -.02 -.00 .03 -.02 1   
14. No. of founders 1.28 2.28 -.02 .03 .11* -.10* -.03 -.03 .11* -.01 -.03 .02 .03 .00 -.00 1  
15. Environmental dynamism .28 .45 .01 .02 .05* -.04* -.03 -.02 .06* .05* -.15* .03+ .06* -.03 .05* .05* 1 
* p < .05 ; two-tailed test 
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As also revealed by our correlation analysis, the regression results depicted in Table 
5.2 (Model 1) show that some of our control variables are significantly related to the 
financial performance of the young ventures. Specifically, Table 5.2 shows 
(marginally) significant relationships between a new venture’s financial performance 
and both entrepreneurs  level of education (β = .237; p < .01) and the number of 
employees (β = .061; p < .10). 
Our regression analyses provide significant support for our hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 posits that new ventures profit from network exploration, i.e. when they 
add new partners to their network. As reflected in Table 5.2 (Model 2), this notion is 
fully supported by our analysis, which reveals a significant positive association 
between exploration in network development and new ventures’ financial performance 
(β = .505; p < .05). 
By showing a significant positive relationship between exploitation in network 
development and new venture financial performance (β = .512; p < .05), our results 
(Model 3) also provide support for our second hypothesis stating that new ventures 
engaging in network exploitation by utilizing existing network relationships are more 
successful than those that do not. 
Our third hypothesis states that new ventures realizing an ambidextrous network 
development by means of simultaneously engaging in both exploration and 
exploitation will show superior financial performance over either network 
development activity. This postulates a positive effect of network ambidexterity on 
new ventures’ financial performance and implies an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between our first ambidexterity measure, which is based on the the difference between 
entrepreneurs’ engagement in explorative and exploitative network development, and 
performance. 
We tested Hypothesis 3 by means of a quadratic model specification (Colombo 
et al., 2006; Wooldridge, 2009) including the ambidexterity measure as well as its 
squared term in the model and performed joint tests for significance. Confirming our 
hypothesis, our results (Model 4) indicate a positive significant relationship between 
new venture performance and the linear term (β = 1.46; p < .05), whereas the 
coefficient of the squared term is negative and also significant (β = -.028; p < .05). 
Since we control for network size in our analysis, this finding indicates that 
ambidexterity in network development is financially beneficial irrespective of the size 
of the network, i.e. the combined extent of exploration and exploitation activities.  
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Table 5.2. Logistic Random Effects Panel Regression Results 
New Ventures’ Financial Performance 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 
174.464* 
(75.771) 
175.327* 
(75.958) 
176.001* 
(75.300) 
115.136 
(83.286) 
128.746 
(82.476) 
129.234 
(82.416) 
Network size 
.040 
(.044) 
.010 
(.047) 
-.015 
(.051) 
.138 
(.091) 
-.081 
(.057) 
-.085 
(.058) 
Prior Industry experience 
.506* 
(.217) 
.508* 
(.217) 
.511* 
(.215) 
.392 
(.238) 
.375 
(.236) 
.375 
(.236) 
Independent venture 
7.020 
(3.937) 
7.069 
(3.944) 
7.057 
(3.918) 
5.501 
(3.331) 
5.240 
(3.201) 
5.240 
(3.190) 
Gender 
-3.058* 
(1.375) 
-3.068* 
(1.378) 
-3.113* 
(1.367) 
-2.393 
(1.508) 
-2.263 
(1.493) 
-2.266 
(1.492) 
Level of education 
-.631+ 
(.380) 
-.637+ 
(.381) 
-.639+ 
(.377) 
-.513 
(.417) 
-.481 
(.413) 
-.481 
(.413) 
Age of founder 
-.833* 
(.341) 
-.836* 
(.341) 
-.839* 
(.338) 
-.672+ 
(.372) 
-.642+ 
(.369) 
-.642+ 
(.369) 
No. of employees 
2.061* 
(.862) 
2.073* 
(.865) 
2.078* 
(.857) 
1.590+ 
(.948) 
1.523 
(.939) 
1.523 
(.938) 
No. of founders 
2.867* 
(1.308) 
2.889* 
(1.313) 
2.888* 
(1.300) 
2.173 
(1.44) 
2.077 
(1.424) 
2.077 
(1.423) 
Environmental dynamism 
14.216* 
(5.954) 
14.280* 
(5.969) 
14.335* 
(5.917) 
10.819+ 
(6.541) 
10.356 
(6.481) 
10.351 
(6.476) 
Inverted mill’s ratio 
-155.298* 
(66.416) 
-156.066* 
(66.580) 
-156.8453* 
(66.006) 
-118.918 
(72.947) 
-113.799 
(72.286) 
-113.749 
(72.222) 
Network exploration 
 .508* 
(.211) 
    
Network exploitation 
 
 
.525* 
(.239) 
   
Network ambidexterity 
 
  
1.462* 
(.724) 
  
Network ambidexterity² 
 
  
-.028* 
(.013) 
  
Weighted network 
ambidexterity  
 
   
-.725+ 
(.430) 
 
Herfindahl measure of 
ambidexterity  
 
    
-1.256+ 
(.747)  
Observations 1296 1296 1296 945 945 945 
Log Likelihood -643.563 -641.822 -641.126 -509.606 -511.749 -511.773 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p < .001, results are reported as two-tailed. 
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To assess the stability of our results, we employed the weighted ambidexterity 
measure, and the Herfindahl-Index described in the methods section above as an 
alternative measures for ambidexterity in network development. Due to their 
construction, both measures are much less highly correlated with network size than our 
first measure. As depicted in Table 5.2 (Model 5 and Model 6), the results of the 
analyses show marginally significant negative effects (β = -.72, p < .10 for the 
weighted ambidexterity measure and β = -1.25, p < .10 for the Herfindahl-Index) of 
more exclusively relying on either exploration or exploitation in network 
developoment, confirming our previous findings. The positive relationship between 
ambidexterity in network development and new ventures’ performance that we find is 
thus seems to be robust with regard to different model specifications and ambidexterity 
measures. 
Furhtermore, we re-estimated our models using pooled logit regression analysis. 
The analysis confirmed our previous results by showing an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between our ambidexterity measure and new venture performance (β = 
1.40, p < .01 for the linear term, and β = -.03, p < .01 for the quadratic term). 
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by the fact that we excluded 
all those entrepreneurs who reported to not relying on network relationships at all, we 
re-estimated our models including them. Because this procedure boosted the number of 
observations, significance levels increased, yet our previous findings were confirmed. 
Additionally, to adress endogeneity, we also calculated our models including as 
a control variable new venture performance in the preceding period (profitability in t-
1) to check for a possible effect of state-dependence in financial performance 
(Heckman, 1981). Furthermore, we included new venture performance in the 
subsequent period (profitability in t+1) as the dependent variable in our models to 
check whether our results also indicate longer-term performance implications of 
network ambidexterity. Again, our results did not change substantially. 
To get an impression of the optimal ratio between exploration and exploitation 
in network development within the range of the data in our sample (min: -25, max: 
10), we plotted the predicted probabilities for new ventures’ financial performance, 
setting all control variables at their means. As depicted in Figure 5.1, our results 
indicate that new ventures that an almost evenly balance exploration and exploitation 
in their network development maximize their chances of being profitable. 
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Figure 5.1. Ambidexterity in Network Development and New Venture Performance 
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5.5. Discussion 
While research has produced considerable theory and cross-sectional analyses 
concerning how the structure and content of new ventures’ network relations affect 
performance, there exists only limited case study evidence about how new ventures 
develop their networks over time and how different ways of network development 
affect new venture performance (Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). 
Drawing on the ambidexterity literature, our study offers theory and supporting 
empirical evidence based on a large-scale longitudinal data set that extends our 
understanding of new ventures’ network development and its performance 
implications.  
Specifically, we argued and our results indeed show that new ventures benefit 
financially when they adapt the composition of their networks over time by 
establishing new network relationships. We submitted that such exploratory network 
development is beneficial, because new ventures are thereby better able to meet the 
changing resource requirements associated with the opportunities and challenges they 
face in course of their development (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lechner & Dowling, 
2003; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). According to our findings, new ventures however also 
benefit financially from exploitative network development. We reasoned that 
entrepreneurs profit from relying on existing relationships, because these relations––as 
a result of the mutual trust and understanding developed over time (Bouty, 2000; 
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Larson, 1992)––provide an efficient way of accessing resources that are continually 
needed in the course of a new ventures’ development. While informing research on 
new venture development, these findings also contribute to closing the striking 
research gap that exists in research on ambidexterity with regard to the direct 
performance effects of exploration and exploitation in firm networks in general (Lavie 
et al., 2010). 
Our study further addresses the key question of ambidexterity in network 
development. Given the respective benefits of, and trade-off between, network 
exploration and exploitation, one can ask whether a focused strategy of network 
development or a particular mix of exploration and exploitation is comparatively more 
advantageous for new ventures. Our analysis shows that being equally engaged in both 
exploration and exploitation is most beneficial for new ventures over time. This result 
is consistent with the argument that ambidexterity in network development provides 
sustained performance advantages for new ventures because it balances the risks 
involved in not getting access to new resources on the one hand, and not getting access 
to resources on affordable terms, on the other.  
By testing the ambidexterity hypothesis on a sample of newly founded and 
small firms, our study moreover strenghtens the case for the generality of the 
ambidexterity argument. While extant research has provided confirming evidence for 
the positive effects of ambidexterity in more mature firms (Lavie et al., 2010), our 
results reveal that ambidexterity is also beneficial for firms in the early stages of their 
development. Moreover, our results inform some previous research suggesting that 
ambidexterity in explorative and exploitative network development activities may have 
different performance effects for smaller and larger firms (2009). Based on an analysis 
of the alliance portfolios of 95 firms, Lin et al. (2007) find that being ambidexterously 
engaged in network exploration and exploitation in inter-organizational relationships 
has postive perfromance effects for large firms, whereas a focused formation of either 
exploratory or exploitative alliances benefits small firms. Lin et al. (2007) explain this 
finding with reference to resource constraints that may prevent small firms from 
successfully seeking ambidextrous alliance network development. In contrast, we find 
a positive effect of ambidexterity on new venture performance for the small firms we 
studied. The difference between our findings and the ones generated by Lin et al. 
(2007) may, however, to some extent also be due to the firm size differences in the two 
samples. While the ventures in our sample employ 1.1 people on average and are in the 
stages of new firm emergence and early growth, even the small firms in the data set 
used by Lin et al (2007) are much larger and more mature. Consequently, even the 
smaller firms in their sample should have much larger pools of slack resources at their 
disposal than the new ventures we studied and should thus better be able to mitigate 
the risks involved in overcommitting to either exploration or exploitation (Cao et al., 
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2009). Consequently, the contrasting results of their and our study may point to the 
possibility that a potential moderating effect of firm size or resource endowment on the 
relationship between ambidexterity in inter-organizational networks and firm 
performance may not be linear and should be addressed in more detail by further 
research. 
We note a number of limitations of our study that also indicate opportunities for 
future research. First, this study addresses the effects of simultaneously engaging in 
explorative and exploitative activities in network development, a concept that has been 
recognized as contextual ambidexterity (Beckman, 2006; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Im & Rai, 2008). As outlined by Lavie et al. (2010), organizations may, however, not 
only contextually balance their explorative and exploitative activities. Rather, they can 
also achieve ambidexterity by either organizationally or temporally separating both 
activities. Due to their small size, it is most probably not an option for new ventures to 
separate organizationally the establishment of new and the maintenance of existing 
contacts, as firms are most likely to comprise only a single organizational unit 
(Beckman, 2006). Yet it might well be fruitful for future research to address the 
performance implications of temporal separation––in terms of shifting from 
exploration to exploitation and vice versa over time––and to compare the relative 
performance implications of contextual and temporal ambidexterity network 
development strategies. 
Second, we acknowledge that we have very limited information on the 
attributes of the partners with whom the new ventures in our sample collaborate and 
the kinds of relationships they maintain. Rather, this study solely focuses on the 
structure of new ventures’ networks, i.e. on whether exchange relationships had 
existed in the previous period or not. It could thus be a fruitful broadening of the 
present study to extend earlier research by Lechner et al. (2006) and address the 
question whether the optimal balance between exploration and exploitation in network 
development differs across functional domains, such as R&D and marketing. 
Furthermore, it could be worthwhile to examine how the network development 
patterns originating in strong and weak ties observed in Elfring and Husink’s (2007) 
case study relate to the development pattern of existing and new ties highlighted in the 
present research.  
Third, we note that our dependent variable is binary in nature and represents a 
rather coarse indicator for the performance of a new venture. Even though a binary 
measure for profitability has been shown to be a valid indicator for performance in 
earlier (nascent) entrepreneurship research (Dimov, 2010; Diochon, Menzies, & Gasse, 
2007; Gatewood, Shaver, & Gartner, 1995), we consider it fruitful for further research 
to complement our research by addressing the effects of ambidexterity in network 
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development based on more fine-grained performance measures, such as revenue and 
growth.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, we believe that our findings contribute to the 
literature in various ways. First, they extend research on new ventures’ networks by 
confirming the widely recognized but so far rarely tested proposition that new ventures 
profit from network exploration. Additionally, we present a theoretical rationale and 
provide empirical evidence for positive performance implications of exploitation in 
network development. Perhaps most importantly, our results show that new ventures 
can realize financial performance benefits when they not only simultaneoulsy engage 
in both activities but also evenly balance them. With these findings, the study at hand 
responds to the call for analyzing network dynamics on the basis of longtitudinal data 
and contributes to answering a key question on the relationship between network 
dynamics and firm performance (Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) by 
suggesting how networks have to be developed to suit the needs and conditions of new 
venture development over time. 
Moreover, our findings contribute to the literature on exploration and 
exploitation in inter-organizational relationships (Lavie et al., 2010). Our study 
provides large-scale empirical evidence based on longitudinal data for the notion that 
both exploration and exploitation in inter-organizational relationships directly foster 
financial performance. Second, our study is––to the best of our knowledge––the first 
one to provide clear empirical evidence for the positive performance implications of 
contextual ambidexterity, i.e. the simultaneous exploration and exploitation in network 
development within one organizational unit. In this way, our results also contribute to 
the discussion on whether young and small companies may potentially profit from 
ambidexterity.  
Finally, our findings also have practical implications for entrepreneurs of new 
ventures. By highlighting the beneficial performance implications of of contionuous, 
evenly balanced network development, the present study indicates that stable 
entrepreneurial networks will be less beneficial for the development of a new venture 
than ones where entrepreneurs, throughout the development of their ventures, maintain 
some of their legacy ties but at the same time continue to change the composition of 
their networks by developing new relationships.  
 
   
Chapter 6 
 
Contextual vs. Temporal Ambidexterity in Network Development: 
Which Provides the Better Pathway to Enhancing New Ventures’ 
Financial Performance? 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Based on March’s (1991) proposition that firms need to balance explorative and 
exploitative activities, the notion of ambidexterity (He, 2004; Lin et al., 2007; 
Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996) has received considerable attention in various domains 
of management research, such as knowledge and innovation management, 
organization design, and inter-organizational relations (Lavie et al., 2010). 
Ambidexterity allows firms to be aligned and efficient in their management of present-
day business demands while simultaneously remaining adaptive to changes in the 
environment (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). In the domain of research on inter-
organizational relations, previous studies have confirmed that firms profit from 
realizing ambidexterity in terms of being involved in both exploration, by developing 
new network relationships, and exploitation, by continuously relying on existing 
network partners (Ebers, Semrau, & Sigmund, 2011; Lin et al., 2007). However, firms 
can employ different modes of ambidexterity (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et al., 
2010). 
Specifically, it has been suggested that firms may simultaneously engage in 
exploration and exploitation within the same organizational unit (contextual 
ambidexterity), separate both activities organizationally (organizational ambidexterity) 
or temporally (temporal ambidexterity). Even though they have been widely 
recognized in the literature, we still lack empirical research that spells out which of 
these modes of ambidexterity is comparatively more beneficial, and under which 
conditions. 
The present paper aims to contribute to shedding more light on this open 
question. Specifically, we develop and test hypotheses denoting conditions under 
which new ventures will profit from contextually or temporally balancing exploration 
and exploitation in their network development. New ventures provide a fruitful setting 
for studying this question, because it has been shown to be particularly crucial for the 
successful development of new ventures that they cultivate network relationships for 
accessing needed resources (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Street & Cameron, 
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2007) and adapt their networks over time in order to satisfy changing resource needs 
(Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Maurer 
& Ebers, 2006). Moreover, previous research has demonstrated that new ventures 
profit from balancing explorative and exploitative activities in their network 
development (Ebers et al., 2011), yet has failed to compare relative performance 
outcomes of different modes of ambidexterity. The setting of new ventures seems 
especially appropriate for comparing the impact on financial performance of the 
contextual and temporal balancing modes, as new ventures usually consist of a single 
organizational unit and are thus unable to organizationally separate both activities 
(Beckman, 2006; Chandler & Hanks, 1994b; Meijaard et al., 2005). 
When testing our contingency hypotheses based on longitudinal data from 158 
ventures from the PSED II dataset, we find contextual ambidexterity to be the superior 
mode for new ventures in general. In line with our hypotheses, our results however 
also reveal that temporal ambidexterity has comparatively more positive performance 
implications under specific environmental, network- and organization-related 
conditions. Specifically, results indicate that environmental dynamism, the balance of 
exploration and exploitation realized over time as well as founders’ human capital and 
the composition of founding teams have an effect on the relative profitability of 
contextual and temporal ambidexterity. 
Based on the results presented, this study contributes to the literature in two 
main ways. First, this is one of the first studies empirically to discern the degree of 
ambidexterity, i.e. the balance between exploration and exploitation, from the mode of 
ambidexterity. Our study also goes beyond earlier research by uncovering particular 
environmental, network, and organizational contingencies that influence the relative 
performance outcomes of contextual and temporal ambidexterity (Lavie et al., 2010). 
It thus extends our knowledge on the performance implications of ambidexterity in 
inter-organizational relationships and their contingencies (Lavie et al., 2010). Second, 
the present study contributes to our understanding of different modes of network 
development and their consequences (Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Oczan & Eisenhardt, 
2009) by highlighting contextual and temporal ambidexterity as alternative strategic 
pathways for securing needed resources and assessing their comparative performance 
effects. 
 
6.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Exploration refers to activities involving “search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71), while 
exploitative activities are defined as including “refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution” (March, 1991, p. 71). The core 
   
 101
proposition forwarded by the literature on ambidexterity suggests that an 
organization’s survival rests on its ability “to engage in sufficient exploitation to 
ensure its current viability and, at the same time, to devote enough energy to 
exploration to ensure its future viability. Survival requires a balance…” (Levinthal & 
March, 1993, p. 105). 
In the context of firms’ inter-organizational relations, it has been regarded as a 
form of exploration when organizations form relationships with new partners, whereas 
it is considered a form of exploitation when they continuously rely on existing partners 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Lavie et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2007). This particular 
conceptualization of exploration and exploitation in the domain of inter-organizational 
relations rests on the following reasoning. When exploiting existing network 
relationships, exchange partners build on and incrementally refine their joint 
expectations and common goals in order to implement and execute their exchanges 
effectively (Das & Teng, 2002; Ring & Van De Ven, 1994). When partnering 
organizations retain existing relations this benefits exchange efficiency, as the 
partnering organizations over time develop mutual understanding as well as heuristics 
for interacting and joint problem-solving that ease communication and collaboration 
(McEvily & Marcus, 2005; McFadyen & Cannella Jr, 2004; Uzzi, 1997). The 
establishment of new network ties, on the other hand, requires that organizational 
actors search for and locate new potential partners, assume the risk of investing in and 
experimenting with relations to heretofore unknown partners, and possess the 
flexibility to adapt to new requirements (Brouthers & Brouthers, 1997; Das & Bing-
Sheng, 1997; Das & Teng, 2002; Ring & Van De Ven, 1994). By forming new 
network ties, firms may discover new possibilities, expand their knowledge base, and 
get access to new resources (Beckman et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2007).  
Based on this conceptualization, and March’s (1991) proposition that firms 
have to balance explorative and exploitative activities, previous research has provided 
first evidence for the notion that firms profit from ambidexterity in network 
development, in terms of being involved in the formation of new relationships as well 
as in the refinement and exploitation of  existing ones. Lin et al. (2007) have shown 
that firms may profit from ambidexterity in terms of balancing the formation of new 
network relations and continuously relying on relationships with existing partners. 
Moreover, Ebers, Semrau and Sigmund’s (2011) study indicates that new ventures 
achieve superior financial performance, when relying on roughly the same number of 
new and existing network relationships. 
However, researchers have also pointed to the fact that a balance between 
exploration and exploitation may be realized in different ways (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006; Lavie et al., 2010). In case of contextual ambidexterity, firms simultaneously 
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engage in exploration and exploitation within the same organizational unit. In case of 
organizational ambidexterity, organizations separate units engaging in network 
exploration and exploitation thus spatially buffering the two activities. In case of 
temporal ambidexterity, an organization balances exploration and exploitation 
activities over time, i.e. alternates between periods of exploration and exploitation. 
Even though these strategies have been widely recognized, we still do not know much 
about which of these modes of ambidexterity is comparatively more beneficial, and 
under which conditions. 
Subsequently, we will contribute to closing this gap in the literature by 
elaborating on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of contextually and 
temporally balancing ambidexterity in the field of new ventures’ network 
development. Based on this elaboration, we then develop and test hypotheses on 
conditions under which it is more beneficial for new ventures to follow each of the two 
strategies.  
 
6.2.1. Contextual Ambidexterity in New Ventures’ Network Development 
According to the definition provided above, following a contextual ambidexterity 
strategy implies that a new venture is, at the same time, engaged in network 
exploration in terms of developing new network relationships and network exploitation 
in terms of relying on and continuously refining existing ones. Reliance on existing 
network relationships ensures organizations’ current viability, while the establishment 
of new network relationships secures future viability by providing access to new 
resources, capabilities and opportunities that may be exploited in later periods (Lavie 
et al., 2010). The core advantage of this strategy is that organizations may at the same 
time reap the efficiency benefits of exploitation while also covering the costs involved 
in exploration (Lavie et al., 2010). Moreover, there is some first evidence that a 
“context in which exploitation and exploration can simultaneously flourish might be 
considered as a valuable, rare, and costly to imitate resource, and therefore a potential 
source of competitive advantage” (Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009, p. 881). 
Contextual ambidexterity is particularly beneficial for new ventures for two main 
reasons. First, it has been widely established that new ventures typically suffer from 
the liabilities of newness and smallness i.e. they are resource poor, limited in visibility 
and external legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1996; Freeman et al., 1983),. Due to these 
liabilities, any further current or future reduction of their limited resource base risks 
the viability of new ventures. A network development strategy of contextual 
ambidexterity to some extent can help mitigate this risk. Network exploitation allows a 
new venture to access currently needed external resources on attractive terms. It thus 
provides a resource base that can support the development of new relationships 
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through network exploration. Thus, a new venture can also seek to meet resource 
needs that secure its future development (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Hite & Hesterly, 
2001). Second, due to their limited visibility, legitimacy, and record of 
accomplishment, it is not easy for new ventures to attract new network partners (Kor 
& Misangyi, 2008; Singh et al., 1986). If a new venture can point to a range of 
ongoing, active network exchange relationships, it might be easier for this new venture 
to develop new relationships, as existing network partners signal legitimacy and trust 
in a new venture’s capabilities (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009). 
Yet, it is also quite challenging for firms to engage in contextual ambidexterity. 
It requires them constantly to pay attention to two distinct activities that compete for 
scarce resources and might imply conflicting requirements. The exploration of new 
opportunities involves other mind-sets, values and capabilities than the exploitation of 
existing ones. Contextual ambidexterity thus implies the risk that neither activity is 
realized effectively and efficiently (Chen & Katila, 2008; Lavie et al., 2010). Due to 
their limited size and resource base, this risk is particularly acute for new ventures’ 
engaging in ambidextrous network development. New ventures may easily overstretch 
their resources and capabilities when trying closely to assess the fit of potential new 
networking partners, initiating trial collaborations, and carefully extending their scope 
(Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Jack et al., 2008; Larson, 1992), while at the same time 
being involved in continuously and incrementally adjusting interactions with existing 
partners. 
 
6.2.2. Temporal Ambidexterity in New Ventures’ Network Development 
When temporally balancing ambidexterity, a new venture focuses on either exploration 
or exploitation for a certain time before switching to the other activity. Such temporal 
separation can provide efficiency benefits of specialization (Chen & Katila, 2008). 
These benefits result from the fact that by focusing on a specific activity at a given 
point in time, actors enhance their ability to perform this activity efficiently (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Specialization further allows the realization 
of economies of scale such that the same output level is achievable with lower levels 
of inputs or that higher output levels are achievable with a given set of inputs 
(Edwards & Starr, 1987). By concentrating on either exploration or exploitation 
activities, actors can mitigate some of the resource constraints and conflicts that inhibit 
the strategy of contextual ambidexterity.  
By means of temporal ambidexterity, new ventures can realize comparatively 
greater economies from specialization and scale effects in their network development 
activities than by means of contextual ambidexterity. Specialization and scale effects 
in the exploration of new relations exist, because entrepreneurs can utilize the same 
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event for approaching a larger number of potential new partners, e.g. at a trade fair or 
conference. Similarly, with regard to network exploitation at least some of the 
activities necessary for refining joint expectations and further developing common 
goals with existing network partners may be expanded to include a larger number of 
partners. When realizing contextual ambidexterity in their network development, 
entrepreneurs in every period will have to engage in both new partner exploration and 
existing partner exploitation activities. That is, they will have to attend events that 
provide the opportunity to approach new partners and have to organize other occasions 
in which they develop their relationships with the existing partners. In contrast, in case 
of a temporal ambidexterity strategy, entrepreneurs can concentrate in each period on 
either of the activities. Due to the specialization and scale effects that exits both with 
regard to network exploration and exploitation, entrepreneurs can thus economize on 
the time and resources they need for managing their network when they realize 
temporal ambidexterity in their network development. These effects are relevant for 
new ventures, as they are particularly limited in their physical and financial resources 
and the time their members can devote to network development (Batjargal, 2006; 
Elfring & Hulsink, 2007).  
Yet temporal ambidexterity also involves significant challenges for 
entrepreneurs and their new ventures. While it may be more economizing on resources 
than simultaneous exploration and exploitation, it involves the challenge of developing 
new network relationships without at the same time being able to rely on existing 
partners for referrals and for gaining legitimacy. Consequently, temporal balancing 
may involve the risk that a new venture fails to make the transition from focusing on 
maintaining existing network relationships to successfully developing new ones. 
As contextual and temporal ambidexterity in network development thus both 
entail specific benefits and risks for entrepreneurs and their new ventures, we expect 
that there is no universally superior strategy of network development. Rather, it seems 
likely that particular contingencies will affect which of the two strategies is 
comparatively more advantageous.  Accordingly, in the following we develop 
hypotheses on how various contingencies affect the link between the mode of 
ambidexterity in new ventures’ network development and new venture performance. 
 
6.2.3. Contingencies of the Balancing Mode Performance Linkage 
As we outlined above, contextual and temporal ambidexterity in network development 
impinge on the ease with which new ventures can develop and maintain network 
relationships through which they may access needed resources. Contingencies that 
influence the relative performance of the two modes of ambidexterity must thus affect 
the ease with which they can develop and maintain their relationships. In the 
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following, we suggest a number of such contingencies that relate to different contexts: 
a new venture’s environment, network, and organization. 
 
6.2.3.1. Environmental Characteristics 
Since early contingency theory, scholars have pointed out that organizations have to 
align their strategies to environmental conditions (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). In 
entrepreneurship research, two environmental variables, dynamism and munificence, 
have shown to be particularly relevant, as they shape new ventures’ opportunities and 
have an impact on their success (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Schoonhoven, 
Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990). Based on these observations, we will delineate below 
why we expect that these two variables moderate the performance implications of 
contextual and temporal ambidexterity in new ventures’ network development. 
 
Environmental dynamism. Dynamic environments involve rapid changes in 
technology, competitors and market demands, thus creating uncertainty and business 
risk (Dess & Beard, 1984; Francis & Collins-Dodd, 2000). A central debate in 
organizational research concerns how firms may be effective in dynamic 
environments. Addressing this issue and recognizing that industries evolve through 
phases of incremental evolution punctuated by phases of rapid, intense change 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), previous research provided evidence for the notion that 
firms in dynamic environments tend to synchronize their engagement in explorative 
and exploitative activities with the nature of environmental changes. Specifically, 
Romanelli and Tushman (1994) have shown that fundamental changes in firms’ 
organization follow major discontinuities in environmental conditions. Tyre and 
Orlikowski (1994) found that firms tend to take advantage of fundamental and 
incremental environmental changes by synchronizing their engagement in 
technological adaptation accordingly. 
Correspondingly, we expect for two main reasons that new ventures in more 
turbulent and dynamic environments that undergo periodic fundamental shifts will 
profit from adopting a temporal balancing mode when developing their networks. 
First, significant environmental changes in technology, competitors, and market 
demands will decrease the relevance of existing network partners in developing new 
network relationships. While existing partners may legitimate a new venture and thus 
help it develop new network relationships, they will likely be of less utility under 
fundamentally changed environmental conditions, as they might lack the knowledge, 
resources or legitimacy that are relevant under the new conditions. If a new venture 
under such conditions sticks with its pre-existing partners, they will thus have only 
limited possibilities to support the development of new ties needed to fit with the new 
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environmental conditions. Second, we expect that the specialization benefits of 
following a temporal ambidexterity strategy are particularly relevant in dynamic 
environments undergoing fundamental change. In order to prevail in such 
environments, organizations need to be able to quickly learn about how to cope with 
new environmental conditions (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). New ventures benefit if 
they can economically seek out new partners who are able to support such learning. As 
we argued above, temporal ambidexterity in network development offers greater time 
and resource benefits than contextual ambidexterity. Based on these two lines of 
reasoning, we propose: 
 
H1a. Temporal ambidexterity in network development is relatively more beneficial for 
new ventures in dynamic environments than in stable environments. 
 
Environmental Munificence. Environmental munificence denotes the extent to which 
an environment offers an abundance of resources that can support sustained growth of 
a firm (Dess & Beard, 1984). A munificent environment is characterized by ample 
growth opportunities, weak competition, and low hazard rates (Cao et al., 2009; 
Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Strotmann, 2007).  Research has shown that munificent 
environments enhance organizational performance (Goll & Rasheed, 2005; McArthur 
& Nystrom, 1991). Moreover, previous research also reveals that environmental 
munificence has a significant influence on organizations’ structures, strategies, and 
processes (Goll & Rasheed, 2005). Miller and Friesen (1983), for example, found that 
firms respond to less munificent, hostile environments by more analytical strategy-
making and reduced risk-taking and innovative activities. Similarly, Goll and Rasheed 
(1997) observed that firms in hostile environments pay greater attention to avoiding 
uncertainty and excessive risk-taking in order to ensure their survival. 
Building on these findings, we expect that new ventures in less munificent 
environments will profit more when they engage in contextual ambidexterity. This is 
because in an environment where resources are scarce, it becomes critical for firms to 
avoid both the risk of obsolescence associated with exploitation and the risk of failure 
to appropriate associated with exploration. These risks are particularly virulent for new 
ventures for two main reasons. First, due to their smallness, new ventures are resources 
scarce. Second, due to their liability of newness, new ventures face difficulties in 
acquiring needed resources, as they lack legitimacy (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Freeman 
et al., 1983; Kor & Misangyi, 2008). A contextual mode of balancing exploration and 
exploitation supports a comparatively more steady flow of resources and the ability to 
signal legitimacy through existing network partners. These properties are particularly 
beneficial in less munificent environments, where precarious resource flows can 
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quickly jeopardize new venture survival. In munificent environments, however, new 
ventures will suffer significantly less from their liabilities of newness and smallness, 
as the availability of abundant resources and lower competition makes it is easier for 
new ventures to acquire needed resources. We argue that temporal ambidexterity is the 
comparatively more profitable mode of ambidexterity in munificent environments, as 
it allows new ventures to reap specialization benefits in resource acquisition that are 
not available when engaging in contextual ambidexterity. Consequently, we propose: 
 
H1b. Temporal ambidexterity is relatively more beneficial for new ventures in 
munificent than in resource-scarce environments. 
 
6.2.3.2. Network Characteristics 
Based on the notion that managing network relationships entails costs (Ebers & 
Grandori, 1997; Witt, 2004) and the fact that temporal ambidexterity comes with 
specialization benefits that increase the efficiency of network management, we expect 
that differences in characteristics of new ventures’ networks will also have an impact 
on the relative performance implications of the two modes of ambidexterity. In 
particular, we will argue that a temporal balancing strategy is relatively more 
advantageous when the size of a new venture’s network increases and when it realizes 
a more balanced ratio between network exploration and exploitation. 
 
Network Size. Previous research indicates that it is time consuming and costly for 
entrepreneurs to develop and maintain network relationships (Ebers & Grandori, 1997; 
Witt, 2004). Entrepreneurs’ network management capacity therefore is limited 
(Batjargal, 2006; Elfring & Hulsink, 2007). Entrepreneurs who spend too much time 
on developing and maintaining network relationships may even compromise their new 
ventures’ performance (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Semrau & Werner, 2012). With this 
in mind, we expect that temporal ambidexterity in network development will become 
relatively more beneficial with increasing network size. 
As a consequence of the specialization and scale benefits associated with 
temporal ambidexterity (Chen & Katila, 2008), the average cost for developing new 
network relationships and for maintaining existing ties should decrease with the 
number of new relationships established respectively the number of existing 
relationships maintained, in any given period. This in turn implies that new ventures 
with larger networks, comprising a larger number of new and/or existing ties that have 
to be managed, should profit significantly more from realizing temporal ambidexterity. 
We thus propose: 
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H2a. Temporal ambidexterity becomes relatively more beneficial for new ventures 
with increasing size of a new venture’s network. 
 
Degree of Ambidexterity. In line with March’s (1991) initial notion and previous 
research in the field of inter-organizational relationships (Ebers et al., 2011; Lin et al., 
2007), we defined ambidexterity in new ventures’ network development as being 
engaged in network exploration as well as exploitation. However, firms realizing 
ambidexterity may be involved in explorative and exploitative activities to different 
degrees, i.e. the precise balance between existing and new ties may vary at any given 
point in time.  
As outlined above, entrepreneurs who maintain a larger network should profit 
more from realizing temporal ambidexterity, as they may reap relatively larger 
efficiency benefits from focusing on managing either explorative or exploitative 
activities at any given point in time. We suggest that independent of network size, the 
comparative efficiency benefits of temporal ambidexterity increase with the extent to 
which new ventures are more equally involved in network exploration and 
exploitation. Consider the following stylized but illustrative example: Venture A has a 
constant network size of four and is equally engaged in network exploration and 
exploitation over two periods, i.e. it develops four new relationships in total. When 
contextually balancing exploration and exploitation, Venture A would thus develop 
two new and maintain two existing network relationships in both periods. When 
temporally balancing the two activities, it would be involved in maintaining four 
existing ties in one period and in developing four new ones in the other. Consequently, 
Venture A should realize significant efficiency benefits from specialization when 
realizing a temporal balancing mode. Venture B also has a network size of four in the 
two periods, but is not equally engaged in network exploration and exploitation. It 
only develops two new network relationships over the two periods. For Venture B, 
following a temporal balancing strategy would thus imply that it has to maintain four 
existing network partners in one period and develop two new partners as well as 
maintain two existing ones in the other.  
To the extent that entrepreneurs can realize specialization and scale effects 
when managing their network relationships, the average costs of developing new 
network relationships and maintaining existing ones, respectively, should decrease 
with the number of relationships newly established or maintained in a single period. In 
the above example, Venture A will then bear significantly lower average costs for 
developing new network relationships than Venture B. It will also have significantly 
lower average costs for maintaining pre-existing ties over the two periods. In line with 
this reasoning, we propose: 
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H2b. Temporal ambidexterity becomes relatively more beneficial with the extent to 
which new ventures are more equally involved in developing new and retaining 
existing ties. 
 
6.2.3.3. Founders’ and Organizations’ Characteristics 
Research in entrepreneurship has a long and lasting tradition of relating founders’ and 
founding teams’ characteristics to entrepreneurial outcomes (Baum & Locke, 2004; 
Gartner, 1985; Mitchell et al., 2002; Zhao et al., 2010). In line with this tradition, we 
suggest that some of these very characteristics––namely founders’ human capital and 
founding team composition––will also affect the link between the mode of 
ambidexterity and new venture performance. 
 
Entrepreneurs’ Human Capital. Earlier research has shown that founders’ human 
capital is positively associated with new ventures’ performance (Colombo & Grilli, 
2010; Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011). Additionally, it has been shown that 
founders’ human capital is connected to explorative activities, such as identifying and 
pursuing new business opportunities (Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2008), and the 
ability to exploit business opportunities (Chandler & Hanks, 1994a; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). Expanding on these previous findings, we suggest that 
founders’ human capital will also have an effect on the performance implications of 
contextual and temporal ambidexterity.  
We expect that a founder’s human capital has a positive effect on the 
comparative advantage of temporal over contextual ambidexterity in network 
development, because it has a positive effect on founders’ legitimacy. A positive link 
between founders’ human capital and legitimacy has been widely recognized in the 
literature. For instance, Packalen (2007) argues that the organizational legitimacy of a 
new venture, and thus its ability to attract partners for cooperation and gain access to 
external resources, is significantly affected by founders’ status, which, in turn, is 
partially determined by their education. Likewise, Cohen and Dean (2005) consider 
the human capital of new ventures’ top management as a factor conveying legitimacy, 
as it reflects individuals’ propensity towards viable, economically attractive business 
ideas and is observable to external stakeholders. Moreover, Tornikoski and Newbert 
(2007) forward that entrepreneurs’ human capital plays a significant role for the 
legitimacy ascribed to new ventures by resource gatekeepers such as financiers, 
because it is viewed as beneficial in overcoming problems during the start-up and 
early development stages of a new venture. 
Based on these observations, we suggest that with increasing human capital of 
entrepreneurs temporal ambidexterity becomes more beneficial for new ventures. As 
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described above, temporal ambidexterity can be problematic for new ventures, as they 
are not able to rely on existing network partners who convey legitimacy. This may 
hamper their capability to develop new network relationships (Milanov & Fernhaber, 
2009). However, entrepreneurs’ human capital also represents a signal of legitimacy. 
We thus expect that entrepreneurs with a high level of human capital can––at least to 
some extent––compensate for a lack of existing network partners when trying to attract 
new ones. Consequently, we expect founders with high human capital to suffer less 
from the disadvantages associated with temporal ambidexterity and consequently 
propose: 
 
H3a. Temporal ambidexterity becomes relatively more beneficial for new ventures 
with increasing human capital of their founders. 
 
Team Homogeneity/Heterogeneity. A significant body of research indicates that 
founding teams’ characteristics may also have a significant effect on new ventures’ 
performance (Chowdhury, 2005; West, 2007). Moreover, Beckman (2006) has shown 
that founding teams’ homogeneity or heterogeneity impacts the levels of explorative 
and exploitative activities that new firms realize. Extending these observations, we 
will subsequently line out why we expect that founding teams’ cognitive 
homogeneity/heterogeneity may also have an impact on the relative benefits associated 
with contextual and temporal ambidexterity in new ventures’ network development.  
While founding team diversity can be defined on the basis of a wide range of 
characteristics, e.g. gender, age, nationality or professional background, diversity in 
these or other dimensions assumes relevance for team performance only insofar as it 
influences team member decisions and actions. Such behavioral consequences may 
result from divergent cognitions, beliefs and values held by team members from 
different backgrounds or from different individual socialization and learning processes 
that lead to distinct patterns of behavior. As socialization and learning also represent 
cognitive processes, diversity of team members’ cognitions, beliefs, and values 
represents the most basic dimension of team heterogeneity.  
Previous research has shown that a founding team’s composition has an effect 
on its perceived legitimacy. MacMillan, Siegel and Narashima (1985) as well as 
Riquelme and Watson (2002) provide evidence for the notion that venture capitalists 
often consider the characteristics of a founding team when making financing decisions. 
Yet even though there is consensus that founding teams’ composition may be relevant 
for the willingness of potential external resource providers’ to grant access to their 
resources, there is significant dissent as to whether homogeneous or heterogeneous 
founding teams are perceived as more legitimate (Packalen, 2007). On the one hand, it 
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is argued that heterogeneous founding teams are superior in performance and thus 
perceived as more legitimate, as cognitive heterogeneity may facilitate decisions of 
superior quality and more creative solutions (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999; Shin, 
Kim, Lee, & Bian, 2012). Moreover, heterogeneous founding teams also have a wider 
array of prior social connections that can contribute to perceived legitimacy (Beckman, 
2006; Packalen, 2007). On the other hand, there also exists evidence for the notion that 
homogenous founding teams are viewed as more legitimate by potential resource 
providers (Packalen, 2007). Homogeneous founding teams may realize superior 
performance due to similar belief structures and attitudes as well as a shared language 
and perspectives that enables them to more quickly agree on what needs to be done in 
critical situations and be more efficient in subsequent action (Beckman, 2006; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
Based on these two lines of reasoning, we expect that founding teams that are 
either homogenous or heterogeneous with regard to their cognitions will be considered 
more legitimate than their counterparts realizing a medium level of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity. Consequently, we suggest that homogenous as well as 
heterogeneous founding teams suffer less from the downsides associated with temporal 
ambidexterity, i.e. from not having existing network partners who provide legitimacy 
and a constant flow of resources, and thus profit relatively more from realizing 
temporal ambidexterity. In contrast, we expect contextual ambidexterity in network 
development to be more suitable for new ventures whose founding teams exhibit a 
medium level of homogeneity/heterogeneity. This is because founding teams with a 
medium level of homogeneity/heterogeneity are better able to deal with the challenges 
involved in contextually balancing ambidexterity (Beckman, 2006). Consequently, we 
propose:  
 
H3b. Temporal ambidexterity is relatively more beneficial for new ventures with 
cognitively heterogeneous or homogenous founding teams, while contextual 
ambidexterity is relatively more beneficial for founding teams with a medium level of 
cognitive homogeneity/heterogeneity. 
 
6.3. Method 
We tested our hypotheses on the basis of the publicly available PSED II dataset. It 
comprises five waves of data on 1214 US entrepreneurs and their ventures in different 
stages of the entrepreneurial process. The PSED II research design, data collection, 
and sample statistics are described in great detail in Reynolds (2011).  
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We drew a sub-sample from this data set that comprises only data for those 
entrepreneurs who already established a new venture and reported that they had 
established external network ties. Since temporal ambidexterity can only be observed 
over time, we further restricted our sample to those 197 entrepreneurs who reported 
relevant information in at least two subsequent waves of the study. Our final sample 
thus represents a subset of firms used in an earlier paper (Ebers et al., 2011) and 
comprises 311 observations, each covering the data of two succeeding waves of data 
collection.  
The new ventures in our sample operate in a wide range of industries, such as 
construction, manufacturing of signs and musical instruments, clothing, cosmetics, 
food services, real estate, computer systems, consulting, and educational services. The 
age of our respondents ranges from 18 to 75 and up, with a mean of 42 years. About 
63% of the entrepreneurs in our sample are male and the majority (73%) has at least 
some college education. 
 
6.3.1. Measures 
Where possible, we relied on earlier measure of the constructs (see Ebers, Semrau, & 
Sigmund, 2011).  
 
6.3.1.1. New Ventures’ Financial Performance 
New venture performance was measured by asking the respondents in each wave 
whether their monthly revenue exceeded their monthly expenses for more than six of 
the past twelve months (Reynolds, 2011). As we treat the information for two 
subsequent waves as one observation, we aggregated the performance data for the two 
waves (the information provided for wave t0 with the information of wave t-1). The 
financial performance measure thus indicates whether respondents’ revenues in the 
different observation periods exceeded their monthly expenses for more than 12 of the 
past 24 months. This measure takes the value of one when the performance criterion is 
met and zero otherwise.  
 
6.3.1.2. Exploration, Exploitation and Modes of Ambidexterity 
We followed earlier studies (Beckman et al., 2004; Perretti & Negro, 2006) and 
regarded a new network relationship as a form of exploration and the continued 
reliance on an existing partner as a form of exploitation. To capture both variables, we 
followed previous studies using PSED data and used the number of newly added 
(exploration) and already existing (exploitation) “helpers” reported in each wave 
(Aldrich & Carter, 2004; Newbert & Tornikoski, 2010). A “helper” is defined as a 
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person who does not have an ownership stake but makes a distinctive contribution to 
the new venture, such as providing financial resources, materials, training, business 
services, knowledge and information (Aldrich & Carter, 2004; Newbert & Tornikoski, 
2010). For each wave of the panel, the PSED data set provides information on the total 
count of helpers for every entrepreneur as well as the number of helpers that were 
established since the previous wave.  
To capture whether a new venture realizes a temporal or contextual mode of 
ambidexterity in balancing exploration and exploitation in network development, we 
constructed a measure reflecting whether the mix of exploration and exploitation in 
network development realized by a new venture varies over time (temporal 
ambidexterity) or remains constant (contextual ambidexterity). To do so, we first 
calculated the proportion of exploration to exploitation for every new venture in every 
wave of data collection by dividing the number of new relationships by the total size 
of the helper network. This continuous variable takes the value of one when 
entrepreneurs exclusively rely on network exploration in that period, zero when they 
are solely engaged in network exploitation, and .5 when they are engaged in both 
activities to a similar degree. For each pair of waves, t0 and t-1, we then calculated the 
absolute value of the difference between the ratios of new relationships and network 
size. This measure takes the value of one when an entrepreneur realized temporal 
ambidexterity by switching from being exclusively engaged in exploration 
(exploitation) in the preceding period (t-1) to exclusively being engaged in exploitation 
(exploration) in the subsequent period (t0). It takes the value of zero when 
entrepreneurs realize the same ratios of exploration and exploitation in two subsequent 
waves and thus engage in contextual ambidexterity. For the ease of interpretation, we 
named this measure temporal ambidexterity. 
The reliability of difference measures has frequently been questioned. This 
critisicm is based on the fact that difference measure have shown to be unreliable 
when component variables are moderately positively  correlated, which is often the 
case, for example when measuring changes(Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Linn & Slinde, 
1977). Thus, we checked the correlation between the ratios of new relationships and 
network size for each pair of waves (t0 and t-1 for every wave).  As our analysis 
revealed that the ratios are not significantly correlated (r = .047, p = .22), we  are 
confident that our difference measure is reliable(Bergh & Fairbank, 2002; Tisak & 
Smith, 1994). 
 
6.3.1.3. Environmental Dynamism and Environmental Munificence  
In contrast to low-tech firms, high-tech ventures face turbulent business environments 
that are subject to rapid changes (Francis & Collins-Dodd, 2000; Schoonhoven et al., 
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1990). We thus used the item “Would you consider this (new) business to be hi-tech?” 
to capture differences in the dynamism of new ventures’ business environment. The 
variable takes the value of one when the new venture operates in a hi-tech industry and 
zero otherwise.  
According to Schoonhoven et al. (1990), an environment is munificent for a 
new venture when it is characterized by a market with few competitors. Consequently, 
we relied on the item “Right now, are there (1) many, (2) few, or (3) no other 
businesses offering the same products or services to your potential customers?” to 
capture environmental munificence. We again calculated the average value of two 
waves and included this measure in our analyses. 
 
6.3.1.4. Network Size and Degree of Ambidexterity 
In line with other studies in the field (Aldrich & Carter, 2004; Newbert & Tornikoski, 
2010), we relied on the total count of helpers as an indicator for network size. We used 
the average number of helpers over two subsequent waves of data collection in our 
analyses. 
To separate the degree of ambidexterity, i.e. balance of exploration and 
exploitation over time, from the type of balancing mode, we constructed a continuous 
measure that reflects the extent to which an entrepreneur engages in network 
exploration and/or exploitation over the two subsequent periods that we combined to a 
single observation. Covering two instead of a single period, this measure differs 
significantly from the ambidexterity measure used in Ebers et al. (2011), and leaves 
open how exploration and exploitation are balanced over the two periods (i.e. more 
contextually or more temporally). Specifically, we calculated the degree of 
ambidexterity as the absolute value of the number of new helpers minus the number of 
preexisting helpers, divided by the size of the network. For ease of interpretation we 
then reverse coded this ratio. No matter whether the venture applies a contextual or 
temporal balancing mode, the resulting measure at the extremes takes the value of zero 
when a new venture is, over two periods, equally involved in exploration and 
exploitation in network development, and takes the value of minus one, when a new 
venture is exclusively engaged in exploration or exploitation over two periods. 
To test for the stability of our results, we also developed a second measure 
reflecting the degree of ambidexterity over time. In particular, we calculated a 
Herfindahl-index (Hirschman, 1964; Jacquemin & Berry, 1979). The index takes the 
form (x1/x)² + (x2/x)², where x1 is the sum of new ties for ervery pair of waves, x2 is 
the sum of maintained ties for every pair of waves, and x is the sum of x1 and x2. We 
then reverse coded the index. Thus, the index takes the value of minus one for every 
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pair of periods in which an entrepreneurs is exclusively engaged in one of the 
activities, and minus .5 if the they are equally balanced over the two periods. 
 
6.3.1.5. Human Capital and Team Homogeneity/Heterogeneity 
According to Ucbasaran et al. (2008) and Unger et al. (2011), the level of education is 
the most frequently examined component of human capital, because it is a central 
source of knowledge and skills. According to entrepreneurship research, it is the lead 
entrepreneur’s human capital that is most relevant with regard to venture development 
processes (Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007). We thus captured founders’ human capital 
by measuring the highest level of education of the lead entrepreneur in 10 categories 
ranging from 1 (education up to eighth grade) to 10 (indicating a Law, PhD, or EDD 
degree).  
Pertinent research has shown that homophily has the most pronounced effect on 
group composition in social networks (Chowdhury, 2005; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & 
Cook, 2001; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). Through their interaction processes team 
members over time will further align their cognitions, beliefs, and perspectives 
(Beckman, 2006; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Accordingly, we relied on the 
average duration of team members’ prior history of interaction to capture founding 
teams’ cognitive homogeneity/heterogeneity. 
 
6.3.1.6. Controls 
On an individual level, we included gender (male = 0, female = 1) of the lead 
entrepreneur as a control, because men and women tend to differ with respect to their 
networks (Moore, 1990; Renzulli et al., 2000). Moreover, previous research has shown 
some evidence for gender-specific barriers to entrepreneurial success (Murphy et al., 
2007). We also added the age of the lead entrepreneur as a control to our analysis, 
because younger and older entrepreneurs likely differ in terms of the resource base 
they have available which may influence the performance of their ventures (Parker, 
2004). We additionally controlled for some firm-level factors. Recognizing that the 
PSED II data set comprises independent and dependent new ventures, a characteristic 
that might influence ventures’ performance and their need for external support 
(Matthews et al., 2009), we controlled for the independence of the venture 
(dependence = 0, independence = 1). We furthermore included the number of founders 
as a control, because the size of the founding team may influence the capacity to 
develop and manage network relationships (Batjargal, 2006).  
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6.3.2. Analysis 
Since our dependent variable is binary, we tested our hypotheses using logistic 
random-effects regression. In this way, we could also account for between-group 
variance, i.e. the systematic variation between different ventures at the same point in 
time, and within-group variance (Tabanick & Fidell, 2007; Wooldridge, 2002). In 
order to determine whether random-effects modeling was the most efficient approach, 
we conducted a comparison with a fixed-effects model by means of a Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978; Stuart & Sorensen, 2007). As we found no significant differences 
between the two approaches, we conclude that the random-effects model provides the 
more efficient estimation. 
 To test for the hypothesized interaction effects, we followed the 
recommendations of Aiken and West (1991) and Frazier, Tix and Barron (2004) and 
mean-centered and standardized all our non-binary independent and moderator 
variables. We then formed the interaction terms by multiplying the respective 
measures. With regard to hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3a we hypothesized a linear 
moderation and thus constructed the interaction term by multiplying the linear 
standardized moderator and the standardized independent variable. In hypothesis 3b 
we hypothesized a u-shaped moderation and thus measured the interaction effect by 
multiplying the squared standardized moderator and our standardized independent 
variable. 
 Computing our regression, we first entered the control variables (Model 1) before 
testing the main effect of contextual and temporal ambidexterity in the second step 
(Model 2). In a third step, we included the two-way interaction terms to test our 
moderation hypotheses (Models 3 to 8) and analyzed how they contribute to 
explaining the variance of our dependent variable (Jaccard, Teitel, & Turrisi, 2003). 
As the PSED II data are based on self-reports, they may potentially be biased. Even 
though a large number of earlier studies make use of the PSED data (see Reynolds, 
2007), and broad evidence giving support for the reliability and validity of self-
reported measures (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Lechner et al., 2006; Peng & Luo, 
2000), we also conducted Harman’s one-factor test for the presence of common 
method bias. Our analyses extracted six distinct factors with an Eigenvalue greater 
than 1, which together accounted for 60 percent of the total variance. With the first 
factor accounting for only 16 percent of the variance, we are confident that common 
method bias is not a serious issue in our study. 
One problem with analyzing new venture performance is that only the firms that 
survive are studied. To control for the unobserved heterogeneity that may affect firms’ 
probability of being in our sample and firm performance, we adapted a procedure 
widely used in empirical studies relying on longtitudinal data (Delmar & Shane, 2006). 
   
 117
Specifically, we predicted the probability of venture failure during the 5 waves of 
observation using a probit model on firm exit. The independent variables of this 
survivorship model include variables that measure founders' characteristics (age, 
gender, marital status, education, race), firm-specific characteristics (firm size and age, 
dependence on a parental organization, number of founders), and other independent 
variables (network size, ambidexterity in netowrk develpoment, network exploration 
and exploitaion, ambidexterity mode, evironmental dynamism, obtained government 
loan, purchased venture). Based on the obtained estimates, we computed the inverse 
Mill's ratio for all the firms included in our sample and inserted it as a control for 
selection bias in our equations.  
 
6.4. Results 
Means, standard deviations and correlations for our variables are shown in Table 6.1. 
With respect to the control variables, the results of the correlation as well as the 
regression analysis depicted in Table 6.2 reveal that founders’ level of educaiton (β = -
.532; p < .05, Model 1) is significantly related to the financial performance of new 
ventures Additionally, Table 6.2, Model 1 reveals no significant link between the 
degree of ambidexterity over the two periods and new ventures’ financial performance. 
When adding our measure for temporal/contextual ambidexterity to the 
estimation (Model 2), we find a marginally significant negative relationship with new 
ventures’ financial performance (β = -.999; p < .10). This result indicates that, in 
general, contextual ambidexterity in network development is more beneficial for new 
ventures than temporal ambidexterity. 
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Table 6.1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. New venture financial 
performance .50 .50 1            
2. Temporal ambidexterity .16 .28 -.12* 1           
3. Environmental dynamism .28 .45 -.06 .02 1          
4. Environmental munificence 1.88 .94 -.05 .03 .01 1         
5. Weighted Ambidexterity .91 .24 -.06 .48* .04 .04 1        
6. Network size 3.16 4.62 -.12* .06 .08* .07* -.09* 1       
7. Level of education 5.83 2.13 .10* .07* .09* .08* .03 .03 1      
8. Team homogeneity 2.56 3.24 .03 -.03 .20* .02 .01 .01 -.05 1     
9. Gender .37 .48 -.02 -.03 -.15* .04* -.01 .02 .08 .06* 1    
10. Age of founder 42.26 1.23 -.01 .02 .03 .09* .01 .06* .20* .45* -.07* 1   
11. Independent venture .69 .46 -.01 -.06 -.03 -.01 -.04 -.01 .01 -.01 .06* .05* 1  
12. No. of founder 1.25 .80 -.05 .01 .05* -.02 .04 .10* .04* -.04 -.03 .02 .01 1 
* p < .05, two-tailed test 
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Table 6.2. Logistic Random Effects Panel Regression Results 
New ventures’ financial performance 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 
-4.559 
(2.810) 
-.470 
(7.480) 
1.319 
(7.180) 
-.194 
(7.235) 
-2.55 
(8.652) 
1.059 
(9.465) 
.257 
(7.351) 
6.461 
(19.710) 
Gender 
-.115 
(.222) 
-.183 
(.249) 
-.093 
(.253) 
-.139 
(.253) 
-.140 
(.256) 
-.138 
(.268) 
-.123 
(.250) 
.009 
(.311) 
Age of founder 
-.130 
(.238) 
-.057 
(.252) 
-.056 
(.267) 
-.085 
(.266) 
-.107 
(.268) 
-.102 
(.277) 
-.133 
(.262) 
-.025 
(.278) 
Independent venture 
-.115 
(.223) 
-.037 
(.262) 
-.001 
(.266) 
-.058 
(.266) 
-.110 
(.289) 
-.067 
(.296) 
-.030 
(.264) 
.040 
(.507) 
No. of founders 
-.565 
(.564) 
-1.111 
(.689) 
-1.321+ 
(.763) 
-1.368+ 
(.773) 
-1.421+ 
(.775) 
-1.610+ 
(.821) 
-1.407+ 
(.768) 
-1.311+ 
(.784) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio 
3.876+ 
(2.310) 
3.50 
(5.659) 
1.471 
(5.80) 
2.924 
(5.843) 
5.072 
(6.830) 
3.285 
(7.324) 
2.570 
(5.925) 
-2.694 
(18.290) 
         
Environmental dynamism 
-1.046 
(.636) 
-1.444 
(1.199) 
-1.087 
(1.232) 
-1.449 
(1.239) 
-1.809 
(1.401) 
-1.522 
(1.476) 
-1.355 
(1.247) 
-.398 
(3.445) 
Environmental munificence 
-.176 
(.234) 
-.071 
(.160) 
-.248 
(.311) 
-.156 
(.308) 
-.052 
(.171) 
-.201 
(.356) 
-.187 
(.308) 
-.389 
(.641) 
Network size 
-1.188* 
(.532) 
-1.225 
(1.225) 
-.813 
(1.243) 
-1.109 
(1.252) 
-1.600 
(1.493) 
-1.050 
(1.553) 
-1.025 
(1.266) 
.134 
(3.889) 
Degree of ambidexterity 
.090 
(.071) 
.086 
(.132) 
.115 
(.133) 
.107 
(.134) 
.076 
(.138) 
.270 
(.207) 
.117 
(.136) 
.185 
(.175) 
Level of education 
.532* 
(.238) 
.401 
(.258) 
.342 
(.263) 
.388 
(.263) 
.430 
(.265) 
.412 
(.273) 
.421 
(.259) 
.311 
(.287) 
Team homogeneity 
.102 
(.389) 
.252 
(.260) 
-.218 
(.451) 
-.152 
(.450) 
-.115 
(.447) 
-.116 
(.465) 
-.069 
(.440) 
-.341 
(.467) 
Team homogeneity² 
.139 
(.181) 
-.007 
(.169) 
.224 
(.194) 
.227 
(.198) 
.221 
(.199) 
.231 
(.206) 
.204 
(.195) 
.385+ 
(.224) 
         
Temporal ambidexterity  
-.999+ 
(.545) 
-1.169* 
(.572) 
-1.129* 
(.571) 
-1.016+ 
(.558) 
.475 
(.996) 
-1.221* 
(.582) 
-1.234* 
(.615) 
Temporal ambidexterity x environmental 
dynamism 
  .445* 
(.220) 
  
   
Temporal ambidexterity x environmental 
munificence 
   .225 
(.242) 
 
   
Temporal ambidexterity x network size 
    -.218 
(.386) 
   
Temporal ambidexterity x weighted 
degree of ambidexterity 
     .227+ 
(.135) 
  
Temporal ambidexterity x level of 
education 
      .373+ 
(.217) 
 
Temporal ambidexterity x team 
homogeneity² 
       .735+ 
(.439) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
R² .083 .132 .136 .134 .134 .135 .135 .135 
Std. Err. in parentheses;+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p <.001  
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Providing considerable support for our moderation hypotheses, further analyses reveal 
that the benefits of contextual and temporal ambidexterity are affected by different 
contingencies. Supporting Hypothesis 1a, Table 6.2 (Model 3) shows a significant 
positive association between the interaction term of temporal ambidexterity and 
environmental dynamism with new ventures’ financial performance (β = .445; p < 
.05). This provides confirming evidence for our suggestion that temporal 
ambidexetrity is relatively more beneficial in dynamic environments. In contrast, 
Hypothesis 1b is not supported by our data (Model 4, β = .225; p = .39).  
Our analysis does not provide empirical support for Hypothesis 2a, as the data 
show no significant relationship between the interaction of new ventures’ network size 
and temporal ambidexterity with new ventures’ financial performance (Model 5, β = -
.218; p = .29). In contrast, Hypothesis 2b receives marginal support (Model 6, β = 
.227; p < .10). It suggested that temporal ambidexterity is more beneficial for new 
ventures that are more equally engaged in exploration and exploitation in network 
development. We assessed the stability of this result by re-estimating this analysis 
employing an interaction term comprising temporal ambidexterity and the Herfindahl-
index of the degree of ambidexterity. However, results indicated a marginal significant 
moderating effect of equally balancing network exploration and exploitation (β = .539; 
p < .10). Thus our result seems to be robust against different measures of degree of 
ambidexterity.  
Hypothesis 3a also receives marginal support (Model 7, β = .373; p < .10). It 
proposed that temporal ambidexterity in new ventures’ network development becomes 
more beneficial with increasing human capital of new venture founders. To test 
Hypothesis 3b, which proposes that temporal ambidexterity is more beneficial for 
homogenous and for heterogeneous founding teams, we ran two different analyses. 
Both include a term that reflects the interaction of the squared value for 
homogeneity/heterogeneity and our measure for temporal/contextual ambidexterity. 
We first run our analysis with the complete dataset, assigning a 
homogeneity/heterogeneity value of zero to all single entrepreneurs in our sample. As 
depicted in Table 6.2 (Model 8) this analysis reveals a marginally significant 
interaction effect (β = .735, p < .10). We then tested our hypotheses with a data set 
only comprising founding teams, which decreased the number of observations from 
215 to 158. We again found the two-way interaction of the squared term of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity and temporal ambidexterity to have a marginally 
significant positive effect (β = .733, p < .10). Consequently, and in line with our 
hypothesis, homogeneous and heterogeneous founding teams seem to profit marginally 
from temporal ambidexterity, while contextual ambidexterity seems to be relatively 
more appropriate for teams with a medium level of homogeneity/heterogeneity. 
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To test for the robustness of our findings, we conducted some additional analyses. 
First, we re-estimated our models using pooled logit regression analysis. Furthermore, 
we included new venture profitability in the subsequent observation periods 
(profitability in t+1 and t+2) as the dependent variable in our models to check whether 
our results also have longer-term performance implications. Finally, we checked for 
endogeneity in terms of a state-dependence in profitability (Heckman, 1981), and also 
included new venture perfromance of the preceding observation periods (profitability 
in t-2 and t-3) in our analyses. 
The results described above proved to be robust with regard to all these 
variations. 
 
6.5. Discussion 
The present paper seeks to advance the emerging stream of research on exploration, 
exploitation and ambidexterity in the context of inter-organizational relationships. We 
comparatively examined two alternative pathways of network development to 
enhancing new ventures’ financial performance. Specifically, we highlighted how 
several environmental, network- and organization-level contingencies affect whether 
new ventures benefit comparatively more from engaging in either contextual or 
temporal ambidexterity when developing their networks of external resource 
providers.  
Earlier research has mainly concentrated on how the balance between 
exploration and exploitation affects organizational performance (Cao et al., 2009; 
Ebers et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2007). The present study extends this research and reveals 
that—when holding the balance between exploration and exploitation in network 
development constant over time—contextual ambidexterity in general seems to be the 
most beneficial mode of balancing exploration and exploitation for new ventures. We 
argued that by means of contextual ambidexterity, new ventures may comparatively 
better mitigate their liabilities of newness and smallness. Exploitation in network 
development, i.e. reliance on existing partners, allows new ventures to access on 
favorable conditions the resources necessary for securing their current viability. These 
existing partners then also ease access to new partners, e.g. through referrals or 
signalling the legitimacy of the new venture, who potentially can provide resources 
necessary for the new ventures future viability. By means of contextual ambidexterity, 
new ventures can thus simultaneously realize efficiency benefits of network 
exploitation and secure a stream of support that is crucial for future firm development. 
In contrast, when new ventures temporally separate  exploration and exploitation, they 
lack at any given point in time either the benefits of exploitation or the opportunity to 
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build needed new relationships by relying on existing partners for referrals and for 
gaining legitimacy.  
However, we argued that under particular conditions temporal separation of 
exploration and exploitation may be relatively more beneficial, because both 
contextual and temporal ambidexterity have their specific benefits as well as 
drawbacks. Thus this study expands earlier research on the performance outcomes of 
balancing exploration and exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010) as well as research on the 
factors moderating this relationship (Lin et al., 2007) by highlighting a number of 
contingencies that possibly affect the performance implications of either following a 
contextual or a temporal mode of balancing exploration and exploitation. This study, 
first, shows that in dynamic environments temporal ambidexterity is comparatively 
more beneficial than in stable environments. This result complements prior research on 
the moderating effect of environmental factors on either persuing a more exploration 
or exploitation-oriented strategy (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005) and on 
the performance effects of balancing exploration and exploitation (Lin et al., 2007). In 
contrast, we did not find a clear moderation effect for the second environmental 
contingency we scrutinized, environmental munificence. In environments that are 
more munificent neither contextual nor temporal ambidexterity thus seem to have clear 
comparative benefits. This result may be due to the fact that pressures of 
environmental selection and reduced availability of resources that are present in more 
resource scarce environments (Goll & Rasheed, 2005; Jansen et al., 2005) do not only 
require that new ventures make efficient use of their network management resources 
but also avoid the potential fluctuations in costs and revenues that are associated with 
temporal ambidexterity. 
Third, our findings partially support the notion that firms’ network 
characteristics are relevant for the performance implications of different approaches to 
alliance management and formation (Gulati, 1998). We find no significant moderating 
effect of network size. Rather than the mere quantity of network relationships, it seems 
to be the particular mix of types of network ties (new versus established) that entails 
performance consequences. Results reveal that the ratio of exploration and exploitation 
marginally moderates the relationship between ambidexterity mode and new venture 
performance. Specifically, we find that with an increasing ratio of new to existing 
network partners, temporal ambidexterity becomes marginally more beneficial.  
Fourth, our findings lend further credence to the notion that characteristics of a firms’ 
management team play a significant role in managing the balance between explorative 
and exploitative activities (Beckman, 2006; Lavie et al., 2010). Specifically, our 
results show that entrepreneurs with higher human capital benefit marginally more 
form engaging in temporal ambidexterity. At the same time, however, our results 
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indicate that an increase in human capital is less beneficial when realizing contextual 
ambidexterity. We argued that founders’ human capital compensates for the lack of 
legitimacy that makes temporal ambidexterity problematic. However, future research 
is needed to analyze in detail how exactly founders’ human capital affects their ability 
to manage more or less effectively the two modes of ambidexterity.  
Fifth, our findings underscore that the right teammates are also relevant for 
being able successfully to manage the challenges involved in ambidexterity (Beckman, 
2006). Our results suggest, though only with marginal significance, that both highly 
homogenous as well as heterogeneous founding teams tend to profit more from 
temporal ambidexterity, whereas founding teams with a moderate level of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity profit more from contextual ambidexterity. This finding 
can potentially help to resolve conflicting results previously generated by Beckman 
(2006) and Jansen et al. (2008). Based on an analysis of the impact of founders’ prior 
company affiliations on explorative and exploitative behavior, Beckman (2006) 
suggested that firms with a mixture of homogeneous and heterogeneous founding 
teams achieve superior performance by means of realizing contextual ambidexterity. 
In contrast, the findings reported by Jansen et al. (2008) point out that team members’ 
shared vision and understanding is positively associated with a firm’s ability to 
combine high levels of exploration and exploitation. With respect to the ability of 
more homogenous and mixed founding teams to manage ambidexterity, our results to 
some extent confirm both of the abovementioned results. In addition, they highlight 
that homogeneous and heterogeneous founding teams differ with respect to which 
mode of ambidexterity is most beneficial. 
 
6.6. Conclusion and Limitations 
Before concluding, we note some limitations of our study that further research should 
address. First, the study at hand only captures ambidexterity in the domain of inter-
organizational relationships. Future research should thus build on our work and 
comparatively examine the performance implications of contextual and temporal 
ambidexterity as well as the factors moderating this link in other domains, such as 
explorative and exploitative product and innovation strategies.  
Second, future research might also address the question of the performance 
effects of different modes of ambidexterity and their contingencies based on other 
samples of firms. As already noted above, the fact that we focused on new ventures, 
which are particularly small in size, may have had a specific impact on our results, in 
particular with regard to the general positive effect of contextual ambidexterity. Earlier 
research by Lin et al. (2007) indicates that firm size may moderate the effects of the 
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balance between exploration and exploitation. It might therefore be that firm size may 
also play a role for the implications of different modes of ambidexterity.  
Third, our dependent variable is binary in nature and represents a rather coarse 
indicator for the performance of a new venture. While a binary measure for 
profitability has been shown to be a valid indicator for performance in earlier 
entrepreneurship research (Dimov, 2010; Diochon et al., 2007; Gatewood et al., 1995), 
future research might fruitfully employ more fine-grained measures capturing different 
performance dimensions when assessing the performance implications of different 
modes of ambidexterity.  
Despite these limitations, we believe that the present study makes significant 
contributions to the extant literature. To the best of our knowledge, our study is one of 
the first to address the tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation by shedding 
light on the comparative performance effects of contextual and temporal ambidexterity 
while controlling for the balance between exploration and exploitation. This clearly 
contributes to the literature on ambidexterity in inter-organizational relationships 
(Lavie et al., 2010), as it directly tests the performance implications of alternative 
modes of balancing exploration and exploitation. Additionally, our study clearly goes 
beyond earlier research in the field that examined boundary conditions of explorative 
and exploitative behavior (Lavie et al., 2010; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008) by 
uncovering particular environmental, network, and organizational contingencies that 
influence the relative performance outcomes of contextual and temporal ambidexterity. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Overall Findings and Implications 
This thesis follows the haunting call for studying the antecedents and outcomes 
of new ventures network development (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Slotte-Kock & 
Coviello, 2010; Street & Cameron, 2007). Specifically, it addresses the following 
two questions: 1) Can entrepreneurs pursue new ventures’ network development 
processes and, if so, how? 2) Do network development processes impact new 
venture performance and, if so, how and why? 
In the following, I would like to summarize the answers to these question 
generated in this thesis. 
 The studies presented in Chapter two and three contribute to answering the 
first question. They provide evidence that the entrepreneur can indeed pursue 
network development processes. Specifically, results indicate that networking 
skills enable the entrepreneur to develop more and stronger network 
relationships, which in turn foster a new venture’s financial performance. The 
rationale given for this mediated relationship is that entrepreneurs who are skilled 
networkers are better able to develop more and stronger relationships, which 
fosters the quantity, the quality and the variety of resources available through the 
network. These resources in turn positively influence new venture performance. 
However, as also revealed in Chapter two and three, this general relationship is 
influenced by certain boundary conditions. First, the age of new venture as well 
as the size of a new venture influence this relationship. Specifically, the older the 
venture and the bigger the venture is, the less influence can be exerted by the 
entrepreneurs networking ability, because the venture will on the one hand to a 
smaller extent depend on external relationships, and on the other hand be better 
able to attract potential exchange partners.  
Additionally, it seems noteworthy that results indicate that the moderating 
impact of organizational variables on the relation between entrepreneurs 
networking ability and new venture performance depends on the institutional 
context the entrepreneur is embedded in. Specifically, the negative moderating 
effect of venture size is only observable within a stable and highly developed 
institutional environment, which means that in less developed institutional 
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contexts entrepreneurs networking ability remains important for a new venture’s 
performance even when it grows. 
The studies presented in Chapter four to six address the question whether, 
how and why network development processes impact new venture performance. 
In a nutshell, the results presented in these Chapters contribute to answering this 
question as they indeed provide evidence for a positive association between new 
venture performance and network development. 
More specifically, the study presented in Chapter four provides evidence 
that network development in terms of adding strategically-selected new ties to a 
new ventures network after the venture is founded, fosters new venture 
performance. In particular, these calculative ties contribute to new venture 
performance by positively influencing new venture’s growth in financial 
performance. The underlying argumentation is that new ventures proceed 
through different development stages, which represent distinct resource needs. 
As a result, entrepreneurs have to adapt their network in accordance to these 
changing needs to secure persistent growth. Results further indicate that the 
identity-based network, which is made of family and friends, and which a new 
venture usually starts with, also fosters new venture performance, yet through a 
different mechanism. In particular it is positively associated with a new ventures 
initial performance which builds the economic baseline for early stages of new 
venture development. 
The studies presented in Chapter five and six focus on continuous network 
development processes which take place once a venture is operating. The Study 
presented in Chapter five underpins that a continuous turnover of a new ventures 
exchange network through adding new ties (network exploration) fosters a new 
ventures’ financial performance. However, results indicate that it is also valuable 
to maintain and develop certain newly added network ties for certain periods of 
time (network exploitation), as this will lead to a more efficient resource 
exchange. Congruously, results further reveal that cumulating both advantages, 
new ventures that balance both network development activities achieve superior 
performance. However, recent research indicates there are two different modes 
by which this ambidexterity in new venture network development might be 
reached— temporal ambidexterity and contextual ambidexterity. Picking up this 
notion, the last study in this thesis comparatively analysis performance effects of 
these two strategies. Results indicate that while contextually balancing network 
exploration and exploitation, which comes along with legitimacy and certainty 
benefits, is generally more beneficial for new ventures, temporal ambidexterity 
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which comes along with efficiency benefits becomes more favorable under 
certain conditions, such as environmental dynamism. 
Summing up, the core message of this thesis is that entrepreneurs can 
indeed pursue network development processes which in turn foster their new 
ventures financial performance. However, the beneficial impact of intentional 
network development depends on the interplay between the network 
development strategy the entrepreneur pursues, organizational characteristics of 
his or her new venture, and the environmental conditions surrounding it.  
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